The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies

Fall 2002 Vol. 27, No. 3

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The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies is a refereed journal published quarterly by The Council for Social and Economic Studies. Subscriptions, manuscripts for submission to the editorial board, and all correspondence should be addressed to:

The General Editor,
P.O. Box 34070, N.W.
Washington D.C., 20043, USA.

Telephone (202) 371-2700
Fax (202) 371-1523
E-mail SOCECON@AOL.COM

Formerly known as *The Journal of Social and Political Affairs*, the subscription rate is $89.00 per annum for libraries and institutions, $39.50 p.a. for faculty members, students and other private individuals. Reduced three-year subscriptions are available at a cost of $220.00 for libraries and $110.00 for individuals. For mailing addresses outside the USA please add $12.00 per annum. Mastercard/Visa accepted.

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The Journal of SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES

Roger Pearson
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Race Legislation in the European Union

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This article examines three pieces of European Union race legislation: The Joint Action (1996) which advocates a whole range of criminal offences based on racism; the European Union's Race Directive (2000) which imposes new legal burdens on whites while at the same time weakening the burden of proof for plaintiffs (mostly non-whites) in disputes involving race and ethnicity; and the proposal for a Council Framework Decision (CFD) to combat racism and xenophobia which was published in November 2001. The cumulative effect of this legislation, argues the author of this article, is to criminalise opposition to Europe's experiment with multiculturalism.

Key Words: Article 19, Article K.3, Council Framework Decision (CFD), Directive, European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHRFF), European Union (EU), free association, free speech, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Joint Action, judicial cooperation, racial origin, racism, TITLE VI, Treaty on European Union (TEU), United States of Europe (USE), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), xenophobia.

The Joint Action and The Directive

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the European Union has adopted a series of major treaties – the Treaty on European Union (1992), the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the Treaty of Nice (2001) – all of which are designed to facilitate the metamorphosis of Europe's independent nation states into mere member states of a new supra-national entity, the United States of Europe. As the ambitions of Europe's politicians have grown, so have the illiberal tendencies of the EU become manifest.[2] Freedoms which in England, for example, have long been taken for granted as inalienable and irrevocable, are now threatened. Nowhere is this more apparent than with regard to free speech. Here, the major threat is the EU's official policy of multiculturalism and the attempt to impose multicultural orthodoxy on Europe's profoundly sceptical populations.

On 19th July 2000 the directive of the Council of the European Union 'implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin' entered into force (hereinafter the

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[2] In this respect see Rodney Atkinson, *Fascist Europe Rising*, Compuprint Publishing, Newcastle-upon-Tyne., England., 2001.

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Directive).[3] The Directive adds to earlier EU legislation, most importantly, Title VI of *The Treaty on European Union* (TEU) which provides for cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs[4] and, additionally, The Joint Action adopted on 15th July 1996 to combat racism and xenophobia[5] (hereinafter The Joint Action).

Despite reassuring references in its preamble to Article 19 of The International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), as well as Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHRFF), the two Titles of The Joint Action weaken the presumption in favour of free speech in order to favour measures designed to combat racism and xenophobia. It is worthwhile to recall the provisions of Article 19 of the ICCPR:

> 1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
>
> 2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
>
> 3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
>
> (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
>
> (b) For the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals.

The preamble of The Joint Action emphasizes 'the respect for the rights of others, as laid down in Article 19' of the ICCPR, yet it is the case, in contrast to the preamble, and obvious from paragraph 3 above, that this is only applicable to paragraph 2 of Article 19, not paragraphs 1 and 3. The right to hold an opinion without interference means more

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[3] 'Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29th June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic'. In *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L 180, 19.07.2000., pp. 22-26.

[4] The relevant Article is K.3, paragraph 2(b) which makes it possible 'to adopt joint action in so far as the objectives of the Union can be attained better by joint action than by the Member States'.

[5] 'Joint Action of 15th July 1996 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, concerning action to combat racism and xenophobia', in *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L 185, 1996, pp.5-7.

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than the right merely to form and to retain an opinion. It means, too, the right to express that opinion (acknowledged in paragraph 2). Although this right may be subject to certain restrictions, the presumption of Article 19 is strongly in favour of the freedom of expression. Where restrictions are to be introduced they must be provided for by law and they must be necessary and subject to a strict scrutiny standard. On these points the preamble of The Joint Action clearly begs an important question: racism and xenophobia, as they affect expression of opinion laid down in paragraph 2 of Article 19 of the ICCPR, are automatically assumed to be so execrable that the various politicians and drafters of The Joint Action are relieved of the burden of demonstrating legislative necessity. They are thus free to impose coercive measures on freedom of expression which would not be justified in time of war, let alone in peace time.

The Directive consists of 19 articles, and many of its provisions represent a serious threat to free speech, free association, the rule of law, scientific research and the dissemination of results.[6] The long term implications are also worrying since the Directive obliges the member states, *inter alia*, to notify the European Commission by 19th July 2003 of 'sanctions applicable to infringements of the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive (Article 15), and that by 19th July 2003 member states 'shall adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive' (Article 16). Two years later on 19th July 2005, and every five years thereafter, member states are required to inform the Commission of 'all the information necessary for the Commission to draw up a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of this Directive' (Article 17).

The emphasis placed on 'the right to equality before the law' (paragraph 3, Preamble) is largely cosmetic and is in any case rendered meaningless by the provisions of paragraph 17 of the Preamble and Article 5 (Positive Action):

> The prohibition of discrimination should be without prejudice to the maintenance or adoption of measures intended to prevent or compensate for disadvantages suffered by a group of persons of a particular

[6] Particularly ominous is the call in paragraph 11 of the Preamble for 'effective judicial cooperation in respect of offences based on racist or xenophobic behaviour'. No attempt is made here to define what constitutes 'racist or xenophobic behaviour' or the nebulous term 'social advantages' (paragraph 12, Preamble).

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> racial or ethnic origin, and such measures may permit organisations of persons of a particular racial or ethnic origin where their main object is the promotion of the special needs of those persons (paragraph 17, Preamble and Article 5).

Now, is the fact that blacks have on average a lower IQ than whites and that this leads to blacks' being under-represented in vocations which require above average IQ – a disadvantage for which whites are responsible and blacks are entitled to compensation? There are also some obvious inconsistencies with the Directive's stated aim of 'the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, economic and social cohesion and solidarity' (Paragraph 9, Preamble). Special dispensation for black-only organisations to plead for blacks is hardly likely to promote 'economic and social cohesion'. Further, there is a strong hint in paragraph 17 that, since it can be taken for granted that whites are always the perpetrators of disadvantages for others and never the victims, the establishment of organisations geared to the promotion of whites' special needs (however defined) are not necessary. Worse still, in the climate of searching out 'hate crime' and combatting 'racism and xenophobia' some will argue that any such organisation is inherently 'racist and xenophobic' and thus to be vilified or proscribed. Indeed this is strongly suggested by Article 14 (Compliance). Anything that conflicts with the 'principle of equal treatment' is to be abolished. This also includes the abolition of 'non-profit-making associations, and rules governing the independent professions and workers' and employers' organisations' where the principle of equal treatment is violated (Article 14, paragraph (b)). In the present inconsistent and frequently incoherent legal climate whites can be certain of one thing, namely that sanctions which the Directive demands be 'effective, proportionate and dissuasive' (Article 15 Sanctions) will in practice be: (i) ineffective (because they are unjust and violate the very principle of equal treatment which the Directive is pledged to uphold); (ii) disproportionate (because of the tendency in all things multicultural to be led by hysteria) and (iii) punitive to the point of viciousness (for the same reasons as ii).

Paragraph 6 of the Preamble goes to the very heart of the EU's multicultural agenda:

> The European Union rejects theories which attempt to determine the existence of separate human races. The use of the term "racial origin" in this Directive does not imply an acceptance of such theories (paragraph 6).

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This attempt to brush aside a vast amount of scientific evidence raises the very important question of exactly what the European Union's legislators do understand by "racial origin". In the absence of any explicit rejection of race as a genetic and biological reality, or any cited evidence on which this rejection is based, the assumption has to be that the drafters of this Directive are either not sure of what they themselves understand by "racial origin" or, possibly, that they harbour a very strong suspicion, even a guarded acceptance of race as a biological and genetic reality, and that race, as a biological and genetic reality, represents a stern challenge to the EU's multicultural agenda.

This failure to make explicit the meaning of "racial origin" and, equally, the failure explicitly to reject 'such theories' rather than endorse the evasive caveat that the term "racial origin" does not imply acceptance, raises, once again, some interesting questions, as can be see from Article 4 of the Directive which is cited in full:

> Notwithstanding Article 2(1) and (2), Member States may provide that a difference of treatment which is based on a characteristic related to racial or ethnic origin shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of the particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate.[7]

Important here is the fact that a distinction is made between 'racial' and 'ethnic'. Now, ethnic gives greater weight to cultural factors but does not automatically exclude race (as a genetic or biological reality), whereas race, according to the multicultural view, is a political or social construct and not a biological or genetic reality. It can be seen that the conspicuous failure to clarify where the Directive stands on the question of race results in the normal double standard and inconsistency. By any standard treating an individual differentially is discrimination, be it negative or positive.

On the other hand, the lack of clarity here and the undetermined position on "racial origin" as well as the criteria laid down – 'particular occupational activities' – make a potentially strong case for outcomes almost certainly not intended by the Directive. To begin with, let us apply the 'genuine and determining occupational requirement' to

[7] Readily applicable to 'the principle of gender mainstreaming' (Article 17 Report, paragraph 2).

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boxing. Consider the case of a black boxing promoter faced with making a choice between whether to support one of two relatively unknown and untested boxers (one black, one white). He would be acting rationally and in a manner consistent with the Directive were he to support the black boxer and reject the white boxer. He could show that his decision was 'based on a characteristic related to racial or ethnic origin' and not on his being personally biased in favour of black boxers, merely because they were black. His decision would also be based on the criteria of legitimacy (within the law) and proportionality (he can only select one boxer from two candidates) as specified in the Directive.

By 'biased in favour' I mean that if, over the years the boxing promoter has found that for most weights of boxing, black boxers have won more fights than whites (and thus made more money for him) his tendency to favour black boxers is entirely rational. Suppose a black boxing promoter favoured black boxers merely because they were black. How would it be possible to determine that his bias was based on a racial preference for his own kind and not on boxing criteria? Given the innate physical advantages that blacks the boxer's colour would be a rough proxy of boxing ability so even here it would be rational to discriminate on the basis of colour. But even if the promoter's decisions were so biased in favour of blacks to the extent of giving contracts to blacks who were temperamentally and physically unsuited to the demands of the sport, should he be stopped from pursuing this discriminatory policy? I suggest no. If he pursues such a policy, he will lose fights (read money) and risk the ultimate sanction of business failure: he either readjusts his policies or goes out of business. Legislation that penalises him for preferring black boxers irrespective of their abilities affects all of us, whereas if he goes out of business because of his personal preferences our fundamental freedoms are left untouched. Unlike the black boxing promoter who decides to promote incompetent boxers, the university that awards university places to incompetent blacks suffers no such business sanction. That is borne by the taxpayer. The use of psychometric testing (including IQ tests) to determine suitability for certain types of employment (as in the famous US case *Griggs v. Duke Power Co*) is also legitimate, proportionate and based on determining occupational need. The black boxing promoter has based his decision on experience, the proven and demonstrable superiority of black boxers over most but not all whites. He does not ask for any biometric data. His judgement is tested in the ring. The case of a university which rejected most but not all blacks because their SAT scores were not good enough for, say, law

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or medical school is also acting according to the criteria specified above, and far more scientifically, given that SAT scores bear a strong positive correlation with IQ test results and academic performance.

Although Article 4 concentrates on occupations, we cannot avoid the fact that blacks and whites have different types of medical problems. So Article 4 also has a bearing on medicine. Given that the profile of black medical problems – the predisposition to certain types of disease – is found throughout the world, these medical problems cannot be explained on the basis of culture. Race as a biological and genetic reality has no difficulty in accounting for this.

The above analysis is of course not at all how the drafters of this Directive wish it to be interpreted. When they use legitimacy they really mean something vague, along the lines of fairness or more specifically equal opportunities and equal outcomes. When they use proportionate they mean quotas based on the percentage of racial or ethnic minorities in the population.[8] The determination to impose quotas arises from the assumption that blacks and Asians are victims of discrimination even when there is no obvious discrimination. Thus paragraph 2(b) of Article 2 states that:

> [...] indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an *apparently* neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary (Article 2, paragraph 2(b) emphasis added)

The use of 'apparently' begs the question that neutrality is somehow flawed or hides discrimination. That has to be demonstrated not just asserted, as is the case here. Or it suggests that the very idea of neutrality is something negative precisely because neutrality, as with colour-blind policing, leads to undesirable outcomes, undesirable being anything which conflict with the multicultural agenda (more blacks are

[8] Of relevance for EU legislation is the landmark US case *The City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co* (1989) in which the Supreme Court struck down the reverse discrimination provisions of affirmative action. At the heart of the *Croson* decision was the failure of the city of Richmond to demonstrate any evidentiary basis for racial quotas. Vague claims about past wrongs and societal discrimination were held to be an insufficient basis for race-conscious programmes. Henceforth, any remedial measures had to be victim-specific and meet a strict scrutiny standard. For a detailed discussion of *Croson* and its wider implications see Roger Clegg ed., *Racial Preferences in Government Contracting*, The National Legal Center for the Public Interest, Washington D.C., 1993.

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arrested for violent crime). Given that we are all 'persons of a racial or ethnic origin' of some kind or other, then this paragraph does not make clear who is supposed to be the source of disadvantage for 'persons of a racial or ethnic origin'. Is this due to other persons of the same racial and ethnic origin or persons of a different racial and ethnic origin? In both scenarios the fact that an outcome benefits one individual or group at the expense of another is not in itself *prima facie* evidence of discrimination on the basis of 'racial or ethnic origin', especially where the discriminating and injured parties are of the same racial or ethnic origin, though that, as noted above, is unwittingly permitted by the Directive.

The exception to this assertion would be the multicultural who is quite happy to see white students with high SAT scores denied a place at a good university in order that a low-achieving minority student be given the place. Article 5 (Positive Action) will also have an impact: 'With a view to ensuring full equality in practice, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting specific measures to prevent or compensate for disadvantages linked to racial or ethnic origin'. The use of compensation here is misleading. It suggests that minorities have somehow been wronged or cheated because, for example, they are not represented in the university population in proportion to their numbers in the population as whites (the disparity ratio fallacy). Apparently, white men can't jump. Should they then be compensated for their failure to match black dominance in basketball?

Article 8 (The Burden of Proof) shifts the burden of proof in any legal action to the respondent and paragraph 2 also permits Member States to introduce 'rules of evidence *which are more favourable to plaintiffs*' (emphasis added). Moreover, in view of the fact that multiculturalists wish to give the widest possible meaning to an interpretation of "hate crime", making it in fact a serious crime (a federal crime in the US), the assurance in Article 8, paragraph 3 that: 'Paragraph 1 shall not apply to criminal procedures' is not convincing. Paragraph 3 should possibly have been amended to conclude with *'for the time being'* (In view of the provisions of the Council Framework Decision, 'for the time being' is appropriate. See below).

The whole dubious notion of 'indirect indiscrimination' also reveals intellectual inconsistency in another way. The Directive states that indirect discrimination can 'be established *by any means* including on the basis of statistical evidence' (Preamble, paragraph 15 emphasis added).

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The combination of 'by any means' and the shift in the burden of proof puts respondents at a severe legal disadvantage. In the context of English common law these are serious erosions of traditional legal freedoms.[9] The willingness to use statistical evidence, which almost certainly means using the low numbers of blacks and Asians in certain professions as well as status within those professions as *prima facie* evidence of discrimination, is in stark contrast to the hostility of egalitarians rationally and honestly to consider the rigorous statistical data as it relates, for example to black and white IQ differences, crime rates worldwide and other forms of dysfunctional behaviour.

Council Framework Decision (CFD) [10]

Multiracial societies worldwide are artificial constructs and liable, as demonstrated by the former Yugoslavia, Soviet Union and countless examples from Africa, to explode into violence. Beyond certain limits racial and cultural diversity has historically posed a threat to the survival of a nation or state. Yet the explanatory memorandum which accompanies the CFD instructs us that: 'European societies are multicultural and multi-ethnic, and their diversity is a *positive and enriching factor*' (paragraph, 1, emphasis added). No evidence is cited in support of this assertion. Nor are we told when in the recent history of Europe, the continent ceased to be monoracial and became multiracial. If diversity, which is a code word for the presence of large numbers of non-white legal and illegal immigrants in European societies, were indeed 'positive and enriching', then whites would be demanding ever more diversity. Of course, they make no such demands. There is massive opposition to large numbers of legal and illegal immigrants in Europe and the CFD is intended as part of the wider coercion of indigenous Europeans to believe, act, and to speak as if they believe, that diversity is a good thing.

When the numbers of racist crimes are discussed it is noted that: '66% fell within the category of *propaganda offences*' (Some Figures, paragraph 3, emphasis added). 'Propaganda offence' is the sort of language we expect to find in Soviet jurisprudence, specifically, the notorious Article 58 of the Soviet criminal code, which made anti-Soviet

[9] Another remarkable feature is the provision of Article 7 (Defence of Rights) which permits individuals to apply the principle of equal treatment 'even after the relationship in which discrimination is alleged to have occurred has ended'.

[10] Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Combating Racism and Xenophobia, COM (2001) 664, 28.11.2001. See:
http://europa.en.int/eur-lex/en/com/pdf2001/com2001_0664en01.pdf

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propaganda and agitation a criminal offence,[11] invariably punished by long terms in slave-labour camps or death.

As far as the EU is concerned, a propaganda offence is anything that rejects multicultural assumptions and the uncritical acceptance of diversity as a positive and enriching factor. The following – many more could be added – would all be regarded as examples of 'propaganda offences':

(i) drawing attention to the disproportionately high numbers of blacks involved in violent street crime even though this is based on official statistics;

(ii) discussion (as in this article) of the fact that the average black IQ is lower than the average white IQ;

(iii) drawing attention to the failure of black states to achieve even minimal levels of good governance and administrative efficiency and competency;

(iv) criticism of the widespread practice of slavery in sub-Saharan Africa or any suggestion that the extremely high levels of AIDS among black populations world wide are due to sexual delinquency;

(v) drawing attention to the murderous policies of black states towards whites (South Africa and Zimbabwe, for example);

(vi) any criticism however mild of multicultural societies.

(vii) as a white, expressing a preference for living in a white neighbourhood. Blacks, would not be guilty were they to express a preference for living in a black neighbourhood.

The whole thrust of the CFD is that racist crime is white crime. References there are aplenty to alleged Neo-Nazi groups but nothing at all regarding black crimes against whites. Whites commit racist acts, we are told, because racism 'is often a manifestation of the cause of belonging to a group, which is perceived as being reinforced by a negative and contemptuous attitude towards other groups' (paragraph 5). The authors clearly have no interest in black and Asian attitudes towards whites. The main theme of rap music is hatred of and contempt for whites. Is this to be condemned as a 'propaganda offence' or 'hate music', or will this be defended on the grounds of free speech? Or are rap and hip hop part of the positive and enriching diversity which whites should eagerly be embracing?

[11] Racism and xenophobia are not be treated as political offences and thus cannot serve as grounds for refusing to extradite an accused individual (Article 14 Political Offences).

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The Move Toward Thought Control

The desire to police what we can and cannot read, view and listen are evident in the concerns expressed about the Internet in the Council Framework Decision (CFD). Among other things, 'the Internet is also a relatively cheap and highly effective tool for racist individuals to spread hateful ideas to an audience of thousands if not millions' (paragraph 12).[12] Now, it is for individual users of the Internet to decide whether ideas are in fact hateful not unelected bureaucrats. There is barely concealed rage directed at the constitutional guarantee of free speech in the USA (paragraph 12) and the following should be noted: 'The Commission's approach on this issue is to ensure that racist and xenophobic content on the Internet is criminalised in all Member States' (paragraph 13). If this goal is achieved, it will mean that the free speech guarantees in the USA will be of great importance to dissident Europeans facing bureaucratic and legal persecution in the EU. It will not be surprising if we see the opponents of censorship turn the concerns expressed about hate crime, racism and the rest in the CFD against its drafters. Thus, an indigenous Briton would be entitled to claim that promoting multiculturalism at the expense of whites is itself racist; that TV-programming and advertisements which conspicuously use black actors to promote black self-esteem or to give a false picture of black status and their numbers in the population, was to use the language of the CFD 'a propaganda offence'; that rap was 'hate music'; that the BBC and a large part of the press, incite racial hatred of whites; that – to use the hyperbole of black activists when campaigning for black history classes – the multicultural curriculum in British schools amounts to cultural extermination since it encouraged white schoolchildren to despise their country and its achievements.

By far the most threatening provisions of the CFD, however, are to be found in the definitions of racism and xenophobia:

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[12] Paragraph 2 of Article 12 (Jurisdiction) states that jurisdiction extends 'to cases where the offence is committed through an information system'. No definition of what constitutes an information system is given so this could mean anything from an Internet web site to a privately held filing cabinet. In view of the provisions of paragraph 3 Article 15 (Exchange of Information) this gives a free hand for the police to search private premises and raid private dwellings at will. Paragraph 3 states:

> Where a member state has information relating to the storage in its territory of material containing expressions of racism and xenophobia for the purposes of distribution or dissemination in another Member State it shall provide that information to the other Member State to enable the latter to initiate, in accordance with its law, legal proceedings or proceedings for confiscation. For that purpose, the operational contact points referred to in paragraph 1 may be used.

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> "*racism and xenophobia*" shall mean the belief in race, colour, descent, religion or belief, national or ethnic origin as a factor determining aversion to individuals or groups (Article 3, paragraph (a)).

This definition represents not just a direct assault on free speech but marks the triumphal assertion of what Orwell famously and presciently called Thoughtcrime. To criminalise belief is to criminalise intellectual activity, to stifle all thought from the very outset. It also effectively repeals paragraph 1, Article 19 of the ICCPR and Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the ECHRFF. For if 'the right to hold opinions without interference' (para 1, Article 19, ICCPR) means anything it means the right to believe in the sort of things that the drafters of Article 3 are seeking to criminalise. Were this definition to become law it would effectively ban all research into the genetic basis of race, as well as huge areas of anthropology and history. It would be argued that criticism of the CFD definition was itself inspired by racist and xenophobic sentiments and thus criminal as well. If we replace belief in race, colour, etc., with belief based on empirical evidence that the Earth and other planets in our solar system revolve round the Sun, then one can appreciate the regressive and crudely medieval nature of this definition. Stripped of all the concerns about racism, it represents an attempt to silence all opposition to multiculturalism. It is a measure of the blindness induced by multiculturalism and a reflection of multiculturalism's innate totalitarianism that 12 years after the fall of communism Europe's legislators can draft proposals which would be more appropriate to the former Soviet Union or North Korea than to 'Free Europe'.

Conclusion

Given the definitions of racism and xenophobia which are used in the Council Framework Decision, it is not racism and xenophobia that 'are a direct violation of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law' (paragraph 2), but the nature of the detailed plans to combat racism and xenophobia themselves, which are the direct and indirect threat to a civilized society. The whole tone of the CFD and related legislation is the assumption that racism and xenophobia are so terrible, so dreadful, that normal rational appraisal must be suspended or be deemed to be inadequate. Established legal custom, it is argued, cannot and must not prevail. As far as the UK is concerned, this means that in order to fight this allegedly supreme evil, the rule of law and free speech must be abandoned in order to serve the greater good of combatting racism and

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xenophobia.

To those familiar with the National Socialist state or Soviet totalitarianism, this has a familiar ring. Indeed, the whole thrust of "anti-racist" legislation in the EU provokes some ominous and startling parallels with the totalitarian despotisms of the last century – Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and Communist China. In much the same way that Nazi Germany's Nuremberg Laws in 1935 consolidated the state's official policy towards Jews, finalising the emergence of the National-Socialist state, so the EU's race and multicultural legislation discussed in this article can be seen as a decisive move towards not just the emergence of a United States of Europe but also towards Europe's becoming a unified police state.

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

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The Paradox of Pursuing Anti-Poverty Strategies under Structural Adjustment Reforms in Uganda

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This paper critically analyses the impact of economic reforms that have been pursued by the NRM regime since 1987. It argues that though stabilization and adjustment reforms are sometimes necessary and have led to GDP growth in the economy for the last sixteen years, this growth has not translated into improved standards of living for the majority poor. The reforms have also been characterized by increasing income disparities. It also argues that the impressive GDP growth in the economy is attributed more to substantial external assistance than the effectiveness of reforms per se. It is hitherto argued that Uganda's anti-poverty strategies are unlikely to succeed in the long-run because of poor policy choices and prioritization, over-reliance on donor funds, and an unfavorable global trading system. Although this paper looks at Uganda, its findings have policy implications for other developing and poor countries facing similar policy conditions.

Key Words: Africa, Uganda, Structural Adjustment Reforms, Poverty, Anti-Poverty Strategies.

Introduction

By the time Uganda attained independence from Britain on 9th October 1962, it was described as one of those countries that had a buoyant economy, an efficient civil service and a fairly democratic political system (Jamal, 1987; Ellyne, 1995). By 1965 its development indicators were not different from those of South Korea and Malaysia. The economy had a general macroeconomic stability. In 1960, per capita income was approximately US$ 57 (Ellyne, 1995). From 1962 to 1971, Uganda's economy improved steadily with real GDP growing at 5.5% per annum and subsistence production accounting for no more than 30% of total output. Domestic savings also averaged 7.5% and there were no serious problems of either inflation or balance of payments (Elliot, 1971). This prosperity was however short-lived due to political strife and economic mismanagement that engulfed Uganda from 1971 to 1985. By 1986 when the National Resistance Movement (NRM) under Yoweri Museveni captured power, there was virtual collapse of the economy and state structures (Brett, 1993). The infrastructure had reached an advanced state of disrepair and almost all the productive

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sectors of the economy had collapsed. Inflation was 240% per annum, real GDP had declined by 15% of what it had been in 1971, and tax collection was 6% of GDP (MPED, 1986/87; Ellyne[2], 1995; Tumusiime-Mutebire, 1995). This crisis meant that government could no longer afford to raise funds to finance basic services needed by the population. As a result, Ugandans were sinking into poverty faster than ever before. To reverse economic decay and uplift people from biting poverty, the NRM regime with the assistance of the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) instituted stabilization and structural adjustment reforms.

The reforms involved streamlining economic planning and tax administration. The role of the state in the economy was reduced while the private sector was enhanced. As elsewhere, the WB/IMF technocrats anticipated that once government pursued market reforms and efficiently managed the economy, this would bring about economic growth. It was hitherto assumed that macroeconomic growth and prudent management of domestic resources would consequently have a 'trickle-down' effect on the population. Put differently, the benefits of economic growth were anticipated to translate into improved standards of living of the ordinary people.

These assumptions notwithstanding, the paper is aware of the policy changes within the World Bank since the 1990s which embraced anti-poverty strategies. It recognizes the dynamic nature of development and role of lending institutions (WB/IMF) which have undergone three reform processes. Whereas the World Bank was preoccupied with growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) since 1981, the 1990s witnessed a softening of the policy framework to incorporate pro-poor growth and the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt scheme. The lending institutions have since shifted from coercive politics of conditionality (although it was not abandoned) to the gradual re-engaging the state but within a framework of 'good governance.' The softening is attributed to the World Bank's realization that the proper functioning of the market requires institutionalization. The renewed focus on the state therefore arose for purposes of guaranteeing institutional capacity and to support the efficient operation of the free market. However, the paper does not believe that such changes in the development approaches of the WB/IMF institutions constitute a paradigm shift. Much as some analysts

[2] Ellyne (1995) gives a different figure of inflation in 1986 as 260%. This figure illustrates the same point that Uganda's economy had reached a point of near collapse.

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like Krugman (1995) claim that the 'Washington Consensus' has died during the 1990s, others (Loxley, 1995; Moore, 1999; Gore, 2000; Watkins, 2000) have expressed skepticism. While these changes may be different, they are still mutually interdependent and do not constitute a shift but are instead geared towards consolidating neo-liberal fundamentals (Gibbon, 1995).

Though substantial achievements have been made at the macro level in terms of impressive economic growth averaging 6% per annum for over sixteen years, the paradox is that this growth has not translated into improved welfare of the ordinary people. The paradox of mass impoverishment amidst high economic growth has since 1996 precipitated the NRM regime to pursue development policies that are oriented towards the poor. More specifically, government attention has not only focused on poverty analysis but has also taken significant steps to address the poverty challenge (PEAP, 1997; MFPED, 1997-2002). Government strategies include credit and budgetary allocations to social programs. Much as the government policy initiatives can be applauded, it is questionable whether the current poverty reduction approaches will alleviate the current levels of poverty on a sustainable basis. This paper critically looks at the challenges faced by the NRM government in pursuing poverty eradication programs within the World Bank/IMF policy framework.

Poverty in the Ugandan Context

The question of poverty is not new in Uganda, what is probably new is the context in which it is being addressed today. Prior to independence poverty existed as a local issue and did not assume a prominent position in Uganda's development debate. Much as poverty in the past was considered a community problem effectively managed under the traditional extended family and the clan, its magnitude has outgrown the traditional welfare mechanisms to require national if not international attention. The turbulence in the traditional systems is attributed to modernization forces that have weakened the traditional welfare institutions. Besides, money together with commercialization of virtually everything has undermined the traditional virtues of reciprocity and trust. Other influences like foreign religions have equally weakened traditional culture and the authority embedded within it, which previously catered for social security. It is therefore the crisis in the traditional norms and value systems that changed the context of managing poverty in the contemporary period.

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Although similarities exist, the experience of poverty varies in its nature, extent and trends between regions, rural and urban areas. Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS) data of 1997, for instance, indicates that in eastern Uganda, which has the greatest proportion of the population, 54% of the people live in absolute poverty, compared to 28% in the central region. According to Okurut, Odwee and Adebua (1999) and the UNHS (2000), the northern region of Uganda was ranked as the poorest in terms of welfare indicators. The western region was also rated as the worst in terms of welfare indicators even though this region has the second highest income levels in the country (Appleton, 1999).

Poverty also differs in definition between urban and rural areas (CDRN, 1996). In Uganda's urban areas, money is for instance the underlying factor that constitutes poverty because virtually everything is monetized. Poverty has therefore been defined as lack of money to cater for family needs. In rural areas however, poverty is perceived in terms of resource deficiency. In this respect, resources refer to physical assets and social networks.

Notwithstanding the variation in definition, the magnitude and intensity of poverty differs between rural and urban areas. The rural areas are much more affected than urban areas. Appleton (2001) basing on data derived from government administered surveys indicates that poverty head-count[3] in urban areas fell from 17% to 10% compared with a fall from 49% to 39% in rural areas in 1997 and 2000 respectively. He further states that poverty has declined by 43% in urban areas in comparison to only by 18% in rural areas of Uganda since 1992. It is clear from the above illustrations that isolation causes vulnerability to poverty. Communities are isolated in terms of distance, markets, poor or lack of schools and health centers and transport, resource allocation, or insecurity. These forms of isolation subsequently exclude rural communities from the development process.

Apart from rural dimension, poverty has equally taken a gender perspective. In Uganda, women are disproportionately affected by poverty than their fellow men (Ahikire, 1998). This is regardless of the fact that women provide 70% of the total agricultural labor and are responsible for producing 80% of Uganda's food. This poverty is attributed to inequalities that are perpetuated by socio-cultural and

[3] The poverty head-count index highlights the number of people or households living below the poverty line.

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economic factors. Women lack access to economic opportunities because of limited education, cultural impediments, big workload and low participation in decision-making. In general, women do not own productive assets like land[4]. Besides, women lack legal protection over property rights in the event of their husbands' death. It is therefore true that increases in household income may not necessarily translate into increased benefits to women.

Poverty is further conceived to have a social dimension. The social dimension of poverty is much more about deficiency of social networks. In rural areas social networks (social capital[5]) are valued much more than the virtual possession of physical assets. Social networks in this respect include, having friends, relatives, a family, and being at peace with neighbors and the community at large. Ugandan society perceives people who lack friends and relatives or those socially disadvantaged to be poor. According to UPPAP[6] Report (2000), a poor person is viewed as having no relatives, no children, no wife or husband; being disabled persons, elderly, orphaned; having diseases; and being unable to access basic necessities. In African traditions, the more a person is socially connected weighs more than owning physical assets. This can be traced in local adages. For example, the *Banyankole* of western Uganda have an adage that "*Ekyokwezirikagye Oshangwa Ozeirwegye*". This literally implies that one who is born in a rich family with wide social networks is better positioned than one without such background. It is traditionally believed that even if one loses his or her material possessions, they can be regained if that person has strong social networks.

According to UPPAP Report (2000: 9), Local people reported more movement into poverty than out of it. Poverty was therefore reported to be increasing. The report further reported a linkage between lack and/or decreasing social capital and increasing poverty levels among the Ugandan people. The absence and/or deterioration of social relationships and networks, particularly the role of extended family that supports the traditional welfare system causes poverty. Relatives enhance a sense of belonging to the community in the form of a clan and

[4] The UNDP (1998) annual national Human Development Report for Uganda stated that although women carry out 70-80% of agricultural work, only 7% of women own the land they till.

[5] Social capital according to Putnam (1993) refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.

[6] UPPAP is a process of assessing the nature of poverty in consultation with the poor. It is a qualitative analysis that uses the perceptions and perspectives of the poor to understand the nature of poverty and subsequently formulate an appropriate policy.

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provide social and physical security in times of hardships. During times of crisis, friends, relatives, neighbors and even the wider community can act as a shield by giving immediate assistance. The CDRN (1996) and UPPAP (2000) reports underscored the high rating of social capital in comparison to economic power by the poor themselves. People who have money but have no family, relatives or friends are classified as being poor because economic power is considered temporary while social networks are permanent. Social support networks, where they still exist, play an instrumental role in protecting the poor from the vagaries of poverty. Such support is in form of helping out like by contributing food, providing labor, seeds, and productive assets, settling of disputes and other forms of charity.

In the case of Uganda, the instrumental role of social networks in improving the welfare of the poor can be cited using various examples. The existence of social capital in Kabale district has helped patients from remote areas to access health facilities. The formation of the *'Engozi'* group epitomizes the role of community networks in shielding the weak during crisis situations. The *'Engozi'* group is 'a stretcher group'. It refers to a self help group in Kabale district that was formed to transport the sick persons from the remote parts of the district to the health centers on locally made stretchers. Other social networks that have helped the poor to access productive resources include self-help groups like *'Munno mu kabi'* in the central region of Uganda. *'Munno mu kabi'* is translated as 'a friend in trouble'. Such groups are formed to assist colleagues and friends in crisis by pooling together their meager resources and then pass them over to those with problems. From the above illustrations, it is clear that lack of social capital causes poverty.

The UPPAP research findings reported that social capital was deteriorating very fast in urban areas:

> The traditional welfare system was seen as promoting community cooperation and household well being, although it was seen to be declining, especially in urban areas (UPPAP, 2000: 15).

Lack of social cohesion was particularly cited as a dominant factor constraining development at the individual, household and community level. The phenomenon of deteriorating levels of social capital is attributed to the breakdown of positive traditional structures and values that are custodians of culture, norms and social ties. These include elders, clans, and the extended family. The breakdown of traditional structures is attributed to modernization, which promotes individualism,

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the need to be secretive, and the drive to succeed economically while out-competing everyone else.

Another dimension of poverty is related to season or time of life. It is common within rural areas for people to be temporarily poor as a result of a bad season. Households move up and down the poverty ladder. Therefore, poverty varies at different points in time. For example, rural people do experience poverty during the pre-harvest period whereas they tend to earn more during the post-harvest season. They therefore experience intermittent poverty during certain seasons (Lipton, 1986). This can sometimes be temporary or permanent depending on the coping mechanisms of those particular people.

Measurement of Poverty

The measurement of poverty remains a major challenge to social scientists. Likewise, there is no precise and generally agreed definition or measurement of poverty (Glewwe and Gaag, 1990; Baulch, 1996). To some scholars, poverty is perceived as a lack of means to satisfy basic necessities of life (Lipton and Maxwell, 1992). Other scholars conceptualize poverty to be more than just the lack of income but also the lack of the means to satisfy basic social needs. It also includes a feeling of powerlessness to break out of the cycle of poverty and insecurity of persons and property (Townsend, 1993; Chambers, 1983). UPPAP (2000) show that vulnerability[7] to poverty assumes four major dimensions namely, poor physical well being, a constrained social network, powerlessness and gender inequality.

There are two conventional approaches used to identify the different forms of deprivation. These include the quantitative measures, which use a technocratic 'top-down' approach. These are popular with international organizations and frequently use a predetermined standard criterion upon which poverty is measured. On the other hand, there is the qualitative method, which uses the 'bottom-up' approach to define poverty. This approach has been popularized by Robert Chamber's participatory studies in Africa and Asia. He lists the popular perceptions of poverty to include inadequate food security, having to accept demeaning or low-status work, lacking land, livestock, farm equipment and other assets. It also includes being unable to send children to school, having to put children into employment, being dependent upon common property resources, having bad housing,

[7] 'Vulnerable groups' refer to those groups that are living at the income poverty datum line or below.

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having more mouths to feed and fewer hands or less able-bodied household members to work. Lastly, having inadequate social support, being single parents, disabled, or suffering the effects of destructive behaviour such as alcoholism. In this case, the point of view of the poor defines poverty. In other words, it is measured from the perspective of the victim. The two poverty studies conducted in Uganda in 1996 and 1999 by CDRN and UPPAP respectively used a qualitative approach which is the ordinary people's own perception of poverty (CDRN, 1996; UPPAP, 2000).

A popular quantitative measurement of poverty widely used in poor countries is material consumption. This measure defines a person as poor if his/her income or expenditure is below a defined poverty line. In many poor countries where data on people's incomes is not readily available, the poverty line is determined in terms of minimum expenditure necessary to ensure access to food calorie intake as a proxy for income. The World Bank (1990) has been determining the absolute poverty line basing on those persons who spend less than one US dollar a day. The World Bank (1984) also proposed the nutrition-linked measurement of poverty (linking consumption and nutrition status). It is based on an assumption of 2200 calories plus a few non-food expenditure items per person.

Much as the use of income/expenditure measurement is believed to be crucial for intervention in poverty alleviation, it is premised on a mechanical perception that poverty is lack of incomes or insufficient access to resources; or relative deprivation or inability to meet basic needs[8]. The problem with this conceptualization is that it gets an oversimplified picture of poverty and over-relies on just one or a small number of quantitative indicators. The use of the poverty line further becomes questionable when applied to subsistence economies where monetization is limited. It is also criticized for being unable to capture gender dimensions of poverty (Kabeer, 1996) Furthermore, the major criticisms revolve around the criteria used for setting of the food energy requirements, which may vary according to the geographic region and climate. It is therefore not easy to standardize it. There are also disputes about measuring the cost of a 'minimum food calorie intake' and about how to add on the allowance for non-food expenditure (Ravallion,

[8] The World Employment Conference of the International Labor Organization (WECILO) defined basic needs as a family's minimum requirements for private consumption and essential services. These include food, shelter, clothing, household equipment and such services like sanitation, transport, health, education and cultural facilities (Quoted in Ghosh, 1998).

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1993). In the same vein, Ghosh (1998) argues that income levels are not useful because the minimum income required to escape deprivation differs from community to community. Therefore, using a minimum cut-off income applicable to poor countries would fail the test if applied to rich countries.

The other quantitative measure of poverty is per-capita income. Per-capita income is calculated by dividing the national income by the total population. Uganda's GDP per-capita is currently estimated at US$ 334 (UN, 2001). Nonetheless, data obtained using the per-capita index can be compromized because it obscures the detailed picture of poverty. The fact that it does not show exactly who the poor are, how many they are, and where they are located makes its reliability questionable.

Equally criticized is the use of basic needs criterion to define poverty, This definition looks at poverty as deprivation in terms of various material requirements like food, health, education, housing, safe drinking water and sanitation. The basic needs perception is attacked for being just an improvement of the income. The criticism is that human needs should not be interpreted as being predominantly physical needs like food, shelter and clothing, rather than social needs. Ghosh (1998) argues that once the concepts are simplified to an insufficiency of income, the easier it is to argue that the national growth of material wealth is all that is required to overcome the phenomenon of poverty. It is therefore widely agreed that the definition of poverty should be widened to go beyond an insufficiency of income to include social needs (Chambers, 1983; Townsend, 1993; World Bank, 1994d; Bakhit, 1996; UNDP, 1998; Ghosh, 1998).

Another measure of poverty is the capability criterion which draws on the work of Amartya Sen (1995). It argues that access to commodities and services determine people's capability to function. These capabilities can relate to simple functions such as being adequately nourished and clothed, and more complex capabilities like being able to participate effectively in the social life of a community. This approach incorporates the problem of social exclusion or marginalization in the idea of poverty. It is therefore much broader than the income and basic needs approach. Nonetheless, in circumstances that pertain in most poor countries where there is lack of an adequate database to allow for accurate measurement of poverty, the basic needs and capability criteria may not be useful.

In addition, the Human Development Index (HDI) is based on the proportion of a population that is deprived in three aspects, namely,

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longevity, education, and decent standard of living. The HDI stresses the multi-dimensional character of development and deprivation. Arjaan de Haan (1998) however criticizes the HDI for describing mainly the outcomes but focusing less on the actors and processes that cause these. Besides, the HDI focuses on national averages and less on specific groups suffering from deprivation.

The major weakness with quantitative treatment of poverty issues is that it assumes that poverty reduction is a technical and value-free phenomenon measured by progress in consumption levels. This perception neglects social and political factors that constitute poverty. Moreover, quantitative measures do not accommodate the feelings of the poor. Furthermore, the weakness with quantitative measurements is the attempt to translate all the aspects of poverty into figures. Poverty is such a complex phenomenon that not all of its elements can be reduced to numbers. Examples of poverty, which cannot be quantified, include issues like powerlessness, social exclusion, dignity and respect. Besides, many of the poor countries lack adequate data banks to allow for accurate measurement of poverty. The exercises for compiling such data are expensive and require periodic updating. This can prove a burden to countries that are already facing economic difficulties and have to make painful choices on where to spend the meager resources.

Given the fact that poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon, this paper conceptualizes poverty to encompass both material and non-material aspects of deprivation like powerlessness and social exclusion. It agrees with Haverman (1987) and Ghosh (1998) who argue that the fact that poverty is a multifaceted phenomenon necessitates the use of various indicators, which capture wider aspects of deprivation. They attribute the problem to poverty being elastic, multidimensional, non-objective and culturally determined. They further argue that a combination of measurements of poverty be used simultaneously if all aspects of poverty are to be captured.

The Causal Factors of Poverty in Uganda

Poverty is a complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon that can be understood from a multitude of points of view. Conventional debates about the causes of poverty continue to be dominated by the orthodox liberal and structural perspectives (Schneider, 1988; Navak, 1988; Townsend, 1993). The orthodox paradigm perceives the cause of poverty to lie in the defects of mind or body, or misfortune proper to the individual. The idea that the poor are themselves responsible for their

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plight is a widely believed explanation of poverty not only in the richer Western countries but also in poor countries (Schneider, 1988). Research carried out on poverty in Uganda also established that the poor tended to be blamed for being lazy (CDRN, 1996).

Some of the critics of this model however argue that poverty is not a product of individual weaknesses or failure, but is rather a result of complex social forces that include actions of classes, groups, agencies and institutions that interact within a particular social and economic order (Alcock, 1997). This structural approach draws on dependency theories of development, theories of stratification, neo-colonialism, and state policies. It conceives poverty to lie in social circumstances, which interfere with the relationship between the individual and the economic organization of society. There is a growing recognition that the cause of poverty is much more explained by how people relate to each other in the process of production, exchange and distribution of resources. It is within the same structural context that Gilbert (1930) succinctly observed that whereas the poverty of the earliest beginnings of human society was attributed to technological incompetence to produce adequately the necessities of life, the recent successes in achieving adequate production has not been equalled by success in securing the distribution of goods in proportion to needs, hence the protest against poverty as a class grievance. Poverty is a symptom of the existence of systems of injustice that are entrenched in socio-economic systems. Such systems not only perpetuate poverty but also allow it to persist.

In the case of Uganda, poverty is partly attributed to individual or domestic causes such as laziness, extravagance, lack of co-operation, and cultural practices like polygamy, oppression of women and high bride price[9]. Another domestic cause of poverty that is common among technologically backward countries is the increasing population pressure on the available resources. It is a fact that uncontrolled population growth can compromize the benefits of economic growth and subsequently increase impoverishment. In the case of some East Asian countries, this problem was overcome by technological advancement in agriculture (Green revolution). The issue of population increase in the context of traditional farming practices is to some extent responsible for causing poverty in some parts of Uganda. Given the fact that more than 80% of Uganda's population is engaged in agriculture to earn a living,

[9] An example can be cited of the Jie people of Karamoja in Eastern Uganda. Men pay bride price averaging 200 cows when marrying (UPPAP, 2000).

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the inability to access land and/or declining productivity leads to poverty (Deininger and Okidi, 1999). There is no doubt that high fertility rates are increasing pressure on land availability and productivity in Kabale, Rukungiri, Kapchorwa and Mbale districts of Uganda (CDRN, 1996).

While it is true that uncontrolled population growth puts pressure on resources and has subsequently caused poverty in some districts, Uganda's population of 21.6 million (UBOS, 2000) and the average annual GDP growth of 6% (UBOS, 2000) has not yet assumed a threatening level in relation to the available resources. Uganda is a fertile country with most parts either unsettled or sparsely populated. The major problem has been the failure to adopt modern farming practices. The current average household size of 5.21 and 4.9 persons in rural and urban areas respectively (UNHS, 1999) has not yet become a major cause of poverty in Uganda but may pose a future threat if no adequate measures are put in place to mange population growth. The available evidence to this effect can be adduced from the findings of the national study on the causes of poverty that was conducted by the government of Uganda. The Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Project (UPPAP) (2000) studied poverty from the perspective of the poor. Its findings on the ten major causes of poverty based on the frequency of reporting by the communities, ranked large families second to the last. Instead, poor health and disease was ranked highest; followed by excessive alcohol consumption; lack of education and skills; lack of access to financial assistance and credit; lack of access to markets; ignorance and lack of information; idleness and laziness; lack of cooperation; large families and; Insurgency (UPPAP, 2000: 21).

Besides, there has been a concerted effort by the successive governments of Uganda to control population growth. This has been done through deliberate policies to control fertility rates using media campaigns, community education programs as well as the giving of free contraceptives in government hospitals and health centers. Indeed, these deliberate government policies have paid off as demonstrated by the results of the Uganda Demographic and Health Survey (UDHS) (2000). It showed improvement in the Contraceptive Prevalence Rate (CPR) which rose from 5% in 1989 to 15% in 1995 and 23% in 2001 while the target is to reach 30% by 2004. Furthermore, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) also reduced from 7.4 in 1989 to 6.9 in 2001 (WHO, 2002). The annual population growth, although still high, dropped between 1959 and 1991 as illustrated by Table 1 below:

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Table 1: Inter Census Annual Population Growth Rates 1948-2000

Period	1948-59	1959-69	1969-80	1980-91
Annual Growth Rates	2.5	3.9	2.7	2.5

Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2000).

The fact that education plays an instrumental role in human transformation, development, and modernization of a country, the NRM government policy of liberalizing education and the introduction of universal primary education (UPE) in 1997 will likely play a role in controlling fertility rates and subsequently reduce poverty. Therefore, a consistent government policy to control population growth must always be a key component of Uganda's anti-poverty strategies.

Though Uganda's poverty has been attributed to individual or domestic weaknesses, it also has historical and international perspectives (Mamdani, 1983; World Bank, 2001). During and since the Colonial period, the pre-capitalist subsistence economy has been increasingly supplanted by the international capitalist economic system and this has exacerbated the existing inequalities and subsequently created structural poverty among the natives. Moreover, the continued imbalances in world trade as well as have undermined the economies of poor countries. The above causes of poverty notwithstanding, the effect of macroeconomic policies pursued under the auspices of the World Bank/IMF since 1987 have also adversely affected the people as illustrated below.

The Macro-economic Perspective of Poverty

Poverty issues again assumed a prominent position in government policy initiatives in 1996 because of the failed expectations that macroeconomic reforms would lead to economic growth and subsequently have a positive effect on the poor. Much as the rigorous implementation[10] of structural adjustment reforms has significantly led to Uganda's GDP growth averaging 6% per annum for the last sixteen years, there is no agreement on the effects of the reforms on the welfare of the majority rural people. The issue of whether the implementation of

[10] The Uganda government initiated the economic recovery program in 1987 and has since then undertaken adjustment reforms embracing liberalized systems for markets, trade, investment, foreign exchange and tax regimes. The prime objective of these reforms was to create efficiency by reducing the direct role of government in production and commercial activities while promoting the private sector as the main engine of growth.

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macroeconomic reforms has had a positive effect on poverty levels therefore remains a contested terrain. There currently prevail two contentious views about the impact of adjustment reforms on the welfare of the majority of the people in Uganda. The official government perspective is that macroeconomic reforms have reduced poverty over the years. However, the contending view disputes the government statistics and argues that poverty has been actually increasing. The two views are hereunder discussed.

The available government statistics show that poverty has indeed come down as a result of maintaining macroeconomic stability and pursuing pro-poor growth. Estimates from the national household surveys conducted by Uganda Bureau of Statistics since 1992 indicate that poverty reduced from 56% in 1992 to 44% in 1997 and to 35% in 2000 (IHS, 1992; UNHS, 1997 and 2000). Much as official statistics claim that there has been a reduction in poverty head-count, they however acknowledge that there is still a problem in distribution of welfare. In other words, they agree that there has been a disproportionately small impact of growth on the majority of the population. This is because growth has mainly occurred in sectors that do not employ the bulk of the population as conceded by the Minister of Finance, Planning and Economic Development in a press release:

> One of the budget falls in poverty since 1995/96 was among the households where the head works in the government sector. In 1995/96, 33% of the people in such households were defined as poor, but by 1999/2000, this had fallen to 8%. Households engaged in trade, hotels, transport and telecommunications, mining and public utilities have all seen substantial reductions in poverty (*The New Vision*, January 11, 2001).

Growing income disparities between the different sections of the Ugandan people have also been confirmed by other studies. Appleton (1998) for example observes that the small reduction in poverty levels in Uganda is almost exclusively explained by growth and not by changes in the distribution of welfare. It is estimated that nine million Ugandans still live below the absolute poverty line irrespective of the fact that poverty has, in absolute terms, decreased by 21% since 1992 (Appleton, 1999). Appleton (2001) further notes that whereas mean real consumption per capita grew by 22% in Uganda, the increase was larger (42%) in urban areas than rural areas (15%). Poverty in Uganda is predominantly a rural phenomenon as indicated by Appleton's findings (1999). It

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should however be noted that even within the rural areas themselves there are sharp disparities between cash crop growers and food producers, between men and women[11] as well as between regions[12]. He further confirms that the consumption gains went largely to the top docile (the richest 10% of the population) which saw its real per capita consumption levels increase by 20%. In stark contrast, the consumption levels of the poorest 10% grew by just 8% during the same period. The Poverty Trends Analysis (1992-1996) also shows that the poorest 20% of the population were becoming poorer while the rich were getting richer.

Notwithstanding the above cited disparities, it has officially been acknowledged that poverty has increased in the northern region from 60% in 1997/98 to 65% in 1999/2000 (UNHS, 2000). Two-thirds of the northern population cannot meet their basic consumption needs (UNHS, 2000; MFPED, 2001/02; *The New Vision*, January 11, 2001; *The Monitor*, September 12, 2001).

While figures by Appleton (2001) and the Poverty Status Report (2001) indicate growth in consumption gains, such a picture should be treated with caution and need not create an impression that the economy is on a sustainable poverty-eradication path. The possible explanation for this growth is the increase in direct transfer payments, which may not guarantee sustainable poverty reduction. These current transfer payments include in-flows of donor funds and the HIPC debt scheme. Similarly, direct funding of district activities by the central government as a result of resource in-flows from the HIPC debt initiative. For example, additional funds have accrued from the HIPC initiative, which reduced government's debt repayments to foreign debtors by approximately US$ 40 million annually for 30 years. In addition, the 1999 enhanced HIPC initiative gave a further debt relief of US$ 50 million for 20 years with effect from May 2000. These two debt relief initiatives have led to increased resource in-flows at both the national and local levels. According to the Secretary of the Poverty Action Fund (PAF[13]), government spent Ushs 141 billion on sectors that

[11] Women fare poorly because they are engaged in food production and also due to socio-cultural impediments that constrain their access to productive resources and the decision making process.

[12] In respect to regions, Appleton (1999) indicates that, whereas absolute poverty only declined by 8% and 13% in the east and northern regions respectively since 1992, it decreased by 39% in the central region. Also see Poverty Trends in Uganda (1998).

[13] The PAF is a special bank account that has been created to handle funds that have accrued from the HIPC debt initiative with a goal of channeling them to priority action areas that have been identified to directly benefit the poor. These include primary healthcare, rural

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directly benefit the poor of which Shs 111 billion was directly channeled to the districts (Local Governments) in the financial year 1997/98. However, by 2000/01 the budgeted expenditures for PAF programs had tripled to Ushs 462 billion of which Shs 340 billion went to districts. The HIPC debt relief savings, donor budget support, and the increased consumption of credit may create temporary relief and false indicators that the benefits of growth are 'trickling-down.' Hence, poverty is still a formidable challenge that requires concerted government action to alleviate it on a sustainable basis.

Notwithstanding official statistics that claim a growing reduction in poverty head-count, independent studies conducted indicate that macro-economic improvements have not only evaded the poor but may have even exacerbated their condition (Kayiso, 1995; CDRN, 1996; Smith, 1997; Goetz and Jenkins, 1998; UPPAP, 2000). These findings contradict government claims that poverty has reduced. For example the Community Development Resource Network (CDRN) used a participatory approach to conduct research in seven districts (Apac, Kampala, Kapchorwa, Kibaale, Kisoro, Kumi and Nebbi) on behalf of Novib, Oxfam and Action Aid in March 1996. The research findings indicate that poverty was increasing due to policies that are part of the structural adjustment reforms vigorously pursued by the Uganda government since 1987:

> Here again field consultations point us in a different direction: not only is poverty perceived by local residents to be widespread among many communities in Uganda, in both rural and urban areas, but it also emerges from the accounts of those communities that were studied that this situation is perceived to be getting worse, especially in the last 10 to 15 years (CDRN, 1996: 3).

Similarly, a survey carried out by Bank of Uganda between 1994 and 1997 found out that poverty was increasing (Smith, 1997). The survey considered a number of dimensions of people's living conditions, especially with regard to housing conditions, sanitation, education, health care, income and expenditure, and access to transport and communication. The report revealed that not only the poverty situation in Uganda had increased in the areas surveyed but that it was also severe.

Moreover, the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) (2000)

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roads, primary education, rural water and sanitation, and the transformation of agriculture.

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ranked Uganda as the 158th out of 174 poor countries. Besides, the government of Uganda conducted a participatory research in 29 districts of Uganda between 1998 and 1999. The UPPAP research findings had a similarity with those of CDRN. They indicated that poverty was increasing in the countryside.

The research findings of this study also agrees with the view that poverty was increasing in the rural areas. Much as the representativeness of the sample (two districts) in which this research was carried out may be questioned, 78 out of 120 respondents interviewed indicated that poverty was increasing despite their hardworking. The heads of households interviewed indicated that their sources of incomes had deteriorated compared to the past years and that the markets as well as the prices for agricultural produce were dwindling. They also complained of hardships faced in raising funds to meet pressing household expenses like tuition, health fees, and payment of taxes, especially graduated tax. Even community leaders generally complained that poverty was on the increase in the rural areas. They however attributed it to poor infrastructure and lack of markets. The increase of mutual aid agencies (self-help support groups) in rural areas was largely attributed to the increase in poverty and the lack of alternative sources of raising funds.

Some of the possible explanations as to why the various researches conducted on poverty in Uganda tend to contradict each other may be due to the different definition, methodologies and analyses used to derive such sets of data. If, for example, poverty is perceived in income-expenditure terms, there is a high possibility that that the non-material aspects of poverty will be skipped which will lead to an incomplete picture of poverty. Like earlier argued, there is need to compliment the quantitative approaches with qualitative methods while conducting studies on poverty. For instance, the major weakness with the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) policy framework was designed on the basis of data generated by quantitative household surveys conducted from 1992 to 1996. This data did not incorporate the perceptions of poverty by the poor themselves, which was a serious omission (Goetz and Jenkins, 1998:13). The eventual realization that the implementation of PEAP was being constrained by the failure to include perspectives of the poor, forced the government to conduct UPPAP, which is a qualitative study, in 1998 and 1999. The study involved consultation with the poor to ensure that their voices influence the national policy.

As far as the approaches used are concerned, official government

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statistics have frequently adopted a quantitative approach while those of CDRN and UPPAP used a qualitative method. Moreover, government statistics tend to be based on small samples carried out either in urban or peri-urban areas. A case in point is the IHS of 1992, which interviewed around 1000 households (Appleton, 1996). The common practice with government officials conducting such studies is that they tend to work around urban or peri-urban areas where conditions are conducive. They also tend to take fewer days than those indicated on their claim forms so as to maximize their savings. This is why such statistics tend to be unreliable. While writing on Uganda, Brett (1994: 66) also cautioned against accepting official statistics by their face value:

> Economists evaluating structural adjustment programs tend to compare performance..... using publicly reported data. They then compare the results to confirm or disconfirm the outcomes predicted by their models. ....this under-estimates the problems involved in managing change, since those concerned systematically conceal information from the state..... Official statistics and actual outcomes are very imperfect indicators of the impact of policy.....

The paradox of apparently mass poverty amidst high economic growth rates can be partly explained by distortions caused by macroeconomic policy reforms. More specifically, the presumption that the liberalization of tradeables such as coffee would increase the incomes of rural farmers and subsequently reduce their poverty, seem not to be applicable in the Ugandan context. This presumption can be disqualified on two accounts. First, is the assumption that trade liberalization stimulates those sectors of the economy in which Uganda has a comparative advantage like agriculture. Although it is possible that farm gate prices may improve the incomes of farmers and create employment opportunities in the initial period and therefore motivate farmers to produce more, these gains are short-lived because of the unpredictable global trading system. The amount of tradeables produced like coffee is regulated by the quota system allocated to each producing country. Moreover, the fluctuation in the world prices of such tradeables negatively impacts on the price. For example, whereas 2,792,753 (60kg) bags fetched US$ 432,651,033 in 1994/95, the total value declined in 1996/97 when 4,148,803 (60kg) bags fetched US$ 366,126,641 despite the increase in tonnage (Bank of Uganda Annual Report, 1997/98). Besides, the findings by Arinda and Namanya (1998) in their study of the impact of liberalizing coffee prices on the farmers indicate that although coffee

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farmers fared well generally, some were not benefiting as anticipated. The key to lack of success seemed to reside in the remoteness but perhaps more significant was the exploitation by both middlemen and moneylenders. It is therefore vividly clear that the liberalization of tradeables may not directly translate to increased benefits to farmers because of both domestic bottlenecks as well as international factors like quota systems, fluctuation of producer prices, and market protectionism by Western countries.

Second, the Ugandan economy is still predominantly a subsistence economy which has a weak integration into the modern economy. In this particular respect, a subsistence economy refers to a situation where the agricultural production of the majority of the population is not driven by the profit motivation but by domestic consumption. Although these people may from time to time interact with the market by selling their surplus produce to meet essential requirements, they have not transformed into commercial farmers and most of their market transactions are not accounted for in government economic statistics. In fact, the recent government policy goal, the Plan for Modernization of Agriculture (PMA)[14], acknowledges that Uganda's agriculture is of a subsistence nature and plans to transform it into commercial agriculture. The participation of farmers in the market as well as general commercialization of Uganda's agricultural produce remains low. According to Deininger and Okidi (1999) about 25% of crop producers are pure subsistence producers while about 70% were only marginal market participants who sell less than 20% of their output. They further indicate that the increase of agricultural cash crop producers grew by only 4% (from 26% to 30%) between 1992 and 1996. This evidence is supported by the findings of the 1992/93 Household Budget Survey which indicate that food crops account for about 90% of total income earned from agriculture including home consumption, whereas traditional cash crops account for about 6%. Moreover, the recent poverty trends (UNHS, 2000) have confirmed that most of the poor live in the rural areas and most of these (84%) primarily depend on agriculture for their livelihood. Therefore, trade liberalization of tradeables may not improve the living standards of the poor.

Ssemogerere et al (1994) had also previously established that the elimination of government marketing boards in Arua resulted in

[14] PMA is a holistic, strategic framework for eradicating poverty through multi-sectoral interventions that are aimed at combating constraints that directly impinge on the agricultural sector, which affects the livelihood of many Ugandans.

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monopoly buyers for cotton and tobacco and consequently led to limited price incentives for farmers. This evidence is corroborated by the findings of the IHS (1992), which indicate that the poor are much less involved in the market than the less poor and therefore have benefited less from market liberalization. Contrary to the neo-liberal assumptions that the rural poor will take advantage of liberalized commodity prices, the remote rural poor have not benefited in the case of Uganda. The macro-economic assumptions grossly underestimate the influence of economic infrastructure as well as other constraints already mentioned. These inherent constraints imply that the liberalization of the prices of tradeables may not automatically translate to direct benefits for all the rural poor. While trade liberalization is assumed to motivate rural farmers to produce more, their participation in the market may be complicated by other factors that generally constrain agricultural production. These include low level of technology, market and credit imperfections, insecure property rights, low level of human capital, limited opportunities for diversification out of agriculture (Reardon, 1996) as well as poor physical infrastructure. Moreover, the increase of agricultural production *per se* may not translate into increased incomes for the farmers. This is partly because their products may not be competitive in the world market because they do not have value added. They are simply unprocessed raw materials, which fetch low prices. Therefore, trade liberalization alone may not be beneficial to farmers unless it is pursued simultaneously with agro-processing to add value to these products.

The impact of adjustment is also gender specific. Women are less likely to benefit from market incentives because their labor goes to the production of food crops. Even in circumstances where Ugandan women are involved in the production of food crops that have a market value like maize, they are less likely to benefit from liberalization of commodity prices because they have little control over the benefits so derived (Ahikire, 1998). This is because most women in Uganda do not have land ownership rights (Goetz and Jenkins, 1998: 10) because of cultural and legal impediments. They are therefore some times marginalized in the sale of items or commodities that arise out of their labor and in the decision making process of the household.

Besides, the requirement of adjustment policies to reduce government expenditure and control inflation to single digit figures negatively impacts on the poor people. The squeeze in government expenditure leads to declining incomes and rising expenditure of the poor because

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they are required to subsidize social services that were previously accessed free of charge. The poor were accustomed to the situation where education and health as well as hybreed seeds, acaracides, pesticides and farm implements were either provided free of charge or highly subsidized prior to the implementation of adjustment reforms. However, the reforms have now required them to sell some of their assets in order to meet immediate requirements like healthcare in form of cost sharing[15] and payment of school fees. The burden of cost sharing on the poor cannot be disputed. Though the rural poor contribute substantially to health-care, emerging evidence shows that user fees have not improved health services. Notwithstanding the delivery of poor services, cost sharing has led to the decline in the demand of outpatients and reproductive health services while increasing attendance of traditional birth attendants and traditional healers (Ssemogerere et al, 1994). In this example it seems clear that adjustment policies have exacerbated misery of the Ugandan poor, contrary to the expectations of the World Bank technocrats.

Moreover, the emphasis by adjustment reforms on stringent fiscal and monetary policies affects the availability of credit to the poor. This is because these policies lead to high interest rates by lending banks. The demand for fiscal and monetary discipline as well as rationalization of financial institutions impedes the access of the poor to credit facilities in Uganda. The interest rates charged on loans by Uganda's commercial banks have ranged from 20 to 40%. These high rates are supplemented by other stringent requirements like collateral, which the majority of the poor lack. The closure of non-viable branches of Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB)[16] in the countryside because of restructuring also reduced access of the rural poor to banking facilities.

The requirement by adjustment policies to restructure and rationalise the civil service, which led to retrenchment, also harmed the well being of the poor. Contrary to the view that retrenchment may not

[15] Since 1990, the government has introduced a number of cost-sharing schemes to raise funds that would be used at the local health unit to motivate staff and meet some operational costs. The outcry against cost sharing however came up during the presidential election campaigns as a highly contentious issue. The sensitivity of the matter forced the NRM government to scrap cost sharing against the poor. It has now been made optional for those who do not want to line up with the ordinary people for medical services to opt for the paying private wards where there is no congestion and services are faster (*The New Vision*, February 17, 2001).

[16] UCB is a government owned bank that was created after independence to protect the interests of the Ugandan people. It is the only bank with an extensive branch network in both urban and rural areas in Uganda. The restructuring process of UCB in 1997/98 however led to the closure of UCB non-viable rural branches.

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impact negatively on the rural poor, the reality is that it cut off remittances of those who had had such a privilege. The linkages between the rural and urban areas cannot be underrated given the fact that urban dwellers maintain close ties with their rural counterparts. The institution of the extended family is very instrumental in Uganda's case. Many rural people receive transfer payments from their children and relatives employed in urban areas. The urban employees also maintain second homes in rural areas where they often provide employment to the rural poor. Retrenchment therefore affected the well being of those rural families that previously benefited from transfer remittances.

The NRM Government's Anti-Poverty Strategies

The NRM government's anti-poverty policy action took cognisance of the fact that high economic growth was not translating into high living standards for the poor as anticipated. The recognition of increasing poverty levels therefore precipitated government to take the necessary steps to reverse it. More particularly, government attention has been focused on understanding the nature, magnitude, causes and location of the poor with the view of designing appropriate policies and/or re-focusing the existing ones to cater for the plight of the vulnerable. Some of these policies include pursuing prudent macroeconomic policies and the formulation of a national policy framework, PEAP. In addition to these, the NRM government has redirected budgetary resources towards programs with the highest potential for poverty reduction as well as creating a Poverty Action Fund (PAF) in 1998 (PEAP, 1997; MFPED, 1999/2000). The government has also resolved to transform the agricultural sector as a means of reducing poverty. This decision is in advanced stages and is guided by PMA. The overall objective of the government's anti-poverty strategy has been driven by the desire to raise family incomes.

It should however be noted that prior to the formulation of PEAP, government had previously been engaged in countrywide activities aimed at alleviating poverty. These include the giving of credit as exemplified by the Rural Farmers Scheme (RFS)[17], *Entandikwa,* and Poverty Alleviation Project (PAP)[18] to the poor. In addition, other

[17] RFS was a rural credit scheme launched by government in 1987 through the Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB) to assist rural farmers. It involved a revolving fund of 6 billion shillings (US$ 6 million) meant to transform farmers from subsistence to commercial producers.

[18] PAP is a micro-finance program formed in 1994 by government to support the economically active poor engaged in small-scale enterprises. It was funded by a loan of US$ 13.5 million from the African Development Bank and US$ 1.5 million by government of Uganda.

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programs geared towards relieving the poor of their poverty include Program for the Alleviation of Poverty and the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAPSCA), Northern Uganda Reconstruction Program (NURP), the Cotton Sub-Sector Development Project (CSDP). All these poverty alleviation schemes have been targeted. A discussion of these targeted programs is detailed below.

Government attempted to directly alleviate poverty through PAPSCA project, which was launched in 1989 to mitigate the social costs of adjustment by targeting social amenities at vulnerable sections of the population whose welfare had deteriorated as a result of the implementation of adjustment reforms. Assistance was given to communities to construct schools, health centres, rural roads as well as the provision of clean drinking water. It also helped orphans by paying their school fees while widows were given credit to engage in productive economic ventures (PAPSCA Report, 1990). The PAPSCA anti-poverty strategy however failed to improve the plight of the poor because it was crowded with many projects that were spread far too thinly to have a broad impact on poverty. Besides, it was plagued by implementation and funding problems, while acting in isolation from other government structures (PAPSCA Report, 1993). In addition to these shortcomings, PAPSCA was not implemented on the basis of informed policy. There was no single study of poverty that had been conducted to establish the plight and needs as well as the location of the poor prior to launching of PAPSCA. It was therefore an impromptu reaction to poverty whose impact on the poor was minimal and short-lived since it could not be sustainable.

PAPSCA was succeeded by *Entandikwa,* a state-managed national credit scheme, initiated in 1994/95 financial year with an initial capital of Ushs 6 billion (US$ 6 million at the then exchange rate of Ushs 1000 per one US dollar). It was aimed at benefiting the poor who can not access bank credit from formal financial institutions due to lack of collateral (Policy Statement on *Entandikwa*, 1995). It is meant to assist the poor to engage in productive economic ventures so as to raise their family incomes. The government has since disbursed a total of Ushs 9.9 billion (US$ 9.92 million) to 39,000 clients (*The New Vision*, February 22, 1999). The performance of *Entandikwa* credit scheme has been futile due to political interference, high deliquency rates and poor supervision. In addition, the available funds have not been able to match the immense needs and those who have succeeded in getting loans received little money that could not make a viable investment. Moreover, the

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disbursement of funds has been characterized by delays due to budgetary constraints.

Other government targeted programs like NURP, CSDP and cattle restocking scheme in the northern and eastern parts of Uganda have equally performed poorly. NURP that was established to reconstruct the northern and eastern regions ravaged by insurgency has been crippled by delays in the disbursement of funds by both the donor community and the Ugandan government. The CSDP was targeted at boosting cotton growing. This project was put directly under Uganda's Central Bank and provided improved cottonseeds, subsidized loans, extension services, farm implements and accessories to farmers. This project has been limping due to unfavourable world commodity prices for cotton, which have de-motivated farmers. Similarly, the cattle restocking exercises in the northern and eastern regions of Uganda are still ongoing though not faring well. These have been aimed at restocking cattle in these areas that were ravaged by insurgency. Nonetheless, the restocking exercise has been slow because of insufficient funds and the continued insecurity in these areas.

It is not until 1996 that the NRM government undertook a comprehensive poverty eradication strategy as its major focus of its overall sustained growth and development strategy. The policy strategy is guided by the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), which is a detailed policy framework to guide government efforts to eradicate poverty within the next two decades (1997-2017) (PEAP, 1997). PEAP underscores government commitment to prioritize poverty eradication as its major objective since 1996. Government anticipates reducing the proportion of the population living in absolute poverty from 44% (1997) to below 10% by the year 2017. PEAP, which is a detailed program for achieving this goal, adopts a multi-sectoral approach. It identifies five priority action areas with the view that increasing their funding would directly meet the needs of the poor. These include primary health care, rural roads, primary education, rural water and sanitation, and the transformation of agriculture. Other government initiatives to eradicate poverty include the enactment of the land law[19] to ensure that peasants and women are given land rights; the implementation of Universal Primary Education (UPE)[20], and the formulation of Vision 2025[21] (a

[19] The Land Act was enacted in July 1998. It includes significant provisions that give security of tenure to the poor in order to lead to increased agricultural production. The new law however denies land ownership rights to women.

[20] UPE is a government education policy launched in 1997 to enable four children in every

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strategic plan for the next 25 years, which earmarks strategic areas of development that should be prioritized).

There is no doubt that these anti-poverty policies show the NRM government's commitment to fight poverty. There is also a possibility that these anti-poverty strategies may reduce poverty in the short-run. The main concern however is the long-term impact of such policies. The anti-poverty policy framework as guided by PEAP is not only ambitious but unrealistic given the resource base constraints of the country. It is reminiscent of the five-year development plans of the 1960s, which looked like wish lists drawn to attract donor funds. PEAP's multi-sectoral approach to fund the social service sector, agriculture and extension of credit to the poor though important for poverty reduction, may not be sustainable for a poor and donor-dependent country like Uganda. For example, the contribution of domestic tax revenue to total government expenditure in the financial year 2000/01 was 53% (MFPED, 2001/02; *The New Vision*, September 15, 2001). This contribution has continued to fall to such an extent that donor funding is currently at 52% of total government expenditure (MFPED, 2001/02). Uganda's domestic revenue to GDP ratio has remained between 11-12% (Poverty Status Report, 2001), which means that its budget is dependent on donor funds. It is therefore suicidal for a poor country that largely survives on borrowing and charity to operate a welfare system that have been restructured and even abandoned by the wealthier countries of the West. It would be more realistic for such a country to efficiently use the available scarce resources to build enduring capacity after which consumption can come later.

The likelihood of implementing PEAP is also doubted because of its multi-sectoral nature and the belief that the mere increase of public spending to sectors that are accessible to the poor directly leads to poverty eradication. Even though poverty is to some extent attributed to a reduction in the provision of social services by governments, the mere increase of funding certain social services may not translate into improved welfare of the poor. This is because such public funds may be diverted and/or embezzled by public servants and politicians. This has been common with the Uganda government, which has been ranked the

family to have free primary education.

[21] Vision 2025 is a UNDP-funded planning process that involved a lot of consultations with all the stakeholders in Uganda to elicit views on national priorities for poverty reduction, human development, governance, environment, gender equity, and economic development more generally.

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third corrupt country in the World by the newly issued report[22] on worldwide corruption levels. Some of the existing literature is equally sceptical about the appropriateness of using budgetary allocations as a policy weapon to address the plight of the poor (Ablo and Reinikka, 1999).

Much as poverty is multifaceted and hence requiring a multisectoral approach, there is need for a cautious strategy given the limited resources available. The limited resources in form of donor funds and domestic resources need to be carefully allocated. This raises policy questions of how to spend these limited resources. Should they be used to fund free medical care and education or be used to create the infrastructure for health and education? The question of prudent planning, prioritization and sustainability becomes very important.

This paper is aware of the policy changes within the World Bank since the 1990s, which embraced anti-poverty strategies like Universal Primary Education (UPE) as earlier indicated. The importance of these reforms notwithstanding, the rural poor still confront hardships in these sectors. It is a fact that UPE has relieved the Ugandan poor from paying primary school fees and increased the numbers of school-going children from 2.4 million in 1996 to 6.5 million in 2000 (Bitamazire, 1999). There is however growing concern about the future of this program as well the quality of the products. The sustainability of UPE in the event of donor pull out is one of the major concerns since it is donor dependent. According to the MFPED (2000/01), UPE has greatly benefited from savings arising from HIPC debt initiative and other bilateral support channeled through PAF. About 90% of Uganda's educational sector is funded by donors and 65% of these funds go to the primary sub-sector (*The New Vision*, October 24, 2001). The NRM government has failed to build capacity for the last sixteen years because 52% of national government expenditure is contributed by donors (MFPED, 2001/02).

Besides, much as communities appreciated the UPE policy since it benefited children from poor households, concern has been raised about the declining quality of UPE. It has for instance been indicated that 30% of primary schools do not offer full curriculum of seven years (UNDP, 2000). Furthermore, the fact that the UPE classes are congested, have inadequate instructional materials, and there is automatic promotion to the next class has raised worries. Government statistics indicate that the

[22] The newly issued report on worldwide corruption levels by Transparency International has ranked Uganda as the second (*The Monitor*, October 02, 2001, 'Uganda Second Most Corrupt-Report'.

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national pupil to teacher ratio is 59 pupils per teacher while the classroom to teacher ratio is 99 pupils per class (*The New Vision*, October 24, 2001). Similarly, a report by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) Institute of Statistics (2001) quoted by the Ugandan press indicated that each Ugandan teacher teaches an average of 60 pupils in a class. This compares badly with The SSA average of 40 pupils per teacher. The report also states that teachers are poorly trained (*The Monitor*, April 12, 2002).

In addition, more concerns have been raised about the declining morale of teachers, delayed arrival of salaries, and poor supervision of teachers. This explains the increase in private schools especially in urban areas to cater for the children of the middle class. It is quite possible that the next generation of UPE will constitute mediocres who may never reach the university level hence worsening the already existing inequalities. Much as UPE has helped parents, their real burden lie in post-primary education where fees have been escalating. Therefore, the introduction of cost-sharing at post-primary and tertiary levels has increased the burden of parents since the paying of fees at the highest levels of education undermines the whole efficacy of cost free UPE.

Much as the NRM's anti-poverty strategies in areas like UPE and health are commendable, there is cause for concern on how policy choices were made. In order for these policies to have a long-term impact and be sustainable especially in case donors pull out, much emphasis could have been put on laying a firm foundation for health and education. This could, for example, have been done by building more schools and health centres, concentrating on preventative rather than curative health as well as improving the quality of teachers and medical workers through intensive training. Community awareness campaigns could also be promoted through the training of many community workers. Furthermore, the initiating of educational media programs on issues like ensuring hygienic conditions and the importance of giving education to children builds more capacity for poverty eradication and are more sustainable than the current populist practices of free primary education and health.

Similarly, PEAP puts emphasis on the strategic role of agricultural development in poverty eradication. The modernization of agriculture sector is intended to reduce poverty in rural areas because this sector engages more than 80% of the Uganda labour force, the majority of who are poor. It is also anticipated to improve the welfare of the poor

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because more than 85% of Uganda's population live in rural areas where agriculture is the major source of livelihood (Poverty Status Report, 2001). The modernization of agriculture is enshrined in the PMA. The major vision of the PMA is to eradicate poverty by transforming subsistence agriculture to commercial agriculture. This transformation is expected to improve the welfare of the poor subsistence farmers by orienting their production towards the market. It is further anticipated that the growth of the agriculture sector will stimulate structural change in the entire economy because of its strategic importance (PMA, 2000). Among the issues earmarked is the increase of acreage for cash crops like coffee. According to the president's address to the seventh parliament, Museveni revealed government policy of ensuring that every Ugandan adult has at least an acre of any one cash crop as a means to fight poverty (*The New Vision*, July 3, 2001).

Although the formulation of PMA is a positive step of government's anti-poverty crusade, the plan makes a false assumption that the rural people are poor because of primitive production techniques and inability to produce for the market, which is not the case. The major cause of poverty among the rural poor is the high cost of inputs, poor storage, inadequate or lack of infrastructure, and the lack of markets for their agricultural products. Recent studies in Uganda have, for instance, revealed that farmers (74%) are dissatisfied with the existing market outlets for produce. The poor marketing facilities coupled with heavy post harvest losses were pointed out to be responsible for keeping the rural communities in the bondage of poverty (NSDS, 2000). Similarly, in the recent speech by president Museveni, he acknowledged that peasants were producing a surplus and their problem was lack of markets (*The New Vision*, November 20, 2000).

Given the deteriorating terms of trade[23], what could have been the viable anti-poverty strategy in the agricultural sector is to put emphasis on food security as well as diversification to promote the production of non-traditional and high value agricultural exports. The major problem of the rural poor is not that they are not willing to adopt new technologies and farming methods so as to increase their incomes but the lack of access to and information about markets. The government policy would be more appropriate if it is oriented towards the provision of storage

[23] The impact of the deteriorating terms of trade on Uganda's exchange rate between June 1999 and April 2000 led to depreciation of 5.4%. Likewise, the terms of trade for agricultural commodity exports reduced export receipts from US$ 726.4 million in 1998/99 to US$ 638 million in 1999/2000 (MFPED, 2000/2001).

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and processing facilities in rural areas, in the form of export processing zones. In addition, the government needs to create new markets, disseminate market information, protect the local markets, and either invest in or give incentives to the private sector. This is likely to encourage more investments in the local production of agricultural inputs and agro-industries so as to add value and subsequently make its products competitive in global markets. Besides, PMA is a grandiose scheme whose co-ordination and subsequent implementation is likely to be difficult if not impossible given the low technical capacity of the Uganda public service which is undergoing restructuring. While this plan may be aimed at attracting donor funds, it is a difficult undertaking in terms of practical implementation.

More significant, however, is the fact that the 'top-down' approach used to design and implement anti-poverty strategies appear to have shortcomings. The NRM's anti-poverty strategies need to have put into consideration the variation in the causes of poverty in different areas. For example, causes of poverty, which are specific to the northern and eastern regions were identified by UPPAP (2000) as insurgency-related. Other areas like Kisoro were reported to be poor because of isolation. Such places would benefit more through the creation of physical infrastructure and accessibility to markets. Therefore, for anti-poverty strategies to be effective, they do not only need to be area-specific but also have to be designed and implemented in collaboration with grassroots institutions. While there has been decentralization[24] of powers and responsibilities to local governments in Uganda (The Uganda Constitution, 1995; The Local Governments Act, 1997), the on-going anti-poverty approach is largely center-driven (top-down) where the priorities of the centre are forced on local governments. The priority areas identified by the central government in its anti-poverty crusade are the ones funded through conditional grants to local governments. For instance, the overall share of conditional grants in total transfers to districts has barely declined from 90% in 1994/95 to about 80% in 1999/2000 (Poverty Status Report, 2001). The priorities for expenditure on poverty eradication at the centre do not always match those at the

[24] Decentralization in Uganda involved the transfer of powers, responsibilities and functions to lower levels of government. It was launched in 1989 and its objective was to make government responsive to the priorities of the local communities, which involves poverty eradication. Local authorities however appear not to be responsive to the needs of the poor. Local patronage networks as well as the tendency for local leaders to be self-serving are undermining the interests of the poor.

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district level. There is therefore urgent need for flexibility over the use of conditional grants so that local governments can effectively respond to local priority needs for poverty eradication.

Nonetheless, the central government may retain the right to oversee such funds so that they are used for the right activities as well as to ensure accountability of such funds. This is because the systems of accountability at the lower levels of government are still weak. The decentralization experience in Uganda has shown that it may also accelerate corruption if no effective control systems are in place. It is therefore important that decentralization of anti-poverty funds be accompanied by the strengthening of 'bottom-up' accountability measures and transparency institutions as a means to allow efficient government institutions at the lower levels of government. These include transparency of decision-making, accountability, the rule of law and enhanced participation of people in local politics. In other words, there is need for a 'bottom-up' approach that enhances a development partnership between local governments and the centre instead of the existing patronizing relationship.

Another central component of Uganda's poverty eradication strategy is the extension of credit to the poor households. Credit is targeted at the poor so that they can engage in income-generating activities and subsequently raise their incomes. Indeed substantial resources have been channeled through credit. The *Entandikwa* and PAP credit schemes have so far disbursed credit worth about US$ 25 million since 1996. This figure excludes other non-governmental credit programs, which are actively engaged with the poor. The problem with credit however is that it tends not to benefit the poor but the rich. Moreover, there is a tendency to attribute poverty to lack of money when poverty is more than the mere lack of money. Though government reports create an impression that credit has substantially uplifted the poor from poverty (PEAP, 1997), this claim is highly contested. There is no concrete evidence to suggest that credit has been instrumental in eradicating poverty[25]. The practice of borrowing credit for consumption by the poor gives wrong indicators that poverty is reducing. A good example is the eastern region where poverty levels fell from 35% in 1997

[25] Field research conducted by the author found no positive relationship between increased credit disbursement and poverty reduction in Uganda (See William Muhumuza's Ph.D Thesis (2002) titled: *Credit and Poverty Alleviation in the Context of Structural Adjustment Reforms in Uganda*, Department of Political Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, Republic of South Africa).

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to 25% in 2000 according to the UNHS (2000). However, the UNHS (2000) noted that the practice of borrowing credit for consumption purposes was on the increase in the east. It is succinctly clear that such gains in household welfare can not translate to sustainable poverty eradication.

Conclusion

The phenomenon of mass poverty in Uganda continues to pose a challenge to the economic policies pursued by the NRM government. It is against this background that the NRM government has pursued the various anti-poverty policy initiatives but within a macro-economic framework of the World Bank/IMF. These government initiatives notwithstanding, there is growing evidence that these anti-poverty strategies being pursued may not be viable in the long-run. The paradox is that high income growth has not benefited the majority people but has instead increased income disparities between the rural and urban areas and at the regional level. The other outstanding challenge is the sustainability of these poverty eradication programs that require substantial resources, which are not easily available. The continued pegging of such programs on donor funding is risky in the long run. It is therefore important that the policy-makers be cautious on how they choose between the various policy choices. It is pertinent that the various policy choices be weighed against the local resource capacity since failure to sustain them may have ugly political implications for the current or future governments.

Furthermore, the poverty reduction programs currently being pursued by the government may not succeed because their design has been compromised by the World Bank's neo-classical assumptions, which seem to take lightly the significant role of external factors in enhancing impoverishment within poor nations. In the opinion of this author, in the case of Uganda the state needs to influence the course of economic and social development rather than leave this responsibility to the market mechanism. The consequence of abdicating this major responsibility to the market has been the kind of growth that has not been translated into improved welfare for many Ugandans. The NRM regime has of recent conceded policy weaknesses and the necessity to selectively intervene to support key sectors of the economy. While addressing the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the NRM in December 2001, President Museveni reported that government has developed a strategy to undertake strategic interventions in areas of the economy so as to

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achieve its objective of eradicating mass poverty by 2017 (*The Sunday Vision*, December 23, 2001).

Another major weakness is that the current macro-economic policies being pursued by government are largely sustained by donor funds. This promotes dependency at the cost of building a self-reliant economy. Moreover, the fact that there have been no tangible achievements in the attempt to transform trade imbalances between the rich and poor nations dilutes the effectiveness of policy reforms being undertaken by the NRM regime. This position is beginning to be recognized by the World Bank technocrats as evidenced by remarks made by James D. Wolfensohn (President of the World Bank). In the preface to the World Development Report 2000/01, he observed that:

> And while domestic action is critical, we have also learned that global developments exert a potent influence on processes of change at national and local levels and that global action is central to poverty reduction (World Bank, 2001).

The recent trend in the World Bank/IMF circles to pursue a combination of macroeconomic and sector policies aimed at achieving broad-based growth so as to reduce poverty is well focused. Coupled with this policy reform, is the HIPC debt relief initiative and other international initiatives to open up markets of industrialized nations for the products of developing countries. These are manifested in USA's Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) as well as those of the European Union, Japan and the recently held World Trade Organization (WTO) in Dohar, Qatar. These initiatives, if successfully implemented, are likely to create more long lasting and positive economic conditions in the economies of poor countries than aid. This is because the continued pegging of anti-poverty strategies on external resources is tantamount to courting disaster. As of now, the NRM government's poverty eradication strategies, though impressive, are like the proverbial house built on sand. The poor prioritization coupled with dependency on donor-resources paints a bleak future for such pro-poor programs.

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Why do Black American Males Earn Less than Black American Women? An Examination of Four Hypotheses

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Four hypotheses to explain why black men in the United States and Britain earn less than black women are examined. These are (1) Sowell's thesis black males have lower average intelligence than black females; this hypothesis is rejected; (2) black males have lower educational attainment than black females; new American evidence on the educational attainment of 8th grade students in reading, mathematics and science is presented that disconfirms this hypothesis; (3) black males have lower work motivation than black females; evidence on the amount of homework disconfirms this hypothesis; (4) employers are reluctant to employ black males; it is proposed that this is the most plausible explanation for the low earnings of black males compared with black females.

Key Words: Earnings, Academic Performance, Work Motivation, African Americans, Gender Differences

In both the United States and Britain blacks have lower earnings than whites, but the difference is greater for males than for females. The black-white earnings differences for men and women in the United States for the period 1949-1985 obtained from census returns have been calculated by Farley and Allen (1989) and are given in Table 1. The figures are for per capita incomes and show the incomes of black men and women as percentages of those of whites. It can be seen that throughout the period the earnings differential was substantially greater for men than for women. It can be seen also that both black men and women improved their earnings relative to whites from 1949 to 1969, but from 1969 to 1985 black men achieved only a very small improvement in their earnings while black women lost ground. A similar difference in the earnings of black men and women relative to whites has been found in Britain. In a study of a nationally representative sample of 2,867 whites and 1,205 blacks carried out in the mid-1990s it was found that among employees black men earned 91 per cent of white men, while black women earned 109 per cent of white women (Madood & Berthoud, 1997).

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Table 1 – Earnings of Black Men and Black Women as Percentages of the White Population in the United States of America

Year	1949	1959	1969	1979	1985
Men	46	50	55	57	57
Women	66	79	91	88	88

There are four possible explanations that have been proposed, or could be proposed, for the fact that black men have lower earnings, relative to whites, than black women. These are that black men have a disadvantage in intelligence, in educational attainment, in work motivation, or that they are subject to discrimination from employers. The intelligence deficit version of the human capital theory has been proposed by Sowell (1994, p.171) who writes that "research findings have consistently shown that black females have higher IQ test scores, and most other test scores, than black males". If this is so, it would explain some or perhaps all of the disadvantage of black men in earnings because intelligence is a determinant of earnings at a correlation of around 0.35 (Brown & Reynolds, 1975; Jencks, 1972; Murray, 1998), and also because intelligence is a determinant of educational attainment at around 0.58 (Jencks, 1972) to 0.72 (Yule, Gold & Busch, 1982), which also determines earnings. A variant of the human capital theory of the disadvantage of black men in earnings is that this is due in whole or in part to poorer educational attainment, caused either by lower intelligence, as maintained by Sowell or by some other factor such as lower work motivation or conformity. A second possible explanation for the lower earnings of black men is that black men have lower work motivation than black women. Some American ethnographic studies of the high rates of unemployment among black men in inner cities have concluded that a major factor responsible for these is unwillingness to work harder. Thus, Anderson (1980, p.75) writes that "there are many unemployed black youth who are unmotivated and uninterested in working for a living, particularly in the dead-end jobs they are likely to get." Petterson (1997, p.605) writes that "it is commonly contended that young black men experience more joblessness than their white counterparts because they are less willing to seek out low paying jobs."

A third theory of the lower earnings of black men, as compared with black women, is that they are subject to discrimination by employers. This explanation proposes that mostly white employers regard black

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men as more of a threat than black women and as a result discriminate against them. This is suggested by Farley and Allen (1987, p.357) who ask "Do employers frequently assume that young black men are involved more in a street culture of drugs and violence, an assumption that is not made about whites or black women? Are black men viewed as competitors for the jobs of white men while women of both races are not?" Farley and Allen do not provide any answers to these questions.

In this paper we present evidence to test two hypotheses on possible causes of the earnings deficit of black males. The first is that black males may have lower educational attainment than black females, relative to gender differences in other racial and ethnic groups. The second is that black males may have lower work motivation than black females, again relative to other racial and ethnic groups.

Method

The data for this study are derived from the American National Educational Longitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS:88), sponsored by the U.S. National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES, 1990). The sample consists of a nationally representative sample of 8th grade students randomly selected from 1,052 schools stratified by size, urban vs. rural, regional, and percent minority population. Samples were weighted to compensate for unequal probabilities of selection and to adjust for non-response rates. Asian-American and Hispanic students were over-sampled in order to ensure adequate sample sizes for subgroup analyses. The numbers in the sample consist of 1,527 Asian American (6.2%), 3,171 Hispanic (12.9%), 3,009 Black (12.2%), 15,692 White (63.8%), and 924 Native American (3.8%) students. The detailed sampling procedure is described by the National Center for Educational Statistics (1990). The students that participated completed an 85-minute battery of cognitive tests (reading, mathematics, science, and social studies). Students were also asked to give an estimate of hours of homework they did per week.

Results

Table 2 presents the mean scores and standard deviations of the four racial and ethnic groups and for the total sample for reading, mathematics, science and homework. It can be seen that girls obtain consistently higher mean scores than boys for reading and for the amount of homework, while boys obtain consistently higher mean scores than girls on mathematics and science. We examined whether there are sex differences in these measures and found that black boys obtain lower

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scores on these measures than black girls, but the difference wasn't as great relative to the sex differences in the three other groups. Table 3 shows the raw score sex differences and these differences expressed as *d* scores (the differences divided by the standard deviations of the total samples). The data set out in this table show that in general there are only small differences in all the measures and that there is no consistent trend for black boys to perform more poorly than black girls, as compared with the sex difference in the other three groups. Thus, in reading, the advantage of black girls is the smallest among the four groups. In mathematics and science, the advantage of black boys is not as great as that in the other three groups, but the differences are quite small. In homework, black girls have a smaller advantage over black boys, relative to Asians and whites, but a slightly greater advantage relative to Hispanics. The statistical significance of the *ds* is shown in Table 4. This shows that the only difference between the four groups is that Asian, Hispanic and white boys do significantly better in science than girls, whereas among blacks this difference is not statistically significant.

Table 2. – Means Scores of 8th grade students' Mathematics, Reading, Science, and Hours Of Homework by Race And Gender

Variables	*Asian*		*Hispanic*		*Black*		*White*		*Male s*	*Fem.*
	M	*F*	*M*	*F*	*M*	*F*	*M*	*F*		
Reading	49.81	/51.69	45.81	/47.29	45.34	/46.60	50.63	/52.96	49.57	51.58
Math	52.99	/52.77	46.67	/45.55	45.07	/44.96	52.04	/51.71	50.78	50.30
Science	52.64	/48.96	47.27	/45.54	45.29	/44.90	52.82	/51.03	51.45	49.68
Homework	3.88	/4.28	3.95	/4.06	3.91	/4.07	3.95	/4.21	3.95	4.18

Table 3 – Sex Differences in Raw scores and in (Effect Sizes) of Reading, Math, Science, and Homework Comparing Among Racial/Ethnic Groups

Variables	Asian	Hispanic	Black	White	Total
Reading	-1.88 **(-.18)**	-1.48 **(-.17)**	-1.26 **(-.14)**	-2.33 **(-.24)**	-2.01 **(-.20)**
Math	.22 **(.21)**	1.27 **(.15)**	.13 **(.02)**	.33 **(.03)**	.48 **(.05)**
Science	3.68 **(.35)**	1.73 **(.21)**	.39 **(.05)**	1.79 **(.18)**	1.77 **(.18)**
Homework	-.40 **(-.29)**	- .11 **(-.08)**	-.16 **(-.12)**	-.26 **(-.18)**	-.23 **(-.16)**

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Table 4 – Results of ANOVA

Variables	Sex F (df = 1)	Race F (df = 3)	Sex x Race F (df = 3)	Direction of Significant Differences
Homework	20.51***	2.28	1.53	Females (F) > Males (M)
Reading	26.05***	227.18***	1.79	F > M Asian, White > Hispanic, Black
Math	1.73	311.00***	.65	Asian, White > Hispanic, Black
Science	32.29***	303.15***	3.64*	Asian M, White M > Hispanic M > Black M Asian F White F > Hispanic F > Black F Asian M > Asian F Hispanic M > Hispanic F White M > White F

* $p < .01$; *** $p < .0001$

Discussion

This study set out to test the hypotheses that the low earnings of black men, in relation to those of black women, and as compared to sex differences in earnings among whites and other racial and ethnic groups, might be due to a greater sex difference among blacks in educational attainment or in work motivation, such that black males are disadvantaged on one or the other, or both, of these characteristics. The results provide little support for either of these hypotheses. The only result providing some support for the hypothesis that black males may have lower educational attainment relative to black females than is present in other racial and ethnic groups lies in the sex differences in science, where the advantage of boys is significantly greater among Asians, Hispanics and whites, but is not significantly greater among blacks. Nevertheless, considered in the context of the results as a whole, and in particular the relatively high achievement of black boys on reading, the results cannot be regarded as supporting the hypothesis that black boys have any disadvantage in educational attainment, relative to blacks girls, as compared with the other racial and ethnic groups.

The results do not address directly Sowell's (1994) contention that black males have a lower average IQ than black females, and that this is not the case among whites. However, intelligence is so strongly associated with educational attainment that if Sowell's theory were correct black males should perform significantly worse than females on

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the tests of reading, mathematics and science reported in this study. The results show that this is not the case and therefore, provide indirect evidence against Sowell's theory. Furthermore, there is strong direct evidence against Sowell's thesis. There is no tendency for black boys to obtain lower IQs than black girls in the American standardisation sample of the WISC-R (Jensen & Reynolds, 1983) or in studies of large samples in Africa (Klingelhofer, 1967; Owen, 1992).

In this paper we have examined four hypotheses for the explanation of the lower earnings of black males than black females, as compared with the differential among whites. We have not found any evidence to support the hypotheses that black males have lower educational attainment or lower work motivation than black females. The evidence does not support Sowell's contention that black males have lower IQs than black females. By default we are left with the fourth hypothesis that employers tend to be reluctant to employ black men but do not have the same reluctance to employ black women as the most likely explanation of the lower earnings of black men. This appears to be a reasonable explanation because black males as a group tend to have high average levels of aggression. Black male convictions for assault are five times greater than those of white males and for homicide 11 times greater (Taylor and Whitney, 1999). Many white employers are likely to be aware of this and as a result may tend to discriminate against black men while remaining quite willing to employ black women.

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

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Immigrants from the Middle East: A Profile of the Foreign-born U.S. Population from Pakistan to Morocco

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The incorporation of persons of Muslim Middle Eastern origin into the United States of America has attracted heightened interest since the September 11, 2001. The author uses U.S. Census Bureau data to examine the increase in migrants from the Middle East as a share of currently growing total immigration into the United States and their consequent distribution, comparative educational attainment and socio-economic status within their adopted country of residence. The author perceives evidence for a further increase in the numbers of persons of Middle Eastern origin in the United States and of their share of total immigration into the United States in the near future. While noting inequity of treating migrant applicants of Middle Eastern origin differently to migrants of other ethnicities, he suggests that it would be more ethical to effect a reduction in immigration across the board combined with a more rigorous pursuit of illegal Middle Eastern immigrants in particular.

Key Words: Middle Easterner; immigration, Census Bureau, INS, education, socio-economic status, populations, America, Christian, Muslim, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afhganistan, Turkey, Levant, Arab peninsula, Arab North Africa.

In the aftermath of September 11, 2002, there has been heightened interest in the Middle Eastern immigrant population living in the United States. Their integration and incorporation into American society has come to be seen as increasingly important.

Based on an analysis by the Center for Immigration Studies of just-released data from the Census Bureau, this article is one of the first to examine the socio-demographic characteristics of Middle Eastern immigrants in a systematic way. For the purposes of this study, the Middle East is defined as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Turkey, the Levant, the Arabian peninsula, and Arab North Africa.[2]

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[2] We include Bangladesh in our estimates because in 1970 it was part of Pakistan, and thus it is unavoidably included in our Mideast estimates for that year. The entire list of Middle Eastern countries included in the study are: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, West Sahara, and Mauritania.

We do nor include Somalia in our study even though it is officially part of the Arab League. We also included all persons who said they were born in Gaza, Palestine, or the West

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Among the report's findings:

- Middle Easterners are one of the fastest growing immigrant groups in America. While the size of the overall immigrant population (legal and illegal) has tripled since 1970, the number of immigrants from the Middle East has grown more than seven-fold, from fewer than 200,000 in 1970 to nearly 1.5 million in 2000.
- The INS last estimated that 150,000, or about 10 percent, of Middle Eastern immigrants are illegal aliens. Preliminary Census Bureau estimates show a similar number.
- Assuming no change in U.S. immigration policy, 1.1 million new immigrants (legal and illegal) from the Middle East are projected to settle in the United Stares by 2010, and the total Middle Eastern immigrant population will grow to about 2.5 million.
- These figures do not include the 570,000 U.S.-born children (under age 18) who have at least one parent born in the Middle East, a number expected to grow to 950,000 by 2010.
- The religious composition of Middle Eastern immigrants has changed dramatically over the past thirty years. In 1970, an estimated 15 percent (29,000) of immigrants from the region were Muslim; the rest were mostly Christians from Lebanon or Christian ethnic minorities such as Armenians fleeing predominately Muslim countries. By 2000, an estimated 73 percent (1.1 million) of all Middle Eastern immigrants were Muslim.
- Interest in coming to America remains very strong in the Middle East even after September 11. In October 2001, the Department of State received approximately 1.5 million applications from the Middle East (not including Pakistan) for the visa lottery, a program which awards 50,000 green cards each year to randomly selected applicants.
- Middle Eastern immigrants are one of the most educated immigrant groups in America. In 2000, 49 percent had at least a bachelor's degree, compared to 28 percent of natives.
- There is little evidence of discrimination in the job market against the group. Median earnings in 2000 for Middle Eastern men were $39,000, slightly higher than the $38,000 average for native workers.

Bank, as well as persons who indicated they were born in "North Africa" or generally the "Middle East." In addition, we also include a small number of people who were reported as having been born in "Africa" or Southwest or South Central Asia and who gave a Middle Eastern ancestry, primarily "Arab," "Palestinian," "Pakistani," and "Lebanese."

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- Citizenship rates are relatively high among Middle Easterners, with 55 percent holding American citizenship, compared to 38 percent of immigrants overall.
- Given their high citizenship rates, relative affluence, and strong interest in Middle East politics, absent a change in U.S. immigration policy, continued Middle Eastern immigration appears likely to lead to changes in U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict as elected officials respond to this population's growing electoral importance.
- While many Middle Easterners are well-educated and prosperous, a significant share are poor and make use of America's welfare system. In 2000, nearly one in five Middle Eastern immigrants and their young children lived in poverty, compared to about one in 10 natives; 23 percent used at least one major welfare program, compared to only 15 percent of natives.
- California has the largest Middle Eastern immigrant population, with nearly 400,000. Of states with the most Middle Eastern immigrants, Virginia has the fastest growing population, followed by Texas, Michigan, and New York.
- 10 percent of immigrants are self-employed compared to 11 percent of natives; 19 percent of Middle Eastern immigrants own their own businesses.

Because all children born in the United States to immigrants are by definition natives, the sole reason for the dramatic increase in the Middle Eastern immigrant population is new immigration. While some immigrants die and others return home, the issuance of permanent residency visas and the settlement of illegal aliens greatly exceed deaths and out-migration, so the immigrant population continues to grow.

In any discussion of immigration's effect on the country, it is important to keep in mind that the number of legal immigrants allowed in each year, the selection criteria used, and the level of resources devoted to controlling illegal immigration are all discretionary policies of the federal government and can be increased, decreased, or left unchanged. It should be noted that sampling and non-sampling errors exist in any survey, and the results for relatively small groups should be interpreted with caution.

In this article, the terms "immigrant" and "foreign-born" are used synonymously. The definition of foreign-born is the same as that used by the Census Bureau – persons living in the United States who were not

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U.S. citizens at birth. This includes persons who are naturalized U.S. citizens, legal permanent residents (green card holders), illegal aliens, and . people living in the United States on long-term temporary visas such as students or guesrworkers. It does not include those born abroad of U.S. citizen parents. The data are from an analysis by the Center for Immigration Studies of the public use files of the decennial censuses (1970, 1980, and 1990), the recently released Census 2000 Supplemental Survey (C2SS), and a combined sample of the March 2000 and 2001 Current Population Survey.[3]

Historical Perspective

Immigrants from the Middle East have come to the United States for at least 100 years. In the late 1800s, Maronke Christians from Lebanon and Armenians and other Christian minorities from the Ottoman Empire began settling in the United States in significant numbers. This report, however, focuses on immigration from the region only in the last 30 years. Figure 1 reports the number of Middle Eastern immigrants living in the United States from 1970 to 2000.

The figure shows very dramatic growth in this population over the last 30 years. In 1970, fewer than 200,000 Middle Easterners lived in the United States – by 2000 the number had grown 650 percent to nearly 1.5 million. Over the same period, the total foreign-born population grew at half the rate of the Middle Eastern population. Just since 1990, the Middle Eastern population has grown by 80 percent. As a share of the total foreign-born, those from the Middle East now account for about 5 percent, compared to 2 percent of the total immigrant population in 1970.

These figures do not include the 570,000 U.S.-born children (under

[3] We use the decennial censuses for 1970 through 1990 because these are the only sources available that include questions on country of birth, citizenship, language, and ancestry. Because the public use file of the 2000 Census is not yet available, we use two different **data** sources for 2000.

The total number of immigrants, year of entry, state of residence, and countries reported in the study for 2000 are from analysis of the Census 2000 Supplemental Survey (C2SS) done by the Center for Immigration Studies. The survey collected data on the non-institutionalized population and was conducted over the course of 2000 and includes 372,000 individuals in the public-use file, 1,645 of whom indicated they were foreign-born and from the Middle East.

We also use these data to estimate the share of the Middle Eastern population that is Muslim because the C2SS includes questions on ancestry and language that are the same as the census. For questions on income, welfare use, and educational attainment we use the combined two-year 2000-2001 Current Population Survey (CPS) because it includes more detailed questions on these subjects than does the C2SS.

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18) who have at least one parent born in the Middle East.[4] Nor do they include the grandchildren, great grandchildren, or even longer descendants of immigrants from that part of the world. There are well over one million native-born Americans (including children mentioned above) who trace their ancestry back a few generations to the Middle East.

These U.S.-born adults of Mideast origin are overwhelming the descendants of groups such as Maronites, Armenians, and other Christian groups who entered the country in the late 19th century or first half of the 20th century. They include prominent Americans such as Ralph Nader, Donna Shalala, Jamie Farr, John Sununu, George Deukmejian, Casey Kasem, Frank Zappa, and William Peter Blatty.

A Growing Muslim Share

Immigrants from the Middle East are not a homogenous group. One of the most important aspects of this diversity is in the area of religion. While the Mid-east itself is overwhelmingly Muslim (approximately 98 percent), historically this has not been true of immigrants to the United States from that part of the world. For much *oi* this century, the vast majority of Middle Easterners in the United States were Christians, mostly Maronites from Lebanon, or Armenians, Assyrians, Greeks, Chaldeans, and a small number of Jews exiting predominately Muslim countries. In recent decades this situation has changed significantly.

While the Census Bureau does not ask respondents about their religion, it is possible ro use the ancestry and language questions found in the Census and the C2SS ro roughly estimate the likely religious affiliation ofMideasr immigrants. Based on a methodology summarized in the appendix to this paper, we estimate that 15 percent of the Middle Eastern immigrant population in 1970 was Muslim, but that by 2000 it was 73 percent Muslim. Thus, as the Middle Eastern immigrant population has grown over the last three decades, it has become far more Muslim.

The fact that Mideast immigrants are overwhelmingly Muslim does not mean that Muslims have replaced non-Muslim immigrants. The number of non-Muslims has grown as well, just not as fast. In 1970 there were approximately 160,000 non-Muslim immigrants from the Mideast in the United States and by 2000 there were almost 400,000. The non-

[4] Based on analysis of a combined sample of the March 2000-2001 CPS by the Center for Immigration Studies.

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Muslim immigrant population from the region, therefore, grew two and one-half times over the last 30 years. By contrast, the Muslim immigrant population increased 38-Fold – from less the 29,000 to 1.1 million. This dramatic shift in the religious affiliation of immigrants from the region shows how our immigration system – which allows people into the country primarily based on whether they have a relative here or have won the visa lottery – has a logic all its own, creating social forces and trends not expected a generation ago.

Mideast Immigration Projections

Projecting immigration trends into the future is a difficult task because socioeconomic conditions in both the sending countries as well as in the United States can change significantly over time. Moreover, U.S. immigration laws can and have been changed in the past, and efforts to control illegal immigration could become more vigorous or perhaps even more lax than they already are. However, shorter term projections are much easier because conditions are less likely to change in the course of five or 10 years than over the course of several decades. In the projections below we only focus on the next 10 years. Moreover, we assume no change in U.S. immigration policy.

New immigration (legal and illegal) is primarily driven by the size of chc existing immigrant population because it is the relatives and friends of people already living in the United States who provide information about conditions and opportunities here to prospective immigrants. And in many cases ir is the relatives who then provide sponsorship. Thus the larger the existing immigrant population from a country the larger the potential flow of new immigrants. Conditions in the Middle East indicate that out-migration is likely to continue to be attractive to a significant share of the population. In October 2001, the Department of State received approximately 1.5 million applications from the region for the visa lottery, a program which awards 50,000 green cards each year to randomly selected applicants. These figures do not include Pakistan, which is not part of the lottery. This is strong evidence that even after September 11, interest in coming to the United States remains high in the Middle East.[5]

[5] In October of 2001, a total of 8.7 million applications for the lottery were received. While the State Department does not published the number of applicants received from each country, we do know that 17.1 percent of those selected were from the Middle East. Since the lottery is random, it is reasonable to assume that 17.1 percent of all applicants were from the Mideast. This means that almost 1.5 million people from the Middle East sent in applications.

Information concerning the lottery can be found at the Stare Department's web site at:

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

http://travel.state.gov/DV-2003results.html.

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The economies of the Middle East have also not performed well in recent years. Political oppression and corruption are common and religious minorities and dissenters are likely ro continue to leave the region. Also, Middle Eastern countries have found it exceedingly difficult to provide gainful employment for the large number of young people reaching working-age each year. Thus, out-migration pressures over the next decade are likely to be at least as high as they were in the 1990s.

In 1990 there were 817,000 Mideast immigrants in the United States. The 2000 data in Table 1 show that 692,000 new immigrants came to the United States in the 1990s from the Middle East. We know this because the C2SS, like the Census, asks individuals what year they came to the United States to live.[6] This translates into a ratio of 0.86 new immigrants to old immigrants. That is, almost 700,000 new immigrants in the 1990s joined the 817,000 who were already here in 1990. However, counting all Middle Eastern immigrants who arrived between 1990 and 2000 would be a 10.5 year time period because the C2SS is a midyear survey for 2000.[7] Therefore we exclude half (27,000) of the 54,000 people who said they arrived in 1990.

This means that 665,000 Middle Eastern immigrants arrived between mid-1990 and mid-2000, creating a ratio of 0.81 new immigrants to old. We further adjust this ratio downward because of the possibility that the C2SS, like the 2000 Census, more completely enumerated the foreign-born population than did the 1990 census.[8] If this is the case, then the Middle Eastern-born population may have been larger in 1990 than what was recorded by the 1990 census.

Unfortunately, the Census Bureau has not specifically estimated the undercount of Middle Eastern immigrants from 1990. Thus, there is no way to know what share, if any, might have been missed in the 1990 Census. However, if we make the reasonable assumption that perhaps 3 percent of the Middle Eastern population was missed in 1990, then the total population was really 841,421 in 1990. This then creates a ratio of new ro old immigrants of 665,000 to 841,421 or 0.79. If we then apply this ratio to the existing Middle Eastern immigrant population of

[6] Because it is based on data collected in 2000, this figure does not include persons who settled in the United States in the 1990s and died before the end of the decade. They were, therefore, not included in the 2000 count.

[7] The C2SS is actually taken every month of the year, and as a result, it is supposed to generate midyear estimates of the nation's population.

[8] The population controls or weighting of the C2SS are derived from rhe 2000 census results.

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Table 1. Middle Eastern Countries with the Largest Immigrant Populations in the United States, 2000

Country	Total 2000	1990-2000	1980-1989	pre-1980
Iran	279,062	70,648	90,437	117,977
Pakistan	269,631	143,125	89,630	36,876
Israel	123,695	44,436	39,577	39,682
Iraq	112,686	66,414	7,470	26,702
Bangladesh	103,341	86,885	13,149	3,307
Turkey	91,178	49,264	13,803	28,311
Egypt	87,268	44,632	15,516	27,116
Lebanon	83,298	21,731	29,841	31,824
All Others	318,482	162,784	86,162	70,536
Total	1,469,847	691,049	384,078	393,611
All Arab Countries*	663,846	281,357	130,176	162,313

*Arab countries include Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE, Yemen, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Mauritania, and all persons who did not report a country but were born in the region and gave an Arab ancestry, primarily Palestinians.

Source: Center for Immigration Studies analysis of public use file of Census 2000 Supplemental Survey

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1,469,847 it translates into 1,161,663 new immigrants from the Middle East over the next decade.

The events of September 11, however, have led to somewhat higher scrutiny for applicants from that part of the world; and some prospective immigrants in the Middle East may be more reluctant to emigrate to the United States out of fear of a possible rise in anti-Middle Eastern sentiment in America. However, this is unlikely to have a large impact on the total flow of immigrants from the region over the course of the decade, because many individuals have been waiting years to join ramily members already here, and the political freedoms and economic opportunities in United Stares remain very attractive to a significant share of the world's population, including those in the Middle East.

Moreover, the largest effect on immigration from the region will likely be on those seeking short-term or "nonimmigrant" visas, such as tourists and students who may be less likely to come. To reflect the possibility that fewer people from the region will wish to settle in the United States, we adjust the 1,161,663 down by 4 percent to 1,115,197.

The 1.1 million new Mideast immigrants (legal and illegal) projected to arrive in the next decade, while certainly large, is in no way a break with the past. If anything, ir suggests slower growth in the population than has been the case for the last 30 years.[9] Moreover, it represents no more than 9 percent of the 13 to 15 million immigrants (legal and illegal) from all countries likely to settle in the United States over the next decade, absent a change in immigration policy.[10] The total Mideast immigrant population will not grow by the 1.1 million projected to arrive over the next decade because some Mideast immigrants here in 2000 will die or go home by 2010. The C2SS shows that by 2000 there were 777,689 pre-1990 immigrants still living in the United States of the 817,000 who were recorded in 1990, meaning that 95 percent of those here in 1990 were still here in 2000. This partly reflects the low death rate of this relatively youthful population[11] and also a very low race of

[9] In the 1990 census, 429,536 immigrants from the region indicated that they arrived in the 1980s, a ratio of 0.86 to the 1980 Mideast immigrant population and in 1980, 338,569 Mideast immigrants indicated they arrived in the 1970s, a ratio of 1.75 to the 1970 population.

[10] While there is no way to know for sure how many legal and illegal immigrants will come to America in the next decade, the C2SS (and the 2000 Census) indicated that more than 13 million new immigrants settled in the United States from all countries during the 1990s. For at least the last 40 years, the number of new immigrants each decade has significantly exceeded that in the previous 10 years. Thus, it seems almost certain that without a change in U.S. immigration policy, at least 13 million (bur probably 15 million or more) legal and illegal immigrants will arrive in this decade.

[11] Most deaths in any population occur at the end of the age distribution spectrum. In 1990,

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return-migration. As already mentioned, these seemingly low death and return migration rates may also partly reflect the fact that the C2SS, like the 2000 census, more completely enumerated the foreign-born population than did the 1990 census.

If we again make the assumption that 3 percent of the Middle Eastern population was missed in 1990, and again assume that this was not the case in 2000, then the total population was really 841,421 in 1990. Because 777,689 pre-1990 Middle Easterners were still in the country in 2000, this would indicate that 92.4 percent of the total Mideast population was still in the United States in 1990.

If we project that 92.4 percent of the 1,469,847 Middle Easterners residing in the country in 2000 will still be in the country in 2010 and add this to the 1,115,197 who are projected to arrive over then next decade, we get a total Middle Eastern immigrant population in 2010 of 2,473,712, or an increase of 68 percent over 2000. While this is a dramatic increase, it is still less than the 80 percent growth rate during the 1990s and only somewhat more than the 64 percent growth in the 1980s. Of course, different assumptions will yield different projections; however, experience suggests that projecting future immigration from developing regions, such as the Middle East, based on past trends often yields estimates that turn out to be too low. Thus, if there is a bias in these projections, it is that they understate the number ofMideast immigrants who will actually come. to the United States.

It is important to note that the above estimates do not include the U.S.-born children (under 18) who will be living in Middle Eastern immigrant families by 2010. In 2000, there were 567,000 U.S.-born children under the age of 18 who had at least one parent born in the Middle East.[12] Assuming a similar growth rate in this population as for the Middle East Immigrant population overall, then the number of young children in Middle Eastern families is likely to grow to roughly 950,000 over the next decade.

If these children are included, by 2010 the total number of Middle Eastern immigrants and their young children will almost certainly reach

22 percent of natives were under age five or over age 65, in contrast to only 8 percent of Middle Eastern immigrants. Part of the reason for this is that there are relatively few young children among the Middle Eastern-born population (this is also true for immigrants in general) because even though the group tends to have larger fami-lies than natives, most of the births occur within the United States, making the children automatically natives and not immigrants. This, in turn, creates a lower death rate among the foreign-born.

[12] These figures are based on an analysis of the combined sample of the March 2000-2001 Current Population Survey.

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3.4 million. Of course, it is also important to realize that all of these estimates are based on the assumption that there will be no change in U.S. immigration policy over the next decade. However, legal immigration could be changed, and efforts to enforce immigration laws could have a significant impact on illegal settlement.

Countries

Table 1 reports the number of Middle Eastern immigrants living in the United States for selected countries. The left side of the table shows the total population and the right side shows the year of entry for each country. It indicates that Middle Eastern immigration is very diverse, and that no one country accounts for more than 19 percent of all immigrants from the region. It also shows that the Middle Eastern immigrant population is very recent in origin, with almost three-fourths indicating that they came ro the United States since 1980, and nearly half since just 1990.

One of the most interesting results in 'table 1 is that many of the leading Middle Eastern countries of immigration to the United States are non-Arab. Of the top eight Middle Eastern sending countries in 2000, five – Iran, Pakistan, Israel, Bangladesh, and Turkey – are not majority-Arab countries. (The reader should note that the non-Arab countries in the study are Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iran, Turkey, and Israel.) This is not to say that Arabs do not make up a sizable share of Middle Eastern immigration.

The table shows that 40 percent of all immigrants from that part of the world are from Arab countries, but no Arab country sends as many immigrants to the United States as Iran, Pakistan, or Israel. Of course, it should be kept in mind that many immigrants from Arab countries are not Arabs: such as Armenians, Greeks, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and Jews. However, at least one-fourth of immigrants from Israel are Arabs. Overall, the table shows that Arabs do make *up* a large share of the Middle Eastern immigrant population in the United States.

Turning to the year of entry, we find that 691,949 Mideast immigrants indicated that they arrived in the United States over the last decade. The leading countries of immigration during the 1990s were Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. In fact, one-fifth of all immigrants from the region in the last decade came from Pakistan. The year of entry data also show that Bangladesh, Iran, and Iraq each accounted for one in 10 Mideast immigrants who indicated they arrived during the 1990s.

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Table 2. INS Estimates of Illegal Alien Population From the Middle East, 1996

Country	Illegal Alien Pop.
Pakistan	41,000
Iran	25,000
Lebanon	20,000
Jordan	14,000
Bangladesh	13,000
Israel	11,000
Egypt	11,000
Syria	3,300
Sudan	3,000
Yemen	1,800
Morocco	1,800
Afghanistan	1,700
Turkey	1,400
Iraq	1,000
Algeria	1,000
Total	150,000

Source: *Estimates of the Undocumented Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: October 1996*, Robert Warren, Office of Policy and Planning U.S. INS. Paper presented at the Joint Statistical Meetings, August 1997.

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The table shows that although Israel had the third largest number of immigrants in the country, it no longer sends as many. It ranks seventh in terms of the number of immigrants it sent over the last decade. Thus Israeli immigrants will progressively become a smaller share of the total Mideast population in the United States. While non-Arab countries tend to dominate the list of top sending countries in the 1990s, immigrants from Arab nations accounted for 42 percent of all Mideast immigration during the 1990s.

Illegal Immigration from the Middle East

Estimating the size of the illegal alien population residing in the United States is a difficult task. It is even more difficult to determine the illegal population from only one group of countries, such as the Middle East, which does not send as many immigrants (legal or illegal) as do other parts of the world. The INS and Census Bureau have attempted to estimate the number of illegal aliens in the country, including those from the Mideast. INS estimates were prepared in 1998 of the illegal population residing in the country in 1996.

Table 2 reports the INS estimates of the size of the illegal Middle Eastern population in the United States by country. It shows that approximately 150,000 people from the Middle East resided in the United States illegally in 1996. It is reasonable to assume that this population has grown since that time, but assuming it has not, then about 10 percent of the total Middle Eastern immigrants were illegally in the country in 2000.

The Census Bureau has also attempted to estimate illegal immigration from the Middle East, but its estimates are still in the development phase. However, they have published preliminary results, which are available at the Bureau's website.[13] The Bureau estimates that perhaps 114,818 illegal aliens from the region were captured by the 2000 census. Three important caveats about the census numbers should be noted. First, their estimates include some people who probably were legal residents. Other figures in the report suggest this might reduce the figures by perhaps 15 or 20 percent.

On the other hand, the Bureau defined the Middle East as only Iran, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Levant. They did not include Arab North Africa, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, or Pakistan in their estimates of

[13] The entire Census Bureau report containing estimates of the illegal population by country of origin can be found at:
http://www.census.gov/population/ www/documentation/twps0061 .html. (See Table A-6.)

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Table 3. States with the Largest Middle Eastern Immigrant Populations in 2000 Ranked by Percentage Increase

State	2000	1990	Increase from 1990 to 2000	Percentage of Increase
California	392,365	277,706	114,649	41%
New York	244,867	120,988	124,359	103%
Texas	101,916	43,974	57,942	132%
Michigan	93,999	44,327	49,672	111%
Virginia	81,110	28,935	52,175	180%
New Jersey	78,365	41,418	36,947	89%
Illinois	71,090	41,400	29,690	72%
Florida	55,107	28,512	26,595	93%
All Others	351,608	190,144	161,464	85%
Total	1,469,847	816,914	652,933	80%

Source: Center for Immigration Studies analysis of public use file of Census 2000 Supplemental Survey

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illegal aliens from the Middle East, and no specific estimates for these countries have been published by the Bureau. If these countries were added to the Census Bureau's estimates for the Middle East then it would ;il most cerrainly create a total very similar to the INS estimates reported in Tabled. The'mird caveat Ts' that the Census Bureau estimates include only the illegal aliens enumerated by the 2000 Census. Although there must be some undercount of illegals from that region, they are not included in the Bureau's numbers.

While the INS estimates are several years old and those from the Census Bureau are still preliminary, where comparisons are possible the results are similar. The Census Bureau estimated 30,823 illegal aliens from Iran, and the INS estimated 25,000. While there is uncertainty in estimating illegal immigration, it seems likely that 100,000-200,000 illegal aliens from the Middle East (as denned in this study) now reside in the United States. This is certainly a large number, but probably represents no more than 2 percent of the total illegal population in the United States.

How have these illegal aliens from the Middle East entered the country? The INS last estimated that 40 percent of all illegal aliens in the United States were persons who arrived on temporary visas – such as tourists or students – and never went home. The other 60 percent are thought to be those who snuck into the country illegally. One would suspect that since the Middle East does not share a land border with the United States that most illegals from that region are visa overstayers. However, significant smuggling of illegal aliens from the Middle East across our land borders has taken place. For example, in October 2001 Iraqi-born smuggler George Tajirian pled guilty to forging an alliance with a corrupt Mexican immigration officer, Angel Molina Paramo, to smuggle "Palestinian, Jordanian, Syrian, Iraqi, Yemeni, and other illegal aliens through Mexico and into the United States."[14]

While persons from the Middle East may stand our more in Mexico than in Canada, which has a large Middle Eastern community, widespread official corruption in Mexico makes that country a useful transit point for those trying to sneak into the United States from other countries, including those from the Middle East. Neither the northern nor southern borders are well defended so it seems likely that while most Mid-east illegals are visa

[14] "Iraqi Accused of Smuggling Hundreds in Mideast to U.S.," *The New York Times,* October 26, 2001.

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Table 4. Top Three Middle Eastern Immigrant-Sending Countries by State and Total Arab Population in 2000

State	Total Pop. in 2000	#1		#2		#3		All Arab Countries*	
California	392,3655	Iran	135,138	Pakistan	67,917	Iraq	26,810	133,916	
New York	244,857	Pakistan	62,334	Bangladesh	30,926	Israel	23,510	71,360	
Texas	101,916	Pakistan	28,645	Iran	24,727	Iraq	16,092	40,433	
Michigan	93,399	Iraq	35,676	Lebanon	17,296	Pakistan	14,589	86,774	
Virginia	81,110	Iran	18,040	Bangladesh	16,810	Pakistan	15,238	21,444	
New Jersey	78,365	Egypt	22,974	Israel	11,162	Turkey	10,793	47,109	
Illinois	71,090	Pakistan	13,049	Iran	8,749	Israel	8,370	33,056	
Florida	55,147	Israel	16,470	Iran	7,432	Turkey	5,126	22,065	
All Others	351,698	Iran	68,538	Pakistan	57,356	Israel	34,441	147,487	

*Arab countries include Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE, Yemen, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Mauritania, and all persons who did not report a country but were born in the region and gave an Arab ancestry, primarily Palestinians.

Source: Center for Immigration Studies analysis of public use file of Census 2000 Supplemental Survey

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overstayers, some portion of illegal aliens from the Middle East entered the United States by crossing the border illegally.

Middle Eastern Immigrants by State

Table 3 shows the states with the largest Middle Eastern immigrant populations in the country. California and New York are by far the leading states. Together, those two states account for 43 percent of the total foreign-born population from the Middle East in the United States. This is less than the 49 percent they accounted for in 1990, an indication that the Middle Eastern-born population is perhaps becoming more dispersed in the United States. However, the table shows that the top eight states accounted for 76 percent of the total Mideast population in 2000, which is virtually unchanged since 1990.

The table also shows that Middle Eastern immigrants live in all major regions of the country. In the West they are found mostly in California. In the South-west, Texas has a substantial population, and Virginia and Florida are the leading states in the Southeast. In the Northeast, New York and New Jersey are the states with the largest Mideast populations, and in the Midwest, Michigan and Illinois both have a significant number of immigrants rrom the Middle East.

Table 4 again lists the states with the largest number of Middle Eastern immigrants, but it also shows the top three Middle Eastern sending countries for each state. Also, the table denotes the total number of persons from Arab countries in each state and lists the Arab countries included in the study. (Non-Arab countries included in the study are Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iran, Turkey, and Israel.) Pakistan and Iran are the leading Middle Eastern countries in a number of states. In only two states are Arab countries the leading source of immigrants, New Jersey and Michigan.

In most states, the top three immigrant-sending countries account for roughly 60 to 70 percent of the total Mideast immigrant population. This is not true for Illinois, which has the most diverse foreign-born population from the Middle East. In that state, the top three countries account for only 42 percent of the total Mideast immigrant population.

Although most of the top countries are non-Arab, immigrants from Arab countries still make up a large share of the Middle Eastern population in most states. The highest percentage can be found in Michigan, where more than 70 percent of Middle Eastern immigrants are from Arab countries. The state with the lowest percentage is

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

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Virginia, where only about a fourth of the foreign-born from the Middle East are from Arab countries.

Education

Figure 2 reports the educational attainment for adult immigrants from the Middle East in comparison to all immigrants and to natives. Education levels are important because there is no better single predictor of how someone will do in the labor market than their education level. In fact, this has become even truer in recent years with an ever-widening gap between educated and less-educated workers.

Figure 2 shows that in contrast to immigrants in general, those from the Middle East tend to be more educated than natives. While a very large share of immigrants overall are high school dropouts, those from the Middle East are only slightly more likely to be dropouts than natives. At the higher end of the education distribution, almost 49 percent of Middle Eastern immigrants have at least a bachelor's degree compared to only 28 percent of natives; and at the highest end, 21 percent have a graduate or professional degree, more than twice the percentage of natives. Overall, the figure shows that immigrants from the Middle East are better educated than other immigrants and natives.

Socio-Economic Status

While the education figures found in Figure 2 provide some insight into the social and economic standing of Middle Easterners, Table 5 (page 10) provides a more complete picture by examining several key measures of economic well being. The table reports the percentage of Mideast immigrants with at least a bachelor's degree, their median income, and their self employment, home ownership, poverty and welfare use, including separate figures for selected countries and for immigrants from all Arab countries. Overall, the table indicates that in many ways immigrants from the Mideast are doing well. As we have seen, their education levels are high and as a result the table shows their median income is somewhat higher than that of natives.

More detailed analysis of earnings shows little evidence of discrimination against Middle Eastern immigrants. If we examine earnings in the middle age ranges, where sample sizes are large enough to make comparisons, we find that the median earnings for Middle Eastern men in their 30s who have a college education is the same as natives of the same age who have a college degree: $50,000 a year. The median income Figures for college educated men, Middle Eastern and natives, in their

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Table 5. Socio-Economic Characteristics of Natives and Middle Eastern Immigrants, 2000

	% U.S. Citizens	% College or Grad. Degree[a]	Average Annual Earnings[b]	% Self-Employed[c]	% Home-owners[d]	% in Poverty[e]	% Using Maj. Welfare Programs[f]
Natives	----	28.2%	$38,000	10.8%	69.8%	10.5%	15.0%
Mideast Immigrants	49.3%	46.7%	$39,000	18.5%	53.8%	17.8%	22.8%
Iran	51.6%	60.9%	$60,000	19.9%	69.3%	11.5%	16.1%
Pakistan	39.5%	56.1%	$39,000	24.8%	40.0%	16.4%	27.0%
All Arab Countries[g]	55.3%	43.6%	$36,826	16.1%	54.5%	20.1%	25.3%
Egypt	55.4%	53.4%	$45,000	21.1%	56.2%	9.8%	14.9%
Lebanon	57.6%	48.7%	$50,000	21.5%	71.3%	25.1%	20.7%
All Immigrants	37.8%	27.7%	$27,040	9.9%	48.8%	17.7%	22.1%

[a] Persons 25 to 64 years of age.
[b] Earnings figures are for men 25 to 64 years of age employed full-time for at least part of the year.
[c] Employed persons 25 to 64 years of age.
[d] Based on country of birth of household head.
[e] Figures for immigrants, including those from the Middle East, include U.S.-born children under 18 years old of immigrant mothers. Figures for natives exclude these U.S.-born children.
[f] Major welfare programs include TANF/General Assistance, SSI, Food Stamps, public housing, and Medicaid. Welfare use rates reflect use of welfare by any member of the household based on country of birth of household head.
[g] Arab countries include Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE, Yemen, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Mauritania, and all persons who did not report a country but were born in the region and gave an Arab ancestry, primarily Palestinians.
Source: Center for Immigration Studies analysis of combined two-year sample from the March 2000 and 2001 Current Population Survey.

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40s are also the same at $60,000 a year. Systematic discrimination in the labor market does not appear to be a problem for Middle Eastern immigrants; moreover, their rates of self employment are also significantly higher than that of natives and immigrants in general.

While discrimination does not appear to be a significant problem overall, as we move across the table from left to right, a more complex picture emerges of the economic status of Middle Eastern immigrants. The table shows that home ownership among the foreign-born from the Middle East somewhat lags behind that of natives. More strikingly, poverty rates and use of welfare are significantly higher than that of natives. In 2000, nearly one in five Middle Eastern immigrants and their U.S.-born children (under 18) lived in poverty, compared to about one in 10 natives. Moreover, almost 23 percent of households headed by a Middle Eastern immigrant used at least one major welfare program, compared to 15 percent of natives.

This is a surprising finding given the group's overall education and income levels. Analysis of individual welfare programs indicates that in most cases Middle Eastern households have higher use rates than natives.[15] One possible reason for their relatively high poverty and welfare use rates is the presence of refugees who tend to have the most difficulty adapting to life in their new country. However, this is unlikely to account for the results in Table 5 because only 11 percent of legal immigrants from the region in the 1990s were admitted as refugees or asylees. In earlier decades the figure is even smaller.

While it is not possible to definitively identify refugees and asylees in the data, if we exclude the three primary refugee-sending countries of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan, we still find that poverty and welfare use remain significantly higher than natives. In 2000, excluding these countries, 18.4 percent of Middle Eastern immigrants and their U.S.-born children lived in poverty, indicating that poverty is at least as high among the non-refugee population as among refugees.

If we exclude the refugees we find that 21.4 percent of households headed by non-refugees from the region used welfare.[16] Thus, the high

[15] The CPS shows that 19.7 percent of households headed by a Middle Eastern immigrant have at least one person who uses Medicaid, compared to 12.3 percent for natives. For food stamps the figures were 5.5 percent for Mideast immigrants and 5.2 percent for natives; for SSI it was 6 percent for Mideast immigrants and 3.8 percent for natives; for TANF it was 3.4 percent for Mideast immigrants and 2 percent for natives; and for public housing/rent subsidy it was 3.9 percent for Mideast immigrants and 4.2 percent for natives.

[16] In the March 2002-2001 combined CPS file used to calculate welfare use it is only possible to identify two of the main refugee-sending countries, Iraq and Afghanistan, but not

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rates of poverty and welfare use do not seem to be the result of those allowed into the country for humanitarian reasons. Overall, Table 5 presents a mixed picture of the socio-economic status of Middle Eastern immigrants. While most Middle Eastern immigrants seem to have integrated economically into their new country, a significant share are not doing as well and are finding it difficult to succeed in America.

Policy Discussion

With a total illegal alien population estimated at eight to nine million (150,000 from the Middle East) living in the United States, violations of immigration laws are certainly very common, but there is no evidence that Middle Easterners violate U.S. immigration law at rates higher than other immigrant groups. The expected settlement of more than one million new immigrants from that region over the next decade will overwhelmingly be the result of legal immigration. Of course, legal immigration is a discretionary policy of the federal government.

The number of immigrants allowed into the country can be increased, decreased, or maintained. The selection criteria can also be changed. For example, recently proposed legislation to eliminate the visa lottery would reduce Mideast immigration because a significant number of immigrants from that region have used it to receive their green cards in the past. Alternatively, an amnesty for illegal aliens, which had been gaining political momentum prior to September 11, would increase Mideast immigration by creating more legal immigrants who could then sponsor their relatives.

The effect of immigration on the United States continues to be a subject of intense debate, and immigration policy is clearly in a state of flux. Reducing immigration makes sense for many reasons, but it should be applied fairly to all groups. The same goes for efforts to deal with illegal immigration. Given limited resources in a time of war, it may make sense to more vigorously pursue Middle Easterners who violate immigration laws in the short-term.

As a long-term policy, however, this would be both unfair and perhaps even unconstitutional. The law should be enforced for all, not just those from one part of the world. Whatever immigration policies are adopted in the future, we must avoid calls to single out Mideast

Sudan. However, the C2SS indicates that only 1.7 percent of all immigrants from the region come from Sudan; thus, even if a large share of Sudanese households use welfare, it could not have an enormous impact on welfare use rates.

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immigrants.

Conclusion

While it does not send as many immigrants to the United States as Latin America, the Caribbean, or East Asia, the Middle East has become a significant source of immigrants to the United States. Based on past trends and assuming no change in U.S. immigration policy, 1.1 million new legal and illegal immigrants from the region will settle in the United States in the next decade. The overall size of the Middle Eastern immigrant population is expected to grow to nearly 2.5 million.

These figures do not include the 950,000 or so U.S.-born children who will be living in Middle Easrcrn immigrant families by 2010. Thus, in less than 10 years the number of Middle Eastern immigrants and their young children will grow to 3.4 million. This means that the successful incorporation and assimilation of these immigrants and their children will be of increasing importance to the United States. As their numbers grow, their impact will increase, especially in such areas as U.S. foreign policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict where many have keen interest.

The successful integration of Middle Eastern immigrants into American society is only be partly measured by a srudy such as this, which only examines socio-demographic variables such as education or income or welfare use. Assimilation and incorporation is, of course, much more than holding a job, buying a house, or driving on the right side of the road. In terms of economic status, these immigrants tend to be well-educated with median incomes at least as high as those of natives. The findings also show that high rates of poverty and welfare use are common among the Middle Eastern immigrant population.

But on the question of what one scholar has described as "patriotic assimilation," this report is entirely silent. Do these immigrants and their children view themselves as Americans first and Pakistanis, Iranians, and Egyptians second? Are Middle Eastern immigrants or immigrants in general coming to see America's history as their history? We cannot say from these data. Also, assimilation is a two-way street. Do native-born Americans view Middle Easterners as their fellow countrymen? Although these questions are as important as the questions explored in this study, Census Bureau data do not provide answers to them. Despite its limitations, the analysis found in this article is intended to inform discussion about this growing segment of immigration to the United States.

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Appendix

Determining the Religious Affiliation of Mideast Immigrants, 1970 and 2000 Muslim population in 1970. While the Census does not ask individuals about their religion, it is possible to use questions in the 1970 census and C2SS ro estimate roughly the likely religious affiliation of immigrants from the Middle East. For the 1970s we employ the following methodology: The 1980 census contains a year-of-entry question, so we selected out only those persons who indicated that they arrived in the United Stares prior to 1971 and thus were living in the United States at the time of the 1970 census. We use the 1980 census because it contains two ancestry questions, which were not asked in the 1970 census.

Persons were asked their ancestry and they could give up ro two responses. 160,251 people in the 1980 census indicated that they were born in the-Middle East and arrived prior to 1971. We then exclude all individuals who did not answer the ancestry question. This leaves 136,575 of the 160,251 pre-1971 immigrants in the 1980 census. Of the 136,575 we find that 59,246 gave a response in one of the two ancestry questions which lead us to believe they were non-Muslim. (Primarily Greeks, Armenians, Assyrians, or other Christians, mostly from Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt.) Subtracting 59,246 from 136,575 leaves 77,329 possible Muslim immigrants from the Mideast in the 1980 census who arrived prior to 1971.

We then use the language question to further select out non-Muslims. Of the remaining 77,329 possible Muslims we find that another 25,371 indicated they spoke a language at home such as Armenian, Greek, or Ladino, which indicated they were likely non-Muslims. This leaves 51,958 pre-1971 possible Muslims in the 1980 Census. This represents 38 percent of the 136,575 pre-1971 Middle Eastern-born population in the 1980. This 38 percent can be seen as the upper bound of the possible share of Muslims in the 1970 census.

Based on anecdotal and other evidence, we then adjusted downward the remaining number of possible Muslims from selected countries using the following ratio: 0.33 for Iran, 0.33 for Egypt, 0.5 for Israel, 0.5 ror Syria, 0.5 Turkey, 0.66 for Lebanon. That is, we reduce the number of possible Muslim immigrants by the aforementioned ratio, while other Middle Eastern countries are left unchanged. This translates into a reduction in the Muslim immigrant population of 19,280. This means that 76 percent of the pre-1971 population in the 1980 census is assumed to be non-Muslim. Because the year of entry data indicate that the older cohorts are much less Muslim, we adjust upward the 76 percent nine percentage points to 85 percent based on the assumption that a larger share of persons born in the Middle East who died between 1970 and 1980 were non-Muslim.

Our final estimate is that in 1970, 85 percent of the Middle Eastern-born population was non-Muslim. If Pakistan and Afghanistan are excluded, then roughly 90 percent of immigrants from the region were non-Muslim. This estimate, while very rough, is consistent with other antidotal information.

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Muslim population in 2000

The C2SS contains both ancestry and language questions so it is possible to employ the same approach as above to estimate the Muslim share of the Middle Eastern population. We find that 1,469,847 individuals gave a Middle Eastern country as their place of birth. We then exclude 111 ,269 individuals who did not report an ancestry or were coded as "other groups," leaving 1,365,087 persons.

Of the 1,365,087, we find that 226,300 gave a response in one of the two ancestry questions, which lead us to believe that they were non-Muslim. (Primarily Greeks, Armenians, Assyrians, Chaldeans, and French, mostly from Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt, and Sephardic Jews.) Subtracting 226,300 from 1,365,087 leaves 1,138,787. We then excluded 59,937 individuals who indicated they spoke a language that is spoken by non-Muslims such as Armenian, Greek, or Ladino.

This leaves a possible Muslim population of 1,078,850. This represents 79 percent of the 1,365,087 of the Middle Eastern-born population in the 2000 C2SS who reported at least one ancestry. This 79 percent can be seen as the upper bound of the possible share of Muslims in 2000. Based on anecdotal and other evidence we then adjusted downward the remaining number of possible Muslim from selected countries using the following ratio: 0.1 for Iran, .05 for Jordan, 0.2 tur Egypt, 0.1 for Israel, 0.2 for Syria, 0.2 for Turkey, 0.33 for Lebanon, 0.1 for Iraq, 0.1 for Sudan, and 0.15 each for those foreign-born individuals who gave "Arab" or "Palestinian" as their ancestry but no country of birth was reported. That is, we reduced the number of possible Muslim immigrants by the aforementioned ratios, while other Middle Eastern countries are left unchanged. This translated into a reduction in the Muslim immigrant population of 87,362. This left 991,488 Muslim Middle Eastern immigrants in the C2SS. Using as the denominator the 1,365,087 individuals who reported an ancestry created a final estimate for the Muslim share of the Middle Eastern population of 73 percent in 2000.

It should be clear that estimates for both 1970 and 2000 contain a good deal of uncertainty. It should also be kept in mind that the above estimates are only for Muslim immigrants from the Middle East. They do not include their U.S.-born children, nor do they include Muslim immigrants or the children of those immigrants from outside the Middle East, including such majority Muslim countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Somalia.

Nor do they include Muslim immigrants from counties with significant Muslim minorities, such as India and China. In total, there are probably between 1.2 and 1.5 million Muslims immigrants in the United States.

This article is based on a Backgrounder entitled *Immigrants from the Middle East: A Profile of the Foreign-born Population from Pakistan to Morocco* by the same author, published by the Centre for U.S. Immigration Studies, Washingotn D.C. in August 2002.

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Secondary Corruption: The Concept of Political Illness

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Various problems are presented with the standard definition of corruption: "the misuse of public power for private benefits." Consequently, an alternative definition is suggested: "the subversion of statesmanship by partisanship" or "of governance by greed," using political elasticity theory. From this, a distinction is made between primary and secondary corruption, based upon the ability or inability to control manifestations of greed. Case studies are then presented to illustrate this distinction. Finally, suggestions are made for treating political illness, which is caused by (or another name for) secondary corruption.

Key Words: Secondary corruption, democracy, international aid, capitalism, LDCs, Japan, Germany, Mexico, Singapore, Sierra Leone, Bangladesh, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Russia, South Korea, United States of America, Tanzania, Spain, Nigeria.

Introduction: Definitional Problems

Heidenheimer, Johnston, and LeVine (1989: 8) classify definitions of political corruption into three often overlapping categories: (1) misuse of money or favors for private gain; (2) inappropriate exchanges of money or favors for undue influence or power; and (3) violations of public interest or norms of behavior for special advantages or self-serving purposes. Transparency International (the most important international organization fighting corruption) has combined these definitions into one that we might refer to as "the standard definition of political corruption": "the misuse of public power for private benefits." Heywood (1997), along with other scholars, have indicated the following problems with this standard definition:

1. Cultural Compatibility.

In January, 2000, Helmut Kohl was forced to resign as the Christian Democratic party's honorary chairman for receiving into party slush funds large illegal (i.e., undeclared) donations. Yet, in Japan and other East Asian countries, "it was natural for those with resources to honor the nation's leaders with gifts that in turn made democratic politics possible" (Pye, 1997: 216).

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Many countries operate semi-feudalistic systems in which positions of power and economic productivity are given to loyal subordinates, relatives, ethnic cohorts, and friends in return for the feedback of a percentage of whatever is gained as a result. In Mexico, Cornelius and Wayne (1991) describe these interwoven chains of patron-client relationships as "camarillas."

Consequently, how clients gain access to wealth is less important than the loyalty, deference and services that they provide to their patrons.

2. Acceptability.

Leak (1999: 64) mentions a Singaporean minister who committed suicide in 1986 upon being accused of accepting bribes from two property developers. In Sierra Leone, on the other hand, according to Kpundeh (1999), government is so weak that bribery and extortion are not considered really "scandalous" but, rather, "standard operating procedure." While this is partly the result of miserably paid and undisciplined civil servants, "those earning high salaries, primarily government ministers and senior civil servants, have indulged in more fraud than junior workers or private citizens" (Kpundeh, 1999: 214).

In Bangladesh, Dey (1989: 508) points out, people "offer bribes to get jobs with high bribe potential." Thus, "the bribe here is similar to an entry fee that one has to pay to join a club and become entitled to its benefits and facilities." The same is true in the Dominican Republic, where government jobs are seen even by the public as a legitimate way of enriching oneself (Ruffing-Hilliard, 1991: 309).

3. Functionality.

Caiden (1990: 150-151) summarizes the arguments of analysts, indicating that corruption may at times be functional: (a) to speed up the administrative and legislative process; (b) to make the bureaucracy more humane and approachable for those who have not yet adjusted to the modern way of life; (c) to overcome excessive bureaucratic inflexibility, sluggishness, and bungling; (d) to integrate otherwise alienated groups (particularly, politically weak ethnic, religious, and racial groups) and, thereby, be an alternative to violence; and (e) to enable entrepreneurs to function within a difficult business environment.

Using these arguments, one might suggest that, inasmuch as corruption is functional, we need not worry so much about it. In his 1967 article, Nye proposed in this regard using a cost-benefit matrix, within

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which corruption can be considered harmful or helpful based on its impact on (1) economic development; (2) national integration; and (3) governmental capacity. Obviously, the worse the administration, the more it encourages corruption which, in turn, further worsens administration (Heywood, 1997: 427). However, in 1986, Nas, Price, and Weber used the Nye approach to suggest that, if corruption has a positive impact on social welfare, it should be considered beneficial; otherwise, detrimental.

4. Democracy.

Since the end of the Cold War, particularly since 1989, the promotion of democracy has become "something of a growth industry," pushed directly and indirectly by foreign assistance agencies (Barkan, 1994: 2). The supposition, as explained by Sklar (1995: 20) is that "countries with less democratic political systems can (and should) modernize by emulating the example of countries classified as democratic."

Lord Acton's famous aphorism, "power tends to corrupt, and absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely," is often quoted in the literature on corruption. The trouble is that in some instances democracy intensifies corruption. For example, one might expect Jamaica (with about the same population size and colonial experience) to be less corrupt than Singapore inasmuch as it is less autocratic. In other words, because of the supposed relationship between corruption and monopoly of power (see Klitgaard, 1996), Singapore (with its one-party system) should be much more corrupt than Jamaica which has maintained a vigorous two-party system. Why then, in reality, is it the reverse?

The answer has to do with the fact that liberal democracy (including competitive elections and majority rule) has taken a dysfunctional form in Jamaica, with both political parties using criminal gangs (occasionally supported by police or civil servants) to mobilize political support, distribute favors, and intimidate opponents and uncooperative neighborhoods. The civil service, the judicial system, and the police have become decreasingly respected, undermined by inadequate pay, training, expertise, and even drug money (Hudson and Seyer, 1989). The purchasing of political support here stems partly from the counterproductive parastatal sector with clientelistic boards that are allowed to draw from the financial system for dubious salaries and contracts (Harrigan, 1998:17). Singapore, on the other hand, has taken all the steps essential for controlling corruption (Leak, 1999).

This frequent linkage between democracy and corruption is not

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unusual. The more democratic a government is, the more it is expected to use a participatory and consultative approach. Yet, it is difficult to use this approach in justifying such controversial requisites for reform as downsizing the civil service, reducing consumer subsidies and scholarships, cost recovery, privatization, and trade liberalization. Political leaders, regardless of the origins of their power, must maintain the support of such powerful groups as the military, the civil service, large business owners, and trade unions. Often these groups oppose reform because of its threat to their power and wealth when it includes privatization, deregulation, decentralization, and reduction in the work force. In any case, as elections become more competitive, they also usually become more costly, as leaders or parties vie with one-another for votes, giving rise to what is often called, "money politics."

5. Capitalism.

The promotion of private enterprise is generally recognized as essential for political, as well as economic, development. Yet, it is widely believed that in the former Soviet Union and other countries escaping from communism or socialism, "market liberalization and privatization have significantly increased corruption" (Kaufmann, 1999: 89). Marshall Goldman (1994: F9) pointed out that in Russia there were more than 4,000 racketeering gangs, unfair legal and commercial rules, a dizzying array of arbitrary taxes, and the unreliability of local banks and currency. This situation continues, according to *The Economist* (November 25, 2000: 26): "almost everywhere, the rewards for honesty and efficiency are tiny. So are the penalties for graft and laziness." In recent years, the World Bank has pushed privatization only to discover that, under "crony capitalism," corruption continues much as before, including: monopolistic arrangements, special access to foreign exchange and needed supplies, the avoiding of taxes and legal requirements, and the misuse of bank loans.

Even in a well-established and prosperous country such as South Korea, there can be a strong linkage between capitalism and corruption. This has come about because, with government encouragement, interdependent conglomerates (called here, *"chaebols"*) have been allowed to dominate the economy. Their practices include: use of corporate money for personal purposes, cross-payment guarantees among subsidiaries, dubious book-keeping practices (for example, inflating sales or assets and deflating debts), false-names for bank deposits, and misuse of the banks (or financial institutions) for careless investments (see Shin and

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Ha, 1999). As pointed out by Cheng, Haggard, and Kang (1999:. 105), "it was generally accepted for businesses to provide gifts, services and even cash for bureaucrats as a way of keeping relations with various ministries on a solid footing." This capitalistic corruption is considered responsible for the financial crisis that struck South Korea in November, 1997, requiring the IMF's most expensive rescue operation (amounting to $55 billion).

6. Rent-Seeking Behavior.

Much corruption is not technically illegal but opportunistic and, as such, it is sometimes called "rent-seeking behavior." Economists tend to see this in a narrow way as "the direct use or waste of economic resources for non-economic gain" (see Gallagher, 1991: 31). I prefer to see it as "legalized or systemic manifestations of greed." Inasmuch as rent-seeking behavior arises from bad or weak governance, it can be more damaging to the political and economic system than overt forms of corruption that are legally punishable.

The American use of "soft money" (unrestricted funds that individuals, businesses, and labor unions can contribute for political purposes) appears to be an example of rent-seeking behavior. According to Drew (1996: C7), both political parties are estimated to have spent during the 1996 election campaign between $200 and $300 million in soft money. Considering that this was several times more than in the 1992 election, we can assume that far higher amounts of soft money were used in the November, 2000 elections. I also consider the Congressional use of "pork barreling" or "logrolling" to be rent-seeking behavior insofar as it used to push through projects or legislation that are of greater benefit to particular constituents than the general public. Among the results of American rent-seeking behavior are: the fact that the gap between the incomes of the rich and poor is wider than in other industrial countries and that the richer you are, the more the government subsidizes your house (by allowing tax deductions for mortgages and property taxes).

In Japan, much rent-seeking behavior consists of gift-giving to politicians to lubricate the appropriate bureaucratic and political wheels. Japanese political parties, politicians, and political groups are estimated to receive from the Japanese people four times more per capita than any other nation (Johnson, 1995:. 215). Johnson (1995) suggests that Japanese corruption is also linked to the *amakudari* system, under which retired officials are allowed to take important positions in the legisla-

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ture, banks, and corporations. The failure of Japanese ministries to prevent widespread bankruptcies during the second half of the 1990s was partly because of preferential treatment of financial institutions resulting from *amakudari* considerations (Inoguchi, 1997: 95).

As we turn to Less Developed Countries (LDCs), rent-seeking behavior is so widespread as to be almost undistinguishable from overt forms of corruption. This is because of the prevalence of improper policies, weak bureaucracies, inadequate supervision, the illegitimacy of laws and regulations, and the lack of independent spheres of power. Dey (1989: 506) asks: "what is dishonesty in an environment where the possibility of punishment is remote?" Smuggling, he argues, can hardly be considered as an abuse of power where the border police are lazy, understaffed, or incompetent.

If the reader agrees that there are problems with the standard definition of corruption in More Developed Countries (MDCs), he/she will certainly agree that there are more problems with defining corruption in LDCs. After all, what does corruption mean, first of all, in Hobbes's "state of nature," where the life of man is so "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" that survival is more important than legality and, subsequently, under his Leviathan, where those in authority are unchallengable and, as such, law is illegitimate? The standard definition does not adequately take into account that "greed" is likely to be the normal pattern in the absence of effective or institutionalized governance.

The Redefining of Corruption

The definition of corruption here introduced – "the subversion of statesmanship by partisanship" or "of governance by greed" – is intended to overcome the problems that have been mentioned with the standard definition. It emerges from the following propositions of political elasticity (PE) theory (see Werlin, 1998):

1. The more governments or those in authority can integrate and alternate soft forms of political power (linking incentives to persuasion) with hard forms of power (including disincentives and coercion), the more effective they will be.

    a. As leaders integrate and alternate soft and hard forms of power, their political power takes on "rubber band" and "balloon" characteristics, allowing them (a) to decentralize or delegate

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2. power in various ways without losing control and (b) to expand their influence, reliably and predictably affecting the behavior of wider circles of citizens, participants, and subordinates.
3. Political elasticity depends partly on the selection of appropriate political hardware (including "objective" forms of organization, regulation, procedure, and technology) but mostly
4. on political software (which has to do with the "subjective" quality of relationships between leaders and followers).
5. Political software can be made more effective in the commonsensical ways suggested by the steps associated with good governance: establishing acceptable goals, hiring qualified
6. personnel, encouraging training, delegating responsibility, stimulating motivation and competition, paying attention to morale, expanding two-way flows of communication, promoting legitimacy, maintaining supervision, cultivating contractors, protecting independent spheres of authority, and developing conflict-resolution procedures. Inasmuch as any of these steps (with appropriate variations) are neglected or mismanaged, all reform efforts in both micro- and macro-administration are going to be difficult, if not impossible.
7. The enhancement of political software requires a balancing of two meanings of political power found in Sheldon Wolin's 1960 book, *Politics and Vision*: the struggle for competitive advantage and the struggle for consensus. These two meanings of politics (i.e., partisanship and statesmanship) can be considered as subdivisions (primary and secondary politics) of my overarching definition of politics (which is also derived from Wolin's 1960 book): the relationship of leadership to followership for the purpose of governance.

In using Wolin's three definitions of politics, I am able to distinguish primary and secondary democracy and primary and secondary corruption. Whereas primary democracy has to do with elections, multi-party systems, and majority rule (i.e., when there is a meaningful struggle for competitive advantage), secondary democracy refers to the consensus-building essential for successfully managing this competition. Primary corruption is my term for excessive partisanship or greed; secondary corruption indicates a governmental inability to control or mitigate this situation. As an analogy, we might think of basketball fouling under two situations: one in which there is normal refereeing, so that fouling is

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meaningful, punishable, and tolerable; the other in which refereeing is corrupt, causing fouling to be pervasive, essential, and destigmatized. (Soccer was actually demoralized in this way in Tanzania, according to a 1999 article by Sedigh and Muganda.)

This concept of secondary corruption suggests a balance between greed and governance. The weaker the governance, the more dangerous and dysfunctional the manifestations of greed.

While under primary corruption, greed is somewhat controlled; under secondary corruption, it becomes more or less uncontrolled and even uncontrollable. However, as here indicated, primary corruption includes systemic (rent-seeking behavior) as well as personal manifestations.

While primary corruption does not necessarily prevent development, secondary corruption has a corrosive effect on the requirements for development. This proposition follows from PE theory, as here presented. Under this theory, the effectiveness of leadership depends upon the ability to integrate and alternate soft and hard forms of power. Such effectiveness requires a high quality of political software. Secondary corruption stems from as well as contributes to weak political software. In so doing, it causes or intensifies political inelasticity.

Since I consider secondary corruption to be a form of "political illness" (similar to mental illnesses, such as alcoholism or drug addiction), whereas primary corruption to be merely a "political problem," why don't I reverse my nomenclature? My answer is that I have been influenced by medical terminology.

Whereas a primary or first-degree burn may be painful, a secondary or second-degree burn penetrates deeper into the flesh and is harder to treat. So it is with corruption: because secondary corruption undermines an already weak governmental system, it requires fundamental political reform before punitive measures can be effective. However, our analogy also suggests that corruption is a natural consequence of primary politics (i.e., the struggle for competitive advantage), much as burning is of physics and chemistry.

Comparative Case Studies

The concept of secondary corruption emphasizes the need for a deeper analysis than is often undertaken. As here indicated, the standard definition of corruption points to "the misuse of public power;" but why is it a "misuse" if it is culturally compatible, acceptable, functional, democratic, and economically productive? Moreover,

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inasmuch as corruption is systemic or secondary, the value judgments that are necessary in the standard definition become undermined. How can we criticize behavior as "corrupt," if it is not disreputable, even if it is formally illegal or harms the public interest.

I do not wish to discard the standard definition of corruption because I believe that it is useful in MDCs. Ironically, where this definition of corruption is least meaningful, corruption (in the form of political illness) must be a cause of greatest concern. The following two comparative case studies indicates why this is so:

Corruption: the United States and Mexico

Two recent articles in the *New York Times* (Firestone, 2000; Dillon, 2000) having to do with the alleged corruption of governors (one in the United States; the other, in Mexico) may illustrate the difference between primary and secondary corruption. While these two ex-governors (one, of Louisiana; the other, of Quintana Roo) were in legal trouble, the American might be considered far more "blameworthy" than the Mexican because his "brazen acts of corruption described in the indictment" were "avoidable" rather than "expected" or "required."

Ex-governor Edwin W. Edwards had often encountered federal law-enforcement officers in regard to his alleged corruption during his four terms of office; but his amusing personality and popularity with low-income, particularly African-American supporters, had kept him out of prison. Eventually the F.B.I. was able to capture him on audio and video tapes at various places extorting payments from people in the casino and insurance industries (see Bridges, 2001).

The problems of ex-governor Mario Villanueva Madrid (causing him to be a fugitive), on the other hand, may have resulted, according to the Dillon article, from the ex-governor's accusation that the national party (the PRI) had cheated him out of his share of graft money (more than $5 million). As a result of this or other disputes, Mexican prosecutors were using him as a scapegoat (from Villanueva's point of view) to assuage American anxiety about the use of the Yucatan Peninsula for smuggling Colombian cocaine to the Texas border. Otherwise, he had done nothing more than was expected of governors by national leaders: to take money from business groups in return for contracts, to share the graft with senior officials, and to use part of it to guarantee election victories for his party.

Many generations of scholars studying the United States have wondered, as did Max Weber, how the U.S. could flourish economically in

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spite of "its lack of political and administrative morality" (Heidenheimer, 1988: 583). Yet, there have always (and increasingly) been offsetting factors: the public education system, the free press, competitive elections, a powerful middle class, professional and specialized associations and organizations, constitutional restrictions and separation of powers, and multiple power points that can be used by discontented and well-organized interest groups. While Congressmen must cooperate with wealthy and powerful interest groups, they need to avoid such excessive ties to particular ones as to prevent them from reaching agreement with supporters of competing groups essential for legislative and administrative action. The existence of a meritocratic civil service (despite its defects) has generally been recognized as essential for the effectiveness of these offsetting factors.

What has reduced American political corruption at the state and local level here (and elsewhere) has been the expansion of federal grants (see Peterson, Rabe, and Wong, 1986). By 1980 these federal grants amounted to over 25 percent of state and local expenditures, as against about 10 percent in 1950. With this growth has come a flood of federal mandates requiring local officials to comply with various statutes and directives, thereby also requiring a qualified civil service and appropriate organization and procedures.

Along with the federal funds have come a swarm of regulators and federal enforcement agents who are often better prepared to deal with impropriety than their state and local counterparts. These agents work with public interest groups, businesses, and others who may be unhappy with what is going on. If necessary, they will use paid citizen informants and those in legal trouble as undercover agents, equipping them with wiretaps and marked money for "sting operations."

Turning to Mexico, we find that there are very few effective offsetting factors. According to Cothran (1994: 219), "the bureaucracy is highly politicized in the sense that virtually the entire public work force is subject to political appointment rather than merit." Because about a third of officials are affected by the "*sexenio*" system (the change of government every six years), those who gain power often consider it their right "to partake of the system's spoils" (Morris, 1991: 73). While Mexico has improved the quality of administration in recent years, it still remains very weak. In 1998, the OECD (which tends to be very diplomatic) reported (p. 113) that "Mexico does not have a true civil service as that term is understood in other OECD countries, with the exception of a few Ministries" and that management and training are

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very inadequate. According to *The Economist* (May 12, 2001, p. 42), "There are few evaluations, either inside or outside government, of how well it performs," thereby facilitating the corrupt handling or mismanagement of contracts as well as the inefficient performance of work. The practices of ministries are often opaque; and insofar as there are no instruments to force them to comply with regulations, there is also no effective oversight.

Freedom of the press is undermined by the fact that journalists, editors, and publishers are often paid (or given financial inducements) by the government or criminal elements to exercise "self-censorship." This means, in the words of Morris (1991: 54) that "members of the press find it rational to follow the corruption-paved avenue to mobility offered by members of the state rather than attack the system." Those who resist (as happened to more than thirty reporters during the late 1980s) may well be murdered. Likewise, under Mexico's one-party system, the Congress and the courts had limited capacity to reduce corruption (see Knight 1996: 226). A 1999 OECD report (pp. 151-2) having to do with regulatory reform in Mexico notes that "the enforcement of regulations is problematic in Mexico," adding: "Complex and unclear regulation, and difficulties at the judicial level with interpretation and enforcement, have meant that Mexican regulation has long been the sources of considerable uncertainty and confusion to the citizen." Consequently, in Mexico, civil society "remains thin and uneven compared with advanced industrial democracies" (Levy and Bruhn, 2001, p. 73).

Where the conservative opposition (the PAN) has been successful, it tends to be "bought off" and to use the same corrupt methods as the dominant party. This is why it is that the dramatic presidential election in July, 2000, of the PAN candidate Vincente Fox might not significantly reduce secondary corruption. The recent murder of Digna Ochoa, one of Mexico's most prominent human rights attorneys raises serious doubts "whether the democratic government being led by President Fox has the political will to transform a culture of impunity into a system of law and order" (Thompson, 2001, p. A14). The fact that an estimated 2.5 percent of Mexico's GNP and 8 percent of its export earnings are derived from the illegal drug trade greatly increases the difficulty of reforming the system (Levy and Bruhn 2001, p. 222).

Knight (1996: 230) notes that, in comparison to their American counterparts, Mexican bosses and political machines are much more powerful because, inasmuch as they are national rather than local, "they

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possess greater resources and can more confidently face down challenges." They have been particularly adept at using public works and patronage "to complement their occasional resorts to force and fraud." Under these circumstances, the payment of bribes is so common that it is difficult to determine if this practice results more from "extortion" or voluntary "gift-giving" (Morris, 1991: 52). Environmental protection becomes impossible when inspectors are bribed to ignore regulations and judges are bribed to undermine the inspectors as well as the regulations.

At the local Mexican level, tax collecting has been extremely difficult. Towards the end of the 1990s, the attorney general admitted that 80 percent of the federal police engaged in corruption; and the most recent report of Transparency Mexico (the local arm of Transparency International) suggests that residents of Mexico City have to pay bribes for almost a quarter of the government services they receive, with businesses particularly targeted (Levy and Bruhn 2001, 73). Since a high percentage of law enforcement officers cannot be distinguished from the criminals they are supposed to arrest, Mexican presidents (even under centralized one-party rule which existed for much of the Twentieth Century) have little control over what goes on at the state and local levels. While there are occasional probes into local corruption, "such probes tend to be cursory at best and inept at worst" (De Cordoba 2002, A6).

Few Mexicans get upset at reports that businesses generally fail to pay local taxes when (as in Nuevo Laredo), three-quarters of the 1982 budget allegedly fell victim to corruption (Morris, 1991: 70). Officials here resisting bribes are sometimes killed by criminal elements who consider "integrity" to be "threatening" (Golden, 2000: 1,5). Moreover, it is often difficult in much of Mexico to distinguish law enforcement agents from the criminals they are supposed to arrest (see Thompson, 2000: A32). During the 1990s, there were major efforts to reform the judicial system; but, according to Pilor Domingo (2000, p. 733), the "alarming persistence of human rights violations, high levels of inefficiency in the administration of justice, overburdened courts, and the continuing crises of corruption scandals and political violence undermine the notion that the rule of law is advancing in Mexico." In 2001, a United Nations special rapporteur on human rights in Mexico claimed that up to seven out of ten judges were corrupt (*The Economist,* June 15, 2002, p. 36).

In Mexico, according to Knight (1996: 231), corruption has been

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useful because it "is less a sickly deviation from Weberian health, than the cartilage and collagen which holds a sprawling body politic together." However, Mexico pays a very heavy price for what I consider to be "secondary corruption." Mexico and Spain had comparable levels of per-capita income and social welfare during the 1970s (see Wise 1998, for Mexico; Yruela and Sorrano del Rosa 1998, for Spain). Yet, despite the favorable impact of economic liberalization and globalization in both countries, there has been a much greater persistence of extreme poverty in Mexico than in Spain (nearly 40 percent, as against about 10 percent), even when there have been high levels of Spanish unemployment and underemployment (see Perez, 1999).

Corruption: Japan and Nigeria

While Japan and Nigeria are similar in population size (125 million), their wealth disparity is immense (Japan, nearly $33,000 GNP per capita in 1999, as against about $330 in Nigeria, according to *The World Development Report, 2000/2001*). Yet, Japan has practically no natural resources, whereas Nigeria could be a wealthy country from the export alone of oil and natural gas, ignoring many other minerals found in abundance and such agricultural products as palm oil and cocoa in which it once led the world in export value. Much of Nigeria' s oil and gas reserves are found in the Niger River Delta where oil production has led to environmental disaster, violence, and anarchy (see Maier 2000). According to a recent CIA report, there is here "an almost total absence of schools, good drinking water, electricity, and medical care" (Farah 2001, A22). Despite a production of two million barrels of oil a day, motorists must wait in long lines at gasoline stations, eventually paying four times the official price.

Corruption is seen as the primary cause of Nigeria's poverty. In the early 1990s, it was estimated that about two-thirds of the country's income (largely from petroleum export, amounting annually to several billion dollars) disappeared into extra-budgetary spending (World Bank 1994, 22-3; Lewis 1994, 330). Yet, corruption has also adversely affected Japan in various ways, manifesting itself most recently in an estimated trillion dollars worth of bank loans to troubled companies (Tett 2001, 16). Other manifestations, according to Kerr (2001), include: excessive governmental expenditure on construction investment (twice as much of GDP as the United States) and on public works (eight percent of its GDP, as against two percent in the United States); inadequate urban planning; poor quality of housing; environmental degradation; and high

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deficit spending. The reasons given for Japanese corruption have to do with "a pervasive and institutionalized system of bid-rigging" in the construction industry (Woodall 1993, 297); various forms of gift-giving to politicians and bureaucrats in return for contracts and favors (van Wolferen 1989, 134); "money politics," with an estimated four times more per capita than in any other country going to politicians and political groups (Johnson 1995, 215); and the *amakudari* system, under which retired officials are allowed to take important positions in state-owned enterprises, banks, and corporations.

However, whereas the impact of Nigerian corruption is economically and socially paralyzing, that of Japanese corruption is clearly not so, based upon the fact that extreme poverty and homelessness in Japan are almost nonexistent (*The Economist*, December 21, 1996, 46). For example, Kerr (2001, 374), who is otherwise highly critical of Japan, notes that steel firms here "boast some of the world's most efficient factories." In Nigeria, on the other hand, a large number of industrial projects, such as the Ajaokua Steel Company, are for the purpose, not of production, but of enriching powerful people from "kickback" arrangements and money laundering. In a comparative case study of solid waste management in Tokyo and Lagos (Werlin 1998, Ch. 1), I note a high degree of political elasticity in Japan (facilitating much more garbage recycling than in the United States), as against political inelasticity in Nigeria, indicating that there are offsetting factors regarding corruption in Japan but not in Nigeria. These factors include: the high quality and integrity of the civil service; the emphasis on consensus and harmony; the role of whistleblowers, investigative journalists, official auditors, and public prosecutors; the activities of local governments and interest groups; and the public intolerance of dishonesty within the public bureaucracy (Johnson 1995).

In a recent issue of *Japan Quarterly*, two articles (one by Hiromitsu; the other by Takeshi) explore the various factors that may have recently increased police corruption: slush funds, *amakadari* considerations, protective or "cover up" procedures, etc. Yet, the Japanese police continue to enjoy a high degree of public esteem. Reflecting the social tradition of respect for the police, "police officers see their work not only as a career, but as a way of life that goes beyond income or even family" (Takeshi 2000, 47). While this professional pride is clearly not enough to prevent police corruption, it does suggest the difference between police corruption in Japan and Nigeria. Whereas the Japanese police are under various types of control, the Nigerian police are

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certainly not, so that, in Japan, police misbehavior is considered scandalous, while, in Nigeria, it is standard operating procedure. This means that, instead of the soft forms of political power (persuasion and incentives) commonly and effectively used in Japan, force remains both "a prevalent method of governance" in Nigeria and, at the same time, largely ineffective (Agbese 1990, 244). For example, between 1987 and 1995, the World Bank and the African Development Bank loaned Nigeria about $1.7 billion for urban infrastructure, with the understanding that local governments were to pay for much of the recurrent costs. Because of official mismanagement and corruption, local governments were "unable to carry out their assigned functions," causing taxpayers to be uncooperative, regardless of coercive measures (Carroll *et al.* 1995, 12).

This difference between Japanese and Nigerian corruption takes us back to the two subdivisions of politics used for PE theory (the struggle for competitive advantage or primary politics and the struggle for consensus or secondary politics). Whereas primary corruption (which exists in Japan) indicates excessive partisanship or greed; secondary corruption (prevalent in Nigeria) reflects the governmental inability to control or mitigate this situation. As an analogy, we might think of basketball fouling under two situations: one in which there is normal refereeing, so that fouling is meaningful, punishable, and tolerable; the other in which refereeing is corrupt, causing fouling to be pervasive, essential, and destigmatized. This concept of corruption suggests a balance between greed and governance. The weaker the governance, the more dangerous and dysfunctional the manifestations of greed. Because secondary corruption undermines an already weak governmental system, it requires fundamental political reform before punitive measures can be effective.

Conclusion: Treating Political Illness

Officials at the World Bank, USAID, and other donor organizations deserve encouragement and support in their recent efforts to combat corruption. However, in presenting the concept of secondary corruption, I am suggesting that some of these efforts may be simplistic. It is not enough to attack bribery, graft, embezzlement, and other manifestations of excessive greed (i.e., primary corruption). It is, instead, necessary to deal with the excessive weakness of governance (i.e., secondary corruption).

Anything which undermines governance must be, therefore, a

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source of concern, including: attacks on a free press, the weakening of the judiciary and the bureaucracy, the prevention of two-way flows of communication by intimidating opposition parties and non-governmental organizations, and the neglect of monitoring and evaluation. While donor organizations are increasingly emphasizing the importance of "good governance," staff members (particularly at the World Bank) continue to be admonished "not to interfere in a country's internal political affairs" (Operations Policy Department, 1993: 3).

While I believe that it is inappropriate for foreign aid donors to get involved in elections (what I referred to earlier as "primary politics"), I am convinced that they must promote "statesmanship" – those aspects of secondary politics or secondary democracy (using PE theory) that are essential for good governance. As I see it, this is the only effective way of treating political illness and, thus, getting at the heart of corruption. (A brief look at the Mexican experience may illustrate this point because, despite the fact that, between 1995 and 2000, it had the highest rate of export growth in the world, at least 40 percent of the population are living below the poverty line.)

Professor Robert A. Pastor of Emory University, a leading expert on the North American Community, has advocated (2001, A19) providing similar levels of assistance to Mexico as does the European Union to its poorest members (from 2 percent to 4 percent of their GDP). I would support such assistance, from which Spain has greatly benefited, if it were carefully linked on a step-by-step basis (with publicly available annual progress reports) to improvements in governance, particularly those needed for political software development.

The experience of Mexico with World Bank supported foreign aid has so far not been very good, based upon studies of the World Bank's Operations Evaluation Department (OED). When Bank staff pointed out during the 1970s and early 1980s that the Bank was lending more to Mexico than was consistent with its absorptive capacity, they found themselves "undercut by management tendency to over-rule them on appeal by the Mexicans" (World Bank OED 1994, xxxviii). While evaluations of the Bank's projects in Mexico during the 1990s, according to the World Bank 2001 OED report, were relatively positive, they had mixed or unsatisfactory results in water supply and sanitation, agriculture, and environmental issues. Above all, this report (p. 18) emphasized the fact that insufficient attention has been paid to "areas such as civil service reform, legal and judicial reform, tax administration, financial management and accountability, or anti-corruption."

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Vincente Fox, who came to power in July, 2000 as head of an opposition party, seems sincerely anxious to reduce corruption (*The Economist*, May 12, 2001, 42). Because he faces great internal opposition in doing so, he would probably welcome the sort of outside pressure advocated here as political leverage. In this regard, Transparency International is already monitoring the comptroller's office and scrutinizing the handling of big contracts. The experience of the Peruvian Sunat project (improving tax collecting) during the 1990s suggests the importance of requiring the country itself to show a real willingness to reform before providing assistance: identifying needed positions; requiring staff to take examinations to compete for these positions; and giving salaries comparable to those in the private sector (see – 1998, 327).

However, for foreign aid to be useful in reforming Mexican public administration, it must be strongly supported by the public. I cannot predict what the response will be. Instead, what I am simply saying is that, for political power to become "elastic" (with rubber band and balloon characteristics), there must be a higher quality of political software (as is apparent in Spain, but not yet Mexico).

While I put less emphasis than does David Landes (1999) on geography, history, and culture in explaining the wealth and poverty of nations (as indicated in my comparative case studies), I ultimately agree with him (p. 523) that the lesson of history is "that the most successful cures for poverty come from within," adding: "no empowerment is so effective as self-empowerment."

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The Upper Limits of Civilization: Why Improvement of the Commonweal is so Difficult

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Rule #1: All politics are local.
Rep. Tip O'Neill

Rule #2: All long-term politics are reproductive strategies.
Rule #3: All effective long term politics camouflage Rule #2.
Ipsoc Macquire

Over the last half century, advancements in agriculture, medicine, and technology have been impressive. However, large segments of the world's population are underfed, sick, and/or pre-industrialized. The question is addressed: "Why does it take so long for the benefits of civilization to spread to everyone?" Using data from the United Nations (n = 165 countries), it is argued that cultural expectations which enhance fertility are aligned with cultural expectations which, in turn, do not emphasize tertiary education, especially for women. Accordingly, those areas of the world's population which do generate advances in agriculture, medicine, and technology represent a proportionately smaller segment of the world's population every generation. Thus, to remain "even" or to maintain their proportion of the world's citizenry, sizable numbers of individuals from higher fertility/lower technology areas must be systematically recruited – every generation – into a set of attitudes or cultural expectations which were not aspects of their early socialization experiences. The slower the recruitment is, the longer it will take for any putative advance to diffuse. It is further argued that the training and self-interests of behavioral scientists make such societal dynamics likely to be systematically under-reported in academia, and, by extension, to the communities at large.

Key Words: Cultural diffusion, migration, rates of natural increase, women's roles, tertiary education, cross-cultural studies, sociology of science.

On this side of Utopia

Prepared or not, expectant or otherwise, the population of the earth has entered (according to the Christian calendar) the 21st century. Depending upon one's philosophy, our earthen cup is half full, viz. Western technology is dazzling, infant diseases have been eliminated, life expectancy has been lengthened, democracy is on the ascendant. On

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the other hand, the cup is half empty. Malnutrition is easy to find. High infant mortality is widespread. Many a country has a per capita income of under $1,000 per annum. For some countries, literacy is overmatched by illiteracy.

The question addressed here is "why" rarefied civilization has not swept the field and been equally embraced across the world's community of tribes. The following exercise is an attempt to address at least part of the problem.

Source of the problem: writ small

Let's look at the profiles of three nations – Japan, Sweden, and Germany – in terms of income, life expectancy, literacy, and infant mortality. For the three countries, the mean per capita income is $23,500 (U.S. dollars) The life expectancy averages 79.7 years. Virtually all adults are literate, and the average infant mortality is 4.0 (CIA 2001). See Table 1.

Now let's look at the profiles of three additional nations: Haiti, Angola, and Bangladesh. Their mean per capita income is $1,470 or less than 7% of the first trio of nations. Less than half of their adult population is literate. Their life expectancy averages 49 years or less than two-thirds of the first group of nations. Their infant mortality average is 119.6 or 29 times the average of the first group of nations. (CIA 2001). See Table 1.

The two sets of countries represent two quite different life chances for their average citizen. And, although an exhaustive definition of "civilization" can be a source of legitimate debate, there is probably a strong consensus that (a) live babies are preferred over dead babies, (b) live grandparents are better than dead grandparents, (c) literacy is preferred over illiteracy, and (d) more access to resources is preferable over less access to resources.

This exercise is not so much interested in the origin of the two distinct profiles nor in the maintenance, to date, of the two profiles. What is of interest to this particular inquiry is the trajectory into the future of the two polar types of countries.

An additional facet of the Japan, Sweden, & Germany trio is their low rate of natural increase (birth rates minus death rates equal rate of natural increase). As Table 1 clearly illustrates, all three nations are very close to zero population growth, i.e. their rate of natural increase is near zero. This zero figure is because low birth rates are essentially matched with low death rates.

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TABLE 1.

Demographics for six countries: Angola, Haiti, Bangladesh, Germany, Japan, Sweden (Central Intelligence Agency 2001).

Demographic	Country					
	Angola	Haiti	Bangladesh	Germany	Japan	Sweden
Crude birth rates[a]	46.5	31.7	25.3	9.2	10.0	9.9
Crude death rates[b]	24.7	15.1	8.6	10.4	8.3	10.6
% natural increase	2.2	1.4	1.6	0.3	0.2	0.0
Total fertility rate (TFR)[c]	6.50	4.40	2.80	1.38	1.41	1.53
Income per capita (in U.S. dollars '000)	1.00	1.80	1.57	23.4	24.9	22.2
Percent adult literacy	42	45	56	virtually all adult	virtually all adults	virtually all adults
Men only	56	48	63			
Women only	28	42	49			
Life expectancy (in years)	38	49	61	78	81	80
Infant mortality[d]	193.7	95.2	70.0	4.7	3.9	3.5

[a] Births per 1,000 population [b] Deaths per 1,000 population

[c] Number of children per lifetime of a woman (2.1 is considered at replacement value with a low infant mortality) [d] per 1,000 life births

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The Haiti, Angola, and Bangladesh triad presents a different dynamic. The rate of natural increase for each country exceeds 1.5% per annum: Haiti 1.4%, Angola 2.2%, and Bangladesh 1.6%. The mean birth rate of the three countries is more than twice as high as its mean death rate. Their average rate of natural increase (1.73%) augers for a population increase, whereas the average rate of natural increase of the first trio of countries (0.17%) implies virtually no growth. See Table 1. In terms of the number of expected births per lifetime per woman (independent of death rates), the women of Angola, Haiti, and Bangladesh are all above replacement value of 2100 births (per 1000 women); while the fertility of women in Germany, Japan, and Sweden is below replacement value, i.e. the average is 1.44 children per woman or a shortfall of over 600 children per 1000 women. See Table 1.

Framed a little differently, as long as these demographics continue in a relatively consistent manner, the populations of Haiti, Angola and Bangladesh are becoming a greater percentage of the planet's population each year, and the populations of Japan, Sweden, and Germany are becoming a lesser percentage of the planet's population each year. Well, so what? The beginning of the answer to "so what" lies in four facts presented below. Fact #1: Each individual who is alive at Time 1 will be dead at some point Time 2.

Said less prosaically, everyone is mortal. Fact #2: While everyone currently alive is guaranteed to have had ancestors, no one is guaranteed to have descendants. Fact #3; Lands do not remain empty. Farmlands of deceased celibate farmers do not stay fallow for long. Cottages of dead, childless couples do not remain empty for long. Fact #4: Humans are intensely bio-cultural beings. Wherever a human decides to move, he or she carries along a biological heritage and a socialization heritage. The four facts seem fairly immutable.

Source of the problem: writ large

Let's look at rate of natural increase (again, birth rates minus death rates per year) across large land masses: Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, and Latin America, and Oceania. See Table 2.

Now look at two polarities: Europe and Africa. The rate of natural increase for Africa (2.8%) is 28 times that of Europe (0.1%). This differential of 28, almost with the force of a definition, means that Africa, compared to Europe, will increase its percentage or proportion of the world's community after each generation. There are two foci which are relevant to this increase. First, the African countries

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TABLE 2

Demographics (population, birth rates, death rates and rates of natural increase) for six areas of the world: Africa, Latin America, North America, Asia, Europe and Oceania plus Total) for the years 1990-1995 (United Nations 1995).

AREA	Population (millions) (1993)	Percent of total	Mean crude birth rate[a]	Mean crude death rate[b]	Mean rate of of natural increase
World	5,544	100.0%	25	9	1.6%
Africa	689	12.4%	42	14	2.8%
Latin America	465	8.4%	26	7	1.9%
North America	287	5.2%	16	9	0.7%
The Americas	*752*	*13.6%*			
Asia	3,350	60.4%	25	8	1.7%
Europe	726	13.1%	12	11	0.1%
Oceania	28	0.5%	19	8	1.1%

[a] Number of births per 1,000 population

[b] Number of deaths per 1,000 population

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themselves will have enhanced populations. They will have more people. Second, these countries are in the position to export their excess population to lands where cheap labor is needed or where sparsely populated areas can be re-populated. See Table 2.

Again, when people emigrate, they carry with them their bio-cultural packages to their new homes. The questions then become: "What are elements in the bio-cultural packages which are increasing their proportion of the world's population and what are elements in the bio-cultural packages which are decreasing their proportion of the world's population?" This exercise argues that an important element is "education".

Levels of education across nations

Although "education" is fairly easy to reify beyond its actual value, there is probably an over-arching benefit to a community for more literacy than less, and more understanding than less, and higher skill levels rather than lower. The question can be asked: "Is education equally distributed across the coarse land masses?" The answer is "no". As Table 3 clearly illustrates, levels of tertiary education (education beyond "high school") are under-represented in Africa (12.4% of the world's population, but only 4.2% of the world's tertiary students and Asia (60.4% of the world's population, but only 33.0% of the world's tertiary students). On the flip-side, levels of tertiary students are over-represented in Europe and the Americas (Europe has 13.1% of the world's population, but 17.7% of its tertiary students and the Americas have 13.6% of the world's population, but 35.8% of its tertiary students (UNESCO 1994).

- *Migration patterns* Looking at coarse migration patterns, the trend is clear. Areas with low rates of natural increase and high levels of tertiary education for its citizens are also areas of net immigration. Areas of high rates of natural increase and lower levels of tertiary education are areas of net emigration (Martin & Widgren 1996). See Table 4. Said differently, individuals from areas with higher fertility and lower educational levels are migrating and replacing/displacing individuals in areas with lower fertility and higher education levels. The inertia which impacts upon the next generation must lie with the individuals with the higher fertility & lower educational expectations. It must surely be that case that emigrants will implement those traditions which they have learned from birth and which were successful enough to have nurtured them to adulthood. It is counter-intuitive that *in situ*

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TABLE 3.

Enrollment (total and female-only) in percentages by area of the world and by level of education (primary, secondary, and tertiary) (1975 and 1990) (UNESCO 1994).

Area/year	Total enrollment (%)			Female-enrollment (%)		
	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
Africa						
1975	7.1%	6.8%	2.4%	8.2%	3.2%	1.5%
1990	10.9%	13.0%	4.2%	12.7%	7.7%	2.9%
Americas						
1975	17.7%	17.4%	41.1%	18.9%	16.4%	44.5%
1990	17.3%	17.7%	35.8%	18.6%	14.3%	41.6%
Asia						
1975	55.9%	60.5%	22.9%	58.4%	44.9%	16.9%
1990	56.6%	58.3%	33.0%	57.0%	30.7%	26.0%
Europe						
1975	12.2%	8.7%	19.8%	9.6%	21.7%	20.4%
1990	9.4%	6.3%	17.7%	6.7%	15.4%	19.3%
Oceania						
1975	0.6%	0.5%	1.0%	0.5%	0.9%	0.9%
1990	0.5%	0.5%	1.0%	0.5%	0.7%	1.2%

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TABLE 4.

Migration patterns by type of region (net receiving vs. net sending areas) (1985-1995) (Martin & Widgren 1996).

Type of Region: Net Sending:	Net Receiving:	Mean Annual net migration
Africa		63,000
Asia		1,366,000
Latin America		392,000
	Europe	739,000
	North America	971,000
	The Americas	*579,000*
	Oceania	111,000

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peoples would actively reject their own low fertility and enhanced educational opportunities.

▪ *Tertiary education and gender asymmetry* In terms of educational opportunity which would lead to (i) a specialized career as well as (ii) a gender neutrality or gender equality for females, the chasm between geographical areas increases. Africa has 12.4% of the world's population, but only 2.9% of the world's females in tertiary institutions. Asia has 60.4% of the world's population but only 26.0% of the world's female in tertiary educational institutions. Conversely, Europe has 13.1% of the world's population, but 193% of the word's women in tertiary institutions, and tire Americas have 13.6% of the world's population, but 41.6% of the world's women who are enrolled in tertiary institutions (UNESCO 1994). See Table 3.

Again, Asia and Africa send emigrants. Europe and (North) America receive immigrants. Framed differently, Asia and Africa send to Europe and (North) America individuals with a bio-cultural heritage of higher fertility and lower expectations for females to achieve in any other role but motherhood.

The relationship between rates of natural increase and percentage of women (rather than men) in tertiary institutions of education is significant and *negative* ($rp = -.515$, $p < .001$, $n = 165$). A rather robust 26.5% ($-.515^2 = .265 = 26.5\%$) of the differences in rates of natural increase can be attributed to changes in the proportions of women in tertiary institutions.[2] That is, as the women of a country increase their proportion in tertiary education, the fecundity of the country decreases. A similar results occurs when the total number of children born per woman over her life-time is used to as a measure of fertility. The relationship between this total fertility rate (TFR) and the percent of students in tertiary education who are women (rather than men) is (rp) $-.664$; $p < .001$; $n = 165$). Over forty percent of the variance in the number of lifetime births (TFR) can be attributed to changes in the percent of women (rather than men) enrolled in institutions of tertiary

[2] Of course, anyone familiar with the field would not be surprised at the outcome.

Discussion about the "demographic transition" is a mainstay in courses in the social sciences. The relationship between female fertility and education levels has been a cottage industry for decades with the same results and conclusions being reached. See Hirschman 1994, Hirschman, Tan, Chamrathrthirong & Guest 1994, Mason 1997, Robinson & Harbison 1995, Van De Kaa 1996, *inter alios*. Accordingly, this statistic is not presented as being new or innovative. What is being presented, in an additive manner, are the *consequences* of such a statistic, not merely for the individuals involved at that time, but for the impact such patterns have upon cultural evolution. Such a putative impact has not been as extensively analyzed.

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TABLE 5.

Highest (top 10) and lowest (bottom 10) fertility rates (mean number of children per woman) by country and geographical area (Central Intelligence Agency 2001).

Highest Ranked:				Lowest Ranked:			
Rank	Area	Country	No. of children	Rank	Area	Country	No. of children
1	Africa	Somalia	7.18	1	Europe	Latvia	1.13
2	Africa	Niger	7.16		Europe	Bulgaria	1.13
3	Africa	Ethiopia	7.07	3	Europe	Spain	1.15
4	Asia	Yemen	7.05	4	Asia	Singapore	1.16
5	Africa	Uganda	6.96	5	Europe	Czech Rep.	1.18
6	Africa	Dem. R. Congo	6.92		Europe	Italy	1.18
7	Africa	Mali	6.89	7	Europe	Estonia	1.19
8	Africa	W. Sahara	6.64	8	Europe	Belarus	1.25
9	Africa	Chad	6.63		Eurasia	Russia	1.25
10	Asia	Gaza Strip	6.55		Europe	Hungary	1.25
		Mean = 6.91				Mean = 1.19	
		sd = .23				sd = .05	

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education ($-.664^2$ = .441 =44.1%) See Table 5 for extremes in the differences in TFR around the world.

Of additional interest is the relationship between the rate of natural increase of a country and the percent of that country's labor force engaged in agriculture. The relationship is positive and significant (rp = .508; $p < .001$; n = 166) (Central Intelligence Agency 2001). Over a quarter of the variance in rate of natural increase ($.508^2$ = .258 = 25.8%) can be explained by changes in the proportion of the work force engaged in agriculture. That is, when children are useful – as cheap labor on rural, peasant farms – they appear in large numbers. When less useful, i.e. in urban areas, the additional children fail to appear (see Day & Mackey [1986] for a discussion). See Brown (1970) for a more extended theoretical discussion.

The process seems elegantly simple, if not particularly cheery. The individuals in societies who lower their fertility and who emphasize education are, over time, replaced or supplanted by individuals with higher fertility and with a lessened emphasis upon education. Similarly, individuals in societies which restrict women's roles to that of motherhood, over time, will replace those individuals who would enlarge women's roles beyond motherhood.

Discussion

To the extent that more "education" is viewed as preferred to less "education" and to the extent that equal opportunity for women is preferred to less opportunity for women, then the world's community has forged for itself a conundrum. Bracketed by the dismal notion of catholic mortality, the earth must be re-populated by fecund women. Systematically, a disproportionate number of births comes from women who are less educated and more circumscribed in their opportunities to experience variegated careers beyond motherhood. The children of these women then carry their bio-cultural heritage to adulthood, i.e. the tree grows as the sapling is bent. The heritage would be expressed in the day-to-day lives of the children-grown-to-adulthood whether these lives are spent in their natal surroundings or in areas with expanded opportunities to which they have migrated.

Their heritage also includes a worldview and cultural expectations which had had to adapt to higher infant mortality, attenuated longevity, and low levels of discretionary income (see Harris [1974a, 1974b, 1977, and 1999] for examples of complex adaptations to environmental exigencies).

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As an example of this cultural diffusion, emigrants from the Moslem swathe tend to flow from high fertility, lower income areas to low fertility, higher income areas, i.e. Western Europe. In the context of this article, emigrants from the Moslem swathe would be expected to gravitate toward (Western) European nations. When they enter and settle into their new homeland, they, of course, bring with them the world-views, expectations, and traditions which had successfully lead to their own socialization. This cultural package includes an anticipation of relatively high fertility. For example, Turkish immigrants into Austria average 4.43 children per woman. This figure is more than twice the figure for Austrian nationals (1.64 children per woman). Moroccan immigrants into Belgium average 5.7 children, and Turkish women average 5.0 children. Both of these averages are more than three times the mean number of children per Belgium nationals (1.6). Pakistan immigrants into Great Britain average 5.3 children per woman. This figure is more than triple the figure for Great Britain's average of 1.7. French nationals average 1.82 children per woman which is less than half of Immigrants from Algeria (4.24), Morocco (4.47), Tunisia (4.67), and Turkey (4.55). German woman average about 1.3 children each whereas Turkish immigrants average more than twice that number (2.9 children), Dutch, women average 1.6 children, but Turkish women who emigrate to the Netherlands average 3.1 children and Moroccan emigrants average 4.7 children. Finally, Swedish woman average 2.1 children, but Turkish emigrants average 3.45 children (Coleman 1994). See White (1997) and see Morris (1997) for discussion. Thus, each of the two demographic profiles (Europe and the Moslem swathe), is not isolated from the other, but does illustrate a dynamic wherein cultural mosaics with higher fertility will displace or replace cultural mosaics with lower fertility. The dynamic of the cultural inertia of Islam versus the speed of cultural assimilation into Western European life-styles should be interesting to track over generations.

These new areas for the immigrants tend to be places where the women have more opportunities, but fewer children. These areas are then increasingly populated by scions whose mothers survived in cultures which limited their own options, but encouraged their fecundity. Despite the inculcations and expectations of their new surroundings, such progeny would be affected by the inertia of their own bio-cultural heritage. As their descendants slowly adapt – over generations – to the new worldview of higher educational vistas with gender equality, their birthrates plummet (see Wattenberg [1987] for

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examples). Because the land will not remain empty, their distant cousins, as emigrants, will dis-embark on the same land and bring with them their worldview of gender asymmetry, low educational expectations, and higher fertility. Both instant assimilation and zero cultural inertia seem unlikely phenomena. And reminiscent of the chore of Sisyphus, the boulder – societal improvement – will be difficult to push up to and over the summit.

The behavioral scientist and Sisyphus

A sub-set of the more molar cultural dynamics is the micro-world of academia and its interaction with the over-all society which surrounds it and in which the behavioral scientists are immersed (see Kuhn [1973] for elaboration and examples). It is suggested here that the training/career of behavioral scientists inhibits complete analyzes of third world countries and thereby makes solutions to some problems less likely to occur. Three points seem relevant and will be explored: (a) cultural relativity, (b) objectivity, and (c) career moves.

- *Cultural relativity* The nineteenth century was a time of intense colonial imperialism. European/U.S. economic & military & political interests generally had greater priority than did humanitarian interests, both internally and externally. The impact of greater economic & political & military power was not always beneficial to the masses of people who encountered them. The masses certainly did not unabashedly welcome the intrusions. Welcomed or not, the more technologically efficient powers generally overwhelmed the less technologically efficient. The victors tended to generalize from their superior technological efficiency to their entire cultural mosaic. The "manifest destiny" concept in the U.S. is a good example.

A reaction in academia to the over-generalization was the Anthropological concept of "cultural relativity" and its cross-cousin "ethnocentrism" (see Harris [1979] for an extended discussion on the relationship between 19th century imperialism and 20th century anthropology). The idea of "cultural relativity" was that behaviors & beliefs of separate and distinct cultures were to be evaluated only by the individual culture's own worldview – such a procedure was deemed "appropriate" by most academic mentors. An evaluation of a culture to which a person was not a native by that person through his/her own worldview was "ethnocentric" – such a procedure tended to be deemed "inappropriate" by most academic mentors. The stage was thereby set for behavioral scientists to refrain from reporting certain tendencies in Non-European/non-U.S.

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cultures. Accordingly, high infant mortality, gender inequality, low access to resources and shortened life spans were de-emphasized in tribal/village ethnographies. The logic for the Western behavioral scientist was thus: (1) my culture has taught me that dead babies, gender inequality, low access to resources, and a short life are to be prevented; (2) the culture I am now studying has many dead babies, much gender inequality, virtually no resources, and a life expectancy about two-thirds of my own culture; (3) if my published work focuses on these conditions, then I may be read as focusing upon "deficiencies" and, *de facto.* I am guilty of being "ethnocentric" and not being sensitive to the natives' own world through their own cultural filters [as my training dictates that I should]; (4) Ergo, nothing is to be gained by referring to these items, and nothing is lost by omitting them. (See Van den Berghe [1990] for a parallel discussion on sociologists and [Darwinian] evolution).

Because the training of many, if not most, behavioral scientists has this commonality, then such omissions systematically occur without criticism.

- *Objectivity* Again, the training of behavioral scientists is not random. For the most part, an impetus of developing scholarship has been to minimize "moral judgments". Such minimizing is probably easier to accomplish with electrons, nebulae, polymers, and wheat hybrids than with "people". Because most citizens in any society are not certified behavioral scientists, they have no compunction at all in labeling other people's behavior as immoral, evil, tacky, impolite, stupid, selfish, weird, mean-spirited, etc., etc. A problem then emerges for the certified behavioral scientist who wishes to be read and appreciated by more people than the editor of the publication. His/her objective count of dead babies or under-educated women or dying fifty year olds who will leave behind no material legacy, however welt presented, might well be construed by a readership to represent a perfectly dreadful society filled with immoral, evil, tacky, impolite, stupid, selfish, weird, mean-spirited natives (cf. Turnbull [1972] and his account of the Ik). To avoid this potential conflation, the items are either not reported at all, or, if reported, are done so with a "case" study wherein the described misfortunes are highly specific to a sympathetic individual, but are not extrapolated as a typical cultural pattern. Thus, the result is a systematic self-censorship of items which could be mis-interpreted as reflecting poorly on the society being described.

- *Career moves* Few behavioral scientists are independently wealthy with a charismatic personality which guarantees instant

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leadership. Hence, the climb through graduate schools, academic appointments, and academic advancement must be predicated on the acolyte successfully "reading" mentors, Chairs, and committees.

There is little to be gained by challenging the premises and assumptions of those holding the keys to one's future. There is much to be gained by accepting those premises and assumptions and building upon them (mentioning that you are standing on the shoulders of giants probably is a useful lactic). If predecessors have achieved fame & fortune with their paradigm, it would seem folly for the neophyte to challenge that fruitful paradigm.

Synopsis

In sum, cultural evolution is occurring now, as it has occurred in the past, and as it will occur in the future. This article argues that the inertia of this evolution must be with those societies whose women give birth to more children. This demographic of "more children" is not evenly or randomly dispersed around the world. There is a strong and negative relationship between restricting women's roles to motherhood and fecundity: More restriction yields higher fecundity. Restriction of the female role is also aligned, across cultures, with higher infant mortality, lower per capita income, and attenuated life expectancy. This cultural mosaic is simply more prolific than an alternative cultural mosaic of (i) gender equality, (ii) high per capita income, (iii) low infant mortality, and (iv) expanded life expectancy.

Thus, a cultural dynamic – a feminist paradox – has evolved wherein an increased scope of women's choice in one generation reverberates in a decreased scope of women's choices in subsequent generations. That is, women with low fertility and a broad range of options must be systematically replaced with women of higher fertility and a narrower range of options. And this reduced range of choices is the milieu in which the daughters (as well as the sons) are raised. That is, fertility levels *above* replacement value will systematically displace or replace fertility levels *below* replacement value. The only variable to this constant is time: time which is measured in generations rather than days or years. The three keys to the dynamic are (i) women, when exercising life-style choices which are wider than the mother role, will often choose a life-style which eventuates in two or fewer children per women, (ii) regardless of the life-style any individual leads, the individual will eventually die, and (iii) children are heavily influenced by their parents as they – the children – are socialized to independence. Women with

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more children will simply have greater influence on the next generation than women with fewer children. Given these three keys, it must be the case that – across generations – those cultural traditions which strive for gender equality or equity are under systematic pressure to be supplanted by those cultural traditions which wedge women into a worldview that strongly emphasizes the mother role at the expense of alternative roles. To date, no socio-cultural formula has been instituted, or at least found, which results both in equal opportunity by gender and population replacement value or higher.

The questions can then be asked: "How did this paradox originate?" Or phrased differently: "How do individual choices of women, made one at a time, systematically threaten to evaporate the women's community?" Finally: "How does the community respond to the harbinger of its own evaporation?" A comprehensive answer to these questions is beyond, well beyond, the scope and acumen of this article. However, a partial answer to these questions involves the dual notions of "choice" and "independence" and would probably begin by looking at our ancestors who lived a very, very long time ago and who probably had neither.

Finally, it is further argued that Western behavioral scientists, because of training, peer expectations, professional advancement, and chariness of a readership are very reluctant to publish reports which analyze *consequences* of a rather simple notion:

Women with more children will have more descendants than will women with fewer children.

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Brunetto Chiarelli



An Italian professor of zoology and genetics traces primate and human evolution, and identifies the living varieties of man: Caucasoids, Mongoloids, Australoids, Congoids and Capoids and their various components. He explains evolutionary differentiation and expresses the need for a new global bioethic in light of the present ongoing demographic explosion in Africa, Asia and the Central and South Americas.

Man Between Past and Future

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Book Review

Our Posthuman Future:
Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution
Francis Fukuyama
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2002, 256 pages, $25.

Redesigning Humans: Our Inevitable Genetic Future
Gregory Stock
Houghton Mifflin, New York, 2002, 277 pages, $24.

Readers have a right to know a book reviewer's philosophical position, so let me be frank from the outset. I have just finished a manuscript entitled *The Case for Cloning*, in which I support a rebirth of the eugenics movement.

By contrast, Fukuyama in *Our Posthuman Future* makes his own case for an outright ban on reproductive cloning and argues that genetic enhancement should not be used to make children healthier or more intelligent: "The idea that states should legitimately worry about collective goods like the health of their national gene pools is no longer taken seriously but rather associated with outdated racist and elitist attitudes," he writes. For him contemporary biotechnology poses a "significant threat," and he wants to put the entire field under international political control. That means "liberal democracy [which] has emerged as the only viable and legitimate political system." He ignores the fact that most people in the world do not live under such a system.

It should be noted right off that Fukuyama's title was selected for its cachet, and not for its relevance to the content of the book. Evidently the editors felt that a title like "Modern Demographic Trends," which would be far more appropriate, was not likely to catch the collective cyclopic eye of the reading audience.

Contrary to the accepted truism that the time of da Vincis and Lomonosovs has passed and that we should all stick to our respective intellectual cubbyholes, there is a true need for an overview of our place in the universe, and Fukuyama displays an admirable eclecticism. He is actually a professor of political economics, and thus – as is true for the majority of thinkers groping for a handle on humanity's genetic future – his training is distant from genetics and demography. Things have to be that way for the time being since demographers have been frightened off

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by political correctness and know better than to engage in anything more daring than quantitative headcounts, while geneticists are keenly aware that society sees them as mechanics whose job is fix the carburetor and not to advise the driver whether he should make a trip to the opera or the grocery store. Fukuyama picks up a lot of threads, sometimes too many, it must be admitted, but he does attempt to sew from them a shirt. When he is not being distracted by marginal topics, he does indeed approach the right topics in dealing with "one of the most momentous periods of technological advance in history." (Both he and Stock like the phrase "cusp of technology" in this context.)

Fukuyama briefly discusses some of the core sources of resistance to scientific thinking: feminism, religion, and "progressive" as represented by writers like Stephen Jay Gould, whose 1981 *Mismeasure of Man* was a blatant hatchet job on studies of biological causality, and Leon Kamin, who has argued that "there exist no data which whould lead a prudent man to accept the hypotheses that IQ test scores are in any degree heritable." Fukuyama also points out that the charges of data fabrication leveled against Cyril Burt were themselves fabricated.

On occasion Fukuyama is more than a little off base. For example, he maintains that "the advantages of higher intelligence are relative and not absolute." While the "relative" advantage of intelligent individuals over others is indeed a given, it is incomprehensible that anyone could argue that intelligence is not an absolute advantage in and of itself. Another example of flowed understanding: Fukuyama claims that "intelligence is not the work of a single g factor but is rather a series of closely related abilities." This is precisely the definition of g given by Arthur Jensen. Or Fukuyama maintains that eugenics was suppressed as a result of revelations of abuses by Nazi eugenicists. In point of fact, the eugenics movement was not suppressed until 1968, when the Holocaust memorial movement was launched and eugenics was proclaimed to be the ideology of Holocaust, despite the fact that American and British eugenicists vigorously denounced Hitler's racism and anti-Semitism on the eve of World War II. Still another instance of dubious statements is the claim that "preferences in music are almost entirely shaped by environment." If we accept this logic, we have to believe that, given the right family environment, Bach would have been a devotee of rap music. Still another statement by Fukuyama about which I confess to having mixed feeling is: "The species-specific differences between nonhuman animals on the one hand and human beings on the other make a tremendous amount of difference to our understanding of their moral

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status." Fukuyama warns of the danger of an emerging "genetic overclass." He is wrong: this is not a danger, but a current reality that no one wishes to admit. Fukuyama also promotes the popular misconception that "the Left has historically sought to play down the importance of heredity in favor of social factors." In point of fact, many of the founding fathers of the eugenics movement were socialists.

Fukuyama distinguishes between "human rights" and "human needs and interests," the latter being dismissively referred to as having been determined on a strictly utilitarian basis. This is a fundamentally specious distinction, and one that takes on heavy emotional overtones in addition when Fukuyama begins comparing utilitarian ethics with cannibalism. Basically, when the persons whose interests or desires are being thwarted are present and able to protest, the topic is one of "rights," whereas when the interests of the yet unborn are trampled, the topic is defined as "needs and interests." Fukuyama's attitude toward ethical reciprocity and human rights as based on human nature, which involves species-level altruism, is on the whole quite positive, although his embrace of the position is not without reservations.

Fukuyama searches for a middle road between genetic interventionist and *laissez faire* policies, admitting that John Locke's *tabula rasa* theory now lies in shambles. But while he opposes state eugenics, he is much more favorably inclined to eugenic measures taken by individuals. On a philosophical level he appears to resist pure scientific reasoning. Humanity for him is constituted by a nebulous, undefined "Factor X" which the electronic brain will never achieve. Consciousness, he would have the reader believe, gives the lie to "reductionism materialist science": "We want to protect the full range of our complex, evolved natures against attempts at self-modification. We do not want to disrupt either the unity or the continuity of human nature, and thereby the human rights that are based on it." He then goes on to the topic of abortion, where he "admits to considerable confusion." As for his proposed global ban on reproductive cloning, he argues that the procedure is "unnatural" and creates "a very asymmetrical relationship" between clone and donor, mistakenly – in my view – referring to the donor as "parent."

Ultimately, Fukuyama is indeed confused. He first claims to oppose human genetic engineering, but then wavers.

The book contains neither a subject nor a names index. There are footnotes and a bibliography, but on occasion Fukuyama leaves out data sources which he should have included, as, for example, when he cites

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heritability estimates of homosexuality as ranging between 31 to 74 percent for men and 27 to 76 percent for women.

Gregory Stock in his *Redesigning Humans: Our Inevitable Genetic Future* strongly advocates voluntary eugenics practiced on an individual level, although he abjures the word "eugenics." Instead, he employs the latest code phrases – "germinal choice technology" (GCT) and "enhancement" – and describes such procedures as "freeing" us from state sponsored "coercive" eugenics.

Stock goes through the expected list of genetic interventions in the germ line, including embryo screening, advanced *in vitro* fertilization, embryo implantations, and the replacement or modification of individual genes and/or clusters of genes. For him "the question is no longer whether we will manipulate embryos, but when, where, and how."

Stock is entirely correct in pointing out that parents, presented with the opportunity to improve their children's health and intelligence, will not pass up the opportunity. As proof he cites a 1993 international poll in which 22% of Israelis, 43% of Americans, 63% of Indians, and 83% of Thais said they would do so if given the opportunity.

There is a sarcastic Russian expression to the effect that it is possible to extract teeth, not through the mouth, but by beginning at the other end of the intestinal tract (forgive my euphemistic phraseology), but "Why bother?" Stock's advocacy of such genetic interventions as jettisoning or adding auxiliary chromosome pairs which would serve as "scaffolding" for new genes, natural and artificial, on occasion brings that phrase to mind:

> Imagine that a future father gives his baby daughter chromosome 47, version 2.0, a top-of-the-line model with a dozen therapeutic gene modules. By the time she grows up and has a child of her own, she finds 2.0 downright primitive. Her three-gene anticancer module pales beside the eight-gene cluster of the new version 5.9, which better regulates gene expression, targets additional cancers, and has fewer side effects. The anti-obesity module is pretty much the same in both versions, but 5.9 features a whopping nineteen antivirus modules instead of the four she has and an anti-aging module that can maintain juvenile hormone levels for an extra decade and retain immune function longer too. The daughter may be too sensible to opt for some of the more experimental modules for her son, but she cannot imagine giving him her antique chromosome and forcing him to take the drugs she uses to compensate for its shortcomings. As far as reverting to the pre-therapy, natural state of 23 chromosome pairs, well, only Luddites would do that to their kids.

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In all fairness to Stock, the above is written somewhat tongue-in-cheek, but still the basic question remains: Why bother? Certainly germline enhancement is coming down the pike, and in as much as this is a book written precisely on that topic, Stock is right in discussing the various technologies which may be possible in the future, but his rejection of traditional positive and negative eugenic methodology, which have proven their efficacy in other species, appears to be inspired chiefly by fear of the environmentalist-egalitarian thought police, Stock's representations to the contrary notwithstanding. He even goes so far as to defend the right of deaf parents to test early-stage fetuses and abort those who are not deaf: "No one could argue that they were injuring a healthy child." So why not blindness? Or any number of genetic illnesses?

Like Fukuyama, Stock is correct in pointing out that selective genetic "enhancement" could lead to a still greater breakdown into genetic classes than we already have. Or, with state-sponsored health insurance, tighten up the distribution curves, creating for a society of greater, not lesser equality. (Stock seems a little confused here, speaking instead of a "flattening of the distribution of individual endowments.")

And he is unquestionably right concerning the inevitability of GCT:

> We add or remove hair, straighten our teeth, fix our noses, enhance or reduce our breasts, get rid of fat. We use drugs to reduce pain, lose weight, change moods, stay awake. The idea that we will long forgo better and more powerful ways of modifying ourselves is a denial of what the past tells us about who we are.

Furthermore, once any major state (China comes first to mind) introduces such a policy, other countries will be left with the choice of doing the same or becoming the vassals of the children of the state.

Like Fukuyama, Stock discusses highly targeted pharmaceuticals working in parallel with genetic enhancement. And like Fukuyama, he does get sucked into what might be called the "kitchen sink" fallacy, trying to pick up too many threads at once.

Lastly, the discussion of animal breeding is entirely correct. We have bred animals for special abilities, not for overall general ability. There is a distinct danger of a misguided society pursuing precisely that route with regard to humankind.

Like Fukuyama's, Stock's footnote system is frustratingly incomplete. Rather than providing specific sources to facts cited, he provides general notes by page order.

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In summation both books are testimony as to the resurfacing of eugenics under the cover of voluntarism and individual freedom of choice. Both are basically popularizations and do not break new intellectual ground, but they are nevertheless serious, multi-disciplinary works, and they can be recommended for the lay audience.

John Glad

The American Dream:
Can It Survive the 21st Century?
Joseph L. Daleiden
Prometheus Books, 1999, Amherst, New York 738 pages, Hardcover

Can "The American Dream" survive the 21st Century? Based upon the author's findings, the answer is "no". And if the U.S. government continues current policies, which are economically myopic, socially dysfunctional, and politically centrifugal, not only "The American Dream" but America, itself, will not survive. These destructive policies, as the author explains, are the result of successful lobbying by two "powers" that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s. They are: (a) special interest groups advancing agendas based on race, ethnicity, religion, language, culture, age, sex, sexual orientation, handicap status, and academic and business "needs", and (b) the ideological fixations of liberals and conservatives.

These "powers" were able to exert such influence because "The American Dream" lost its original meaning. The dream expressed by Thomas Jefferson in the American Declaration of Independence to "establish a nation on the principle that all men had the 'right to Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness' " has been replaced over the years by a multitude of different, at times, conflicting definitions. If "The American Dream" can denote everything, it means nothing. Absent a common bond, the unraveling of society is all but inevitable. This slow unraveling became a rapid deconstruction after radicals from the 1960s assumed leadership roles in the academic, economic, and political fields. Since then, "The American Dream" has been redefined to mean the superiority of the individual over society, of rights over responsibilities, of materialism over morality, of consumption over savings, and of the present over the future.

Can this self-destruction be reversed? The author – who has worked

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as a statistician, demographer, business economist, urban policy analyst, and strategic planner in the public and private sectors – argues it can be provided the public recognizes the solution is complex, multifaceted, and requires immediate implementation. To highlight this importance, Chapter One is entitled "Two Scenarios for the Year 2050". Here, depending on whether or not the necessary reforms have been instituted, two radically different Americas are presented in the State of the Union address given in 2050 by the President of the United States to Congress. Without necessary reforms, the United States has politically disintegrated, like the old Soviet Union, with seven Southwestern States seceding and forming an independent "Hispanic" country. The rump United States has declined to the level of a Third World country due to overpopulation – already at 500 million and projected to reach a billion in fifty years – and its corollaries: environmental destruction and rampant crime. The second scenario, after the necessary reforms have been adopted, depicts a United States that has remained united politically and culturally, is economically and academically sound, and is enjoying an improved standard of living that is, most importantly, sustainable into the future.

In the next twelve chapters, the author examines the serious problems confronting the United States – population growth, immigration, environment, deficit, trade, poverty, welfare, education, crime, health care, and taxation. Various solutions are presented balancing those advanced by liberals with those proposed by conservatives. After offering a critique on their respective strengths and weaknesses, the author submits his own recommendations.

The author advocates, first and foremost, a liberation from the mental straitjacket of the political ideologies of liberalism and conservatism as they currently exist. As a matter of faith, liberals believe in egalitarianism and conservatives in meritocracy. To prove the truth of their respective "faiths", the former seek bigger government and more regulations, while the latter seek less government and fewer regulations. Commitment to these secular "faiths" insures that specific government programs are continued even when empirical evidence shows they do not work.

Therefore, the author calls for solutions based on pragmatism. This pragmatism would promote what he calls "the three harmonies" and a modified theory of Rawlsian justice.

The three harmonies are:

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1. "Individuals must, to some extent, have the opportunity to fulfill their basic biological needs to be in harmony with their genetic nature.
2. Fulfillment of the needs of individuals must be reconciled to the needs of others, i.e., to a reasonable extent, individual needs must be brought into harmony with societal needs.
3. The aggregate needs of society must be fulfilled in a manner that is in harmony with the environment, i.e., aggregate consumption cannot exceed the carrying capacity of the environment."

They are complemented by a modified theory of Rawlsian justice that reads: "All social primary goods (liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the basis of self-respect) are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all these goods is to the greater (relative) advantage to the least favored."

One of the first important points raised by the author is how the metamorphosis of "The American Dream" into the pursuit of materialism has not, contrary to advertisers' assertions, produced happiness. "A 1995 study showed that most Americans felt poorer than they did thirty years before when real incomes were almost 30 percent lower than the 1995 levels."

Next he addresses the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). While the rising GDP of the United States is frequently cited by the government, economists, and the media as proof of the country's economic well being, the author points out that since the GDP is an average it presents a false image of prosperity.

The author presents data the GDP ignores. For example, from 1966 to 1970, the lowest quintile of American families saw their income increase by 22 percent. However, from 1980 to 1997, that income dropped by one percent. Meanwhile, the top quintile saw their income grow 29 percent from 1966 to 1979 and a further 34 percent from 1979 to 1997. It appears "99 percent of all the economic gain between 1979 and 1994 went to the upper 5 percent of income earners."

In 1980, CEOs made 42 times what factory workers received. By 1994, CEOs made 53 times the average factory worker's pay, and among the largest U.S. companies it was 225 times greater.

This occurred while the hourly earnings adjusted for inflation, which had risen 50 percent from 1950 to 1970, from $5.34 an hour to $8.03, dropped by six percent, to $7.54, from 1970 to 1997.

At the same time, weekly earning, which had increased 48 percent

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from 1950 to 1970, dropped 21 percent by 1997 to 1973 levels.

During the 1950s and 1960s, family income grew on average by 3 to 4 percent. After 1973, it grew by less than 1 percent.

Real per capita disposable income adjusted for inflation actually rose 59 percent from 1950 to 1970 and 62 percent from 1970 to 1997. This was due in large part to more hours worked and the necessity of having a two-income family.

The result has been a growing gap not only between rich and poor, but between the rich and the middle class as well. The emotional impact of such growing economic inequalities are reflected in the Louis Harris poll used to calculate an Alienation Index. This index jumped from 29 in 1969 to 65 in 1993.

Alienation based on the perception among the middle class – the corner stone of a stable and prosperous democratic society – that their economic position is deteriorating, and among native-born poor, especially poor blacks, that they are economically worse off today than they were years ago are recipes for potential political instability.

The author explains how the economic, social, and political problems confronting the United States are the result of overpopulation. And this overpopulation is driven by Third World immigration. The combined number of legal and illegal aliens entering the United States annually is now approximately 1.5 million – the highest level in the history of the United States.

Immigrants and their descendents accounted for two-thirds of the U.S. population growth during the 1990s. They are projected to be responsible for virtually all of the population growth in the United States hereafter. The Census Bureau now projects that the U.S. population will increase from 269 million to 400 million by 2050. However, Census Bureau projections are notorious for underestimating U.S. population growth. If immigration, legal and illegal, is higher than anticipated the U.S. population could reach 500 million by 2050. And by 2080, it could exceed 800 million.

What are some of the consequence of such population growth?

Currently, "one percent increase in the immigrant composition of one's occupation reduces wages at least 0.7 percent".

If the U.S. population increases by 40 percent, another 100 million, the per capita income may be reduced by an equal amount.

By 2050, U.S. arable land will be reduced by nearly 40 percent from 470 million acres to 290 million acres due to population-generated development. The United States, historically a food exporter, will

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become a net food importer. The standard of living will fall towards a Third World status.

There are more immediate problems according to the authors. By admitting Third World immigrants, the US government is importing poverty, illiteracy, infectious diseases, and crime.

Third World immigration is also responsible for higher unemployment among blacks, lower wages for the poor, and increased costs for welfare, SSI, and public education, and increased environmental degradation.

In support of his thesis that Third World Immigration has had an adverse impact on employment, social services, and crime in the U.S., the author presents the following evidence:

- Immigration cost U.S. workers $133 billion a year due to depressed wages.
- From 1974 to 1996, minimum wage dropped 34 percent in constant dollars.
- More than 2 million U.S. workers were displaced in 1992 alone.
- Third World immigrants are beneficiaries of affirmative action programs originally meant for black Americans allowing Third World immigrant-owned businesses to discriminate against blacks with impunity.
- Net cost of immigration to U.S. taxpayers since 1970 reached $65 billion annually by 1996 and is projected to jump to $866 billion for the period 1997 to 2006.
- Immigrants are a net cost to Social Security of about $1,000 per person annually.
- Immigrants who arrived before 1988 were 56 percent more likely than native born Americans to be living in poverty and 25 percent more likely to receive public aid and have an average per capita income from public assistance of 14 percent more than native born.
- In 1995, the General Accounting Office, GAO, reported immigrants are now twice as likely to receive public assistance as the general population.
- By 1990, the cost of bilingual education was $7.5 billion – one thousand times the original 1968 estimate.

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- Incarceration rate of illegal aliens is three times the U.S. average.
- In 1994, 25 percent of inmates in federal prisons were aliens.
- Since 1980, there has been a 600 percent increase in alien inmates.
- In Los Angeles, alone, there are an estimated 600 ethnic gangs with over 100,000 members.

In the last chapter, "Putting It All Together", the author lists specific proposals to save "The American Dream". Many recommendations are highly controversial, constitutionally or morally, but all need to be given a fair hearing. These include the elimination of Political Action Committees (PACs) and limitations on campaign spending, Term limits, and the enactment of a national referendum system.

After identifying the necessary political reforms, he offers proposals for socioeconomic reform, including:

1. Abolish GDP as the principle measurement of social welfare.
2. Reduce population growth by a moratorium on immigration. Eliminate all benefits to *illegal* aliens except for emergency medical treatment. Establish an employment eligibility verification system. Eliminate automatic citizenship for children of illegal aliens. Deny federal and state funding to municipalities that refuse to cooperate with the INS. Strengthen border control using the armed forces if necessary. Sharply delimit who qualifies as a political refugee. Return refugees to home country after end of hostilities. End multiculturalism. Expand family planning services, including subsidizing abortions for unwanted children. Emphasize the moral responsibility of avoiding children one cannot support in sex education.
3. Introduce incentives to promote savings into the tax law.
4. Revise the defense budget (which he regards as inflated).
5. Reduce national debt by significantly raising taxes on gasoline, tobacco, alcohol, and decriminalized drugs, and on mortgages over $200,000.
6. Slow any further tariff reductions.
7. Establish a national database of available jobs, relocation allowances, and job retraining, and a public works program for those unemployed for reasons other than performance.

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Receipt of welfare must be tied to incentives to avoid additional children. Discourage reproduction among the socially irresponsible. In some cases, recourse to abortion and sterilization must be addressed.

8. Return control of the classroom to the teachers and control of the schools to the principals. Expel incorrigible students and terminate ineffective teachers. Require standardized tests. Increase the school year from 180 to 220 days. End affirmative action. Expand vocational training and apprenticeships.
9. Institute a universal health care based on a two-tier system consisting of a basic healthcare insurance supplemented by allowing people to either take out additional coverage or receive treatment on a pay-for-service basis. Permit voluntary euthanasia.
10. To insure accuracy and prevent Social Security surpluses from being used to finance other federal programs, the Social Security Trust Fund should be separate from the rest of the budget.
11. Decriminalize drugs so as to reduce the price to such low levels that drug pushers disappear. At the same time establish an extensive drug education program.
12. Abolish corporate tax and index capital gains for inflation. A value-added or consumption tax should be instituted together with a graduated income tax ranging from 10 percent for families above the poverty line to 75 percent for the nation's wealthiest.

Since many of these various issues are interconnected, the author stresses implementing some, but not all, of his proposals – i.e., ending welfare but continuing immigration – will not achieve the necessary reforms. Partial measures, "compromises" in the vocabulary of politicians, will only result in the proverbial rearranging of the deck chairs on the Titanic.

The author's proposals are drastic, but they summarize the opinions of many who have advocated fundamental reform in the U.S. and the book makes stimulating, controversial reading.

Joseph E. Fallon

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Joseph E. Fallon

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ISBN 0-930690-56-7. Softback

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

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